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The research described investigates why subjects frequently give 
logically wrong answers to problens requiring deductive reasoning. In 
Experiaent 1 a pattern of erroneous responses to Nason's selection task 
which has coowonly been attributed to verification bias is shown to be due 
to a fora of aatching bias (higher-^rder aatching) iNiich takes account of 
negation. This forn of aatching is shown to be associated with binary 
problea content.
In Experiments 2 and 3 it is shown that responses are sometimes made 
on the basis of salient problem features when a logical task is of only 
moderate difficulty. This suggests that, contrary to a widely held view, 
aatching nay not be a fall>back strategy in response to logical 
difficulty.
Experiaent 4 demonstrates that comprehension nay be based on 
pra^Mtic features of sentences, rather than their graimutical structure. 
It is argued that subjects night comprehend the selection task in this 
way, and be unaware of its logical structure and difficulty. Independent 
evidence using conditional reasoning problems is described in support of 
this conclusion.
In Experiment 3 subjects frequently formulate a potentially 
conditional truth-function in a conjunctive fora to which higher-order 
matching yields correct responses. The reason for previous experimenters' 
failure to observe facilitation with conjunctive formulations of the 
selection task is demonstrated in Experiments 6, 7 and 6.
It is argued that errors on the THOG problea are due to a fora of 
matching bias. In Experiment 9 some facilitation is observed on a 
plausible version of the THOG problem, possibly because the disjunctive 
rule was not stated. In Experiment 10 conjunctive formulation is also 
shown to considerably improve performance. It is argued that conjunctive 
formulation cues a more complete representation of the premises and an 
effective solution strategy of a kind which has not previously been 
suggested.

CHAPTER 1 
INTROOUCTICM
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the areas of theoretical 
debate which have a bearing on the research to be reported. These will 
include general theories of reasoning and narrower hj^potheaes concerning 
the deterainanta of perforaance on specific probleas. The relation 
between theory and research will be discussed» as will the relation 
between soae general theories and soaw particular hypotheses. A further 
aim is to describe empirical findings which have lead researchers to 
accept or reject various hypotheses and to discuss alternative 
interpretations of the experimental data.
Two theories of reasoning, and their role in the present research
The research to be reported in this thesis is concerned with certain 
aspects of comprehension and reasoning. The principal focus is on 
linguistic comprehension and deductive reasoning. In this section of 
Chapter 1 two theories of reasoning will be briefly outlined in order to 
introduce some of the concepts which will be used later in describing my 
own research. In addition, a broad comparison of these two theories will 
serve to indicate the nature of current theoretical positions with regard 
to research in this area. At this stage it is not intended to offer any 
empirical evidence for the correctness or otherwise of the theories, but 
simply to present a broad outline of what they suggest. Later in this 
section the relevance of theory to research will be discussed. It will be 
concluded that commitment to any particular theory, or to its 
falsification, is often a less than optimal position to adopt in 
undertaking psychological research in many areas, including the present 
one.
CoMprehenaion and reasoning can be taken to consist of both 
relatively slow, conscious processes and rapid, unconscious (and therefore 
noo-introspectible) processes, for exsaple, one aight set oneself to read 
a written passage and be aware that one was gaining an understanding of 
what the passage meant. This would be an exanple of a relatively slow 
process of which one is consciously aware. As a component of this 
processing one would also be arriving at a particJbr interpretation of any 
potentially aabiguous word in the passage. This would tend to be done 
rapidly and without conscious awareness, so one would not be aware of 
having considered alternative meanings of such words. This can be 
illustrated by the use of 'garden path sentences' such as 'The old nan's 
glasses were filled with sherry'. One is not aware of having chosen one 
of two interpretations of the word 'glasses' (as meaning 'spectacles') 
until the more plausible interpretation of 'drinking vessels' is suggested 
by the way in which the sentence is completed. An implicit inference has 
been node, quickly, automatically and unconsciously, regarding the meaning 
of the word 'glasses'. Such inferences are frequently invalid (if 
evaluated by the criteria appropriate to formal logic), but their 
conclusions are subject to correction on the basis of further information.
Here is a possible source of error in performance on verbally 
presented problems which require reasoning. Subjects may be making the 
wrong implicit inferences during the comprehension process. Subsequently 
they might go on to reason by making deliberate, explicit and valid 
inferences so as to reach a conclusion which is entailed by the premises 
as comprehended, although that conclusion aight contradict the premises as 
they were intended to be understood.
Making implicit inferences during comprehension is an unconscious 
component of the process of understanding what propositions are expressed 
by the sentences used to communicate the premises of a problem. Until
fairly recently there was considerable general agreement regarding the 
nature of the processing which follows the formation of this initial 
propositional representation. Piaget and others (eg; Inhelder and 
Piaget,1958; Beth and Piaget, 1966} have argued that by the formal 
operational stage of development a child will have acquired the competence 
to reason in accordance with the valid inference rules of the 
propositional calculus of formal logic. The task of reasoning would then 
amount to selecting the appropriate inference rule suggested by the 
syntactical form of the premises, and applying it so as to reach a 
deductively entailed conclusion.
Since an educated adult is supposed to have competence in reasoning 
which is equivalent to mastery of the complete set of valid inference 
rules, the only possible source of error in reasoning would be the use of 
an inappropriate rule. Since the selection of an appropriate rule depends 
on the perceived syntactic form of the premises, an incorrect selection 
might be the result of faulty comprehension of the premises, possibly as a 
result of the salience of pragmatic or contextual features t^ich may 
distract attention from syntactic ones. Hence implicit inferences 
concerning the meaning of syntactically important words may lead to an 
understanding of the syntactic form of a sentence which differs from that 
intended. For example, a premise of the form 'If p, then q' could be 
erroneously comprehended as 'p, if and only if q', particularly in 
contexts where this would be a very plausible interpretation. Were such 
an interpretation correct, it would be possible to reason validly from the 
truth of q to the truth of p. However, reasoning in this way about 'If p, 
then q' is invalid.
If it could be shown experimentally that errors sometimes occur in 
the computational processes involved in reasoning, rather than in 
comprehension of the task, this would suggest that subjects had acquired a
defective set of inference rules. Since rationality night be said to be 
inconsistent with having a defective set of rules, the existence of such 
errors would suggest that hunan beings are irrational.
On certain types of syllogistic reasoning tasks, and on Wason's 
selection task (to be described later), erroneous responses are extremely 
coMon. Hence, if the Piagetian view that most adults have the competence 
to reason according to logically valid inference rules is correct, and if 
(contrary to the Piagetian view) such errors are not attributable to other 
aspects of cognitive processing, then one night reject the Piagetian 
premise above and conclude that humans do not have the logical competence 
that Piaget attributes to us. However, such a conclusion would be a 
product of human reasoning, and it may therefore have been reached by 
logically invalid reasoning. Hence there is no logical justification for 
accepting this self-defeating conclusion. Piagetian theorists are 
consequently constrained to reject the second premise: thst errors are 
sonetines due to faulty reasoning. They are able to do this consistently 
only by constructing their theory in such a way that nothing will count as 
faulty reasoning. Hence Piagetian theorists, and others who advance 
theories of competence rather than of performance, are insulated from 
empirical evidence which could lead to rejection of their theories.
If one is committed to the view that deductive reasoning is 
essentially the application of the valid inference rules of propositional 
logic, then there are only two positions which can be taken: either humans 
are rational and never make errors in reasoning, or humans are irrational 
and do luke errors in reasoning. Since it would be self-defeating to 
attempt to argue for the second of these alternatives, commitment to the 
Piagetian view of reasoning is tantamount to coamitment to the view that 
intellinent, educated adults are rational and never make errors in 
reasoning. Hence Henle (1978), in accepting the Piagetian view, had
little alternative but to interpret subjects' logically unacceptable 
conclusions in a way which led her to assert: "I have never found errors 
which could unaabiguously be attributed to faulty reasoning".
It has been noted above that an appreciation of syntactic structure 
is necessary in order to apply logical rules of inference. Greene (1970) 
has argued that it ia iapossible to study syntactic aspects of language in 
isolation, since the only purpose of syntax is to convey "aesning". She 
showed that the difficulty (Measured by response latency) of 
ssne/different Judgements concerning pairs of sentences depends on whether 
they differ in meaning rather than on their syntactic forms.
Formal aspects of reasoning behaviour depend on prior appreciation of 
syntactic features of the premises on which the reasoning is based. If it 
is impossible to study syntactic aspects of language behaviour in 
isolation, it is also impossible to study in isolation aspects of 
reasoning which depend on the syntactic features of the relevant premises. 
The Piagetisn view is that reasoning behaviour can be described entirely 
in formal terms, and that such a description corresponds to the inference 
rules of formal logic. This appears to be an empirical claim) but if it 
is impossible to study these formal aspects in isolation, the claim cannot 
be tested empirically. To continue the analogy with Greene's (1970) 
remark about language it could be added that the purpose of logic is to 
preserve truth; and the truth of a statement depends on what it means. A 
theory of reasoning is therefore required which takes into account the 
semantic and pragmatic aspects of reasoning behaviour.
A possible reason for reluctance to abandon the Piagetian view is 
that until recently no positive alternative was available to challenge it. 
The situation changed when JohnsonM.aird (1983) pointed out the weaknesses 
of the theoretical position outlined above (which he calls the 'doctrine
of Mental logic'} and proposed a detailed alternative theory. 
Johnson^Laird’s theory concurs with the doctrine of mental logic only to 
the extent that the initial coaprehension of premises is taken to consist 
in the formation of a propositional representation of their meaning. 
According to the doctrine of mental logic, the next step is the 
application of an inference rule whose selection depends largely on the 
syntactic structure of the premises. Johnson-iaird denies the existence 
of any logical rules of inference in the minds of those untrained in 
formal logic, and argues that reasoning is normally carried out in a way 
«^ich depends on the semantic properties of the premises. The meaning of 
the premises suggests an appropriate recursive procedure which is applied 
to either the propositional representation of the premises or to a set of 
mental models based on the propositional representation. This set of 
mental models represents the alternative possible states of affairs which 
could obtain on the assumption that the premises are true. Thereafter, 
reasoning consists in executing the recursive procedure of searching for 
an appropriate single proposition which is true of any mental model in the 
set. Candidate propositions are tested against the set of mental models 
in order to detect any contradiction. Any proposition which passes this 
test will necessarily be one which is implied by the original premises, 
and it will have been inferred without recourse to any formal rule of 
inference.
An alternative recursive procedure is sometimes applied to the 
propositional representation itself, according to Johnson-Laird. This 
involves the replacement of propositions by their truth-values, for 
exanple, given premises of the form 'p or q' and 'not-p', the second 
premise indicates that the proposition p is false. The value 'false' may 
therefore be substituted for the proposition p in the first premise, which 
yields 'false or q'. The presence of the connective 'or' indicates that 
at least one of the propositions which it connects must be true. Hence it
can be concluded that q is true.
Whether reasoning is carried out in this 'truth-functional' way or by 
means of the construction of mental models appears to depend on the degree 
of familiarity and concreteness of the content of the premises. Highly 
unfamiliar or symbolic content may not offer the richness of meaning 
required for the construction of mental models. Oohnson-Laird (1983) 
suggests, however, that in most circumstances people tend to use mental 
models rather than truth-functional reasoning.
Johnson-Laird's theory of mental models is essentially a theory of 
valid reasoning, although it allows for novel explanations of reasoning 
errors. For example, in the case of syllogistic reasoning many errors are 
attributed to the greater difficulty of those figures tWiich require more 
mental models to be considered. Neither of the theories so far described 
can have much explanatory value in cases where subjects appear not to 
respond on the basis of the logical features of a problem, and evidence 
will be presented later tW^ ich suggests that incorrect responses to 
reasoning problems frequently have such an origin.
When responses are made on the basis of non-logical features of a 
problem, interpretation of such behaviour in the light of either theory 
may be unhelpful, or even misleading. These theories suggest certain ways 
of interpreting erroneous responsesi for example, both theories suggest 
that it is important to decide whether subjects are forming adequate 
propositional representations of the premises. However, neither theory 
gives an account of the variables which determine whether a subject will 
reason logically (whatever detailed procedures this involves) or on some 
other basis. The doctrine of mental logic avoids this question by 
suggesting that reasoning is always logical, hence It is always 
appropriate to seek explanations of errors in areas other than the
reasoning process itself. On the other hand, the sental models approach 
allows for the possibility of errors which are due to the cognitive 
overload i^ich may be imposed by the task of constructing and evaluating a 
full set of mental models. Both theories emphasize an approach to the 
explanation of errors in terms of defective performance in executing the 
cognitive processes normally involved.
forming any degree of commitment to either of these theories, or even 
to the task of deciding between them, involves some risk of losing sight 
of the possibility that non^logical processes may be cued by experimental 
stimulus material. To emphasize the formal or semantic aspects of 
reasoning may be to distract attention from its pragmatic aspects, which 
may prove to be equally important. In everyday experience elements of a 
situation may cue us to avoid or postpone deductive reasoning and seek 
further information. This may be achieved by direct observation which 
could confirm or disconfirm something which we could have deduced to be 
true or false. Alternatively such situations could cue us to ask an 
appropriate question, the answer to which would be as informative as 
direct observation. When an experimenter expects responses to be made on 
the basis of deductive reasoning, this expectation can induce a bias 
towards explanation of errors in terms of 'faulty reasoning' or 'faulty 
comprehension* when, in fact, an alternative kind of processing may have 
been cued by the pragmatic features of the stimulus material and executed 
faultlessly.
The bias which may be attendant on theoretical commitment can extend 
to the design of experiments ss well as to the interpretation of results. 
This has been pointed out by Greenwald et al (1986) who give examples of 
research projects in which, they argue, theory has obstructed progress. 
They suggest that this tendency is avoided most effectively by regarding 
research as an attempt to discover under what conditions a given effect
occurs. This approsch asy lead to the identification of iaportant 
independent variables which have not been considered in connection with 
any existing theory. It is an approach which cones closest to 
characterizing the nethod adopted in carrying out and reporting the 
present research. The aain question to be addressed here nay be 
formulated in the way suggested by Greenwald et al (19B6) as{ "Under what 
conditons do educated adults fail to give correct responses to formal 
problems?".
The scope of the research to be reported
The main paradigms used in the present research are Wason's selection 
task and THOG problem. These paradigm ere particularly appropriate to 
the aim of the research, since they tend to elicit a considerable 
proportion of erroneous responses. The nature of such errors can be 
informative regarding the ways in «4^ich features of the tasks give rise to 
the cognitive strategies responsible for these errors.
Wason's selection task
experiments using Wason's (1966) selection task typically begin by 
informing subjects that a pack of cards has been prepared, each of which 
has a letter on one side and a number on the other. Subjects are then 
shown a set of four cards which are said to be taken from that pack and 
show on their uppermost sides, for example, the symbols *6'« 'C, *3* and 
'4'. A written sentence is then shown to subjects, such as "If there is a 
8 on one side of a card, then there is a 3 on the other side".
Subjects are then asked i^ich card or cards they would need to turn 
over in order to decide whether the written sentence is true or false. It 
is emphasized that no card should be turned over unnecessarily.
The correct solution is to select only cards ahich could show the 
conditional sentence to be false« and any such card would need to have a B 
on one side and a n<jiber ahich is not 3 on the other side« since this is 
the only possible counterexaaple to the conditional sentence. Of the four 
cards displayed« only the one with a B uppersost and the one with a 4 
(not-3) upperaost could satisfy this description of the counterexanple« 
therefore they should be selected.
In order to discuss the selection task briefly and in general terns 
it is useful to regard conditional sentences such as "If there is a 6 on 
one side of a card« then there is a 3 on the other side" as consisting of 
the 'If« then' relation plus an antecedent "there is a B on one side of a 
card" and a consequent " there is a 3 on the other side". The antecedent 
is usually synbolized by 'p', and the consequent by 'q'. Hence the whole 
sentence is of the fora 'If p, then q'. The four cards used aay be 
referred to according to whether they instantiate the affiraation of p 
(the p card) or its negation (the not-p card)« '-p'l and the affiraation 
of q (the q card) end its negation (the n o t^ card) *-q'. In soae 
contexts it is also useful to identify the cards, not in teras of t*at 
they affira or negate« but by logical cases. Thus« in this example, the p 
card instantiates the truth of the antecedent 'TA', the not-p card the 
falsity of the »ttecedent 'fA'« the q card the truth of the conaequent 
■TC and the not-p card the falsity of the consequent T C .
Three ways of describing card selections when the conditional sentence ist 
'If there is a B on one side of a card« then there is a 3 on the other 
side'.
Syibol on card 8 C 3 4
Proposition affirmed or denied p -p q ^
Logical case TA FA TC FC
For any conditional of the for« 'If p, then q' the four cards can be 
described in either of the ways shown in the second and third rows of 
Table 1 above.
Although the correct solution to the problea is 'B, 4', the aajority 
of subjects select '8« 3* or 'B' only. Typical selection frequencies, 
taken froa data obtained in four eKperiaents by 3ohnson-Laird and Mason 
(1970), sre shown in Table 2.
Card(s)
Selected t frequency
Piq 4éP 33P .q .- q 7P .-q 4
Others 10
The verification hypothesis
It is clear that sUijects have relatively little difficulty in 
selecting the correct antecedent card 'p', but tend either to fail to 
select a further card or to select the incorrect 'q' card. Other 
frequently observed patterns of selection are 'p, q and not>q' and all 
four cards. An explanation of all these four patterns of selection has 
been suggested according to iM^ich subjects are said to be trying to verify 
the conditional sentence instead of adopting the logically correct 
strategy of trying to falsify it.
The effect of this tendency to verify on sii)ject8' selections is held
to depend partly on their having a defective truth-table for conditionals. 
The idea that subjects may have a defective truth-table arises from the 
observation of subjects’ behaviour i^en they are given 
antecedent-consequent pairs to evaluate in the context of a similar 
conditional sentence. They are asked to classify pairs of cards as true 
of, false of or irrelevant to a conditional sentence. Subjects tend to 
judge the combinations 'FA, T C  and 'FA, F C  to be irrelevant to an 'If, 
...then' conditional, although in formal logic these combinations are 
taken to be true of a conditional relation (Johnson-Laird and Tagart,
1969} Evans, 1973; Evans and Newstesd, 1977). It has also been found that 
Mhen subjects are asked to construct and classify pairs which are true or 
false of a conditional they fail to construct 'FA, T C  and 'FA, F C  pairs 
(Evvts, 1972).
Johnson-Laird and Mason (1970) suggested that the commonly observed 
patterns of card selections are a result of subjects' defective 
truth-tables and their differing levels of insight into the logical 
structure of the problem. Two factors are involved here: whether the 
subject tries to verify or falsify or both, and whether the conditional is 
correctly construed or mistakenly construed as a biconditional of the form 
'p, if and only if q'. Accordingly, the choice of the p card alone is 
said to result from construing the conditional correctly and trying to 
verify it. The suggested reason for the selection of 'p and q' is a 
similar level of insight with the conditional construed as a 
biconditional. Appreciation of the need to falsify a conditional, without 
the appreciation that there is no need to verify also, produces 'p,q,-q' 
choices in the context of a defective truth-table (the 'not-p' card being 
judged to be irrelevant). M>en the sentence is construed as a 
biconditional, complete Insight (resulting in the use of a pure 
falsification strategy) would lead to the selection of all four cards. 
Complete insight with a conditional construal would result in the correct
*p,^' choice even in the context of a defective truth-table, hence the 
defective truth-table ia not itself a source of error, but leads subjects 
to avoid selecting the incorrect 'not-p' card when atteopting to verify 
the conditional sentence, so construed.
If this interpretation of subjects’ behaviour on the selection task 
is correct, it would appear that an error of reasoning is occurring even 
on those occasions t^ ien the conditional has been correctly comprehended.
In particular, the coamon failure to select the 'not-q* card might suggest 
that subjects have an incomplete or defective set of inference rules.
Fro* this observation, as argued above, it is a short step to the 
self-defeating conclusion that humans are irrational. This point has been 
debated extensively in Cohen (1981) and the responses to Cohen's paper 
(published together with it).
From a less theoretically connitted position it can be argued that it 
has been shown only that subjects tend not to use the logically correct 
falsification strategy. However, it does not follow that subjects are 
verifying or using any other kind of logical (if inappropriate) strategy. 
They may be responding on a non-logical basis. This is the contention of 
the matching hypothesis which is becoming widely, although not 
universally, accepted. Later in this chapter reasons will be suggested 
why some researchers have accepted the matching hypothesis without 
abandoning the verification hypothesis.
Matching Bias
Evans (1972) and Evans and Lynch (1973) suggested that subjects' 
selections are determined not by a verification bias but by a matching 
bias. According to this hypothesis p and q are commonly selected because 
subjects match their selections to the symbols named in the conditional
science. In order to coapare the predictive accuracy of this hypothesis 
and the verification hypothesis, negation nay be introduced into the 
conditions! sentence. This nakes possible the four forms of conditional 
shown in Table 3, together with the logical status of the four cards 
concerned.
TABLE 3
Logical status of card 
TA FA TC rC
Form of conditional 
If p, then q p >p q -q
If p, then -q p -p -q q
If -p, then q -p p q -q
If -p, then -q -p p -q q
The verification hypothesis predicts that subjects will tend to 
select TA rather than FA, and TC rather than FC. By contrast, the 
matching hypothesis predicts that subjects will select the cards mentioned 
in the conditional sentence, regardless of whether they are mentioned with 
or without negation. SU)jects will therefore select p rather than >p, and 
q rather than >q.
Hanktelow and Evans (1979), in two experiments, found a significant 
preference for p over -p, and for q over -q{ a result which supports the 
matching hypothesis. Evans (1983a, 1983b) argues that subjects' 
preference for p and q is due to the fact that for linguistic reasons they 
are more likely to perceive as relevant, and therefore to attend to, the 
matching cases. In natural language negations are used to make denials 
rather than assertions, and what is denied is likely to be taken to be the 
relevant topic. Hence the sentences "I went for a walk" and "I did not go 
for a walk" deal with the same topic. Similarly, the sentences "If the 
letter is B, then the number is 3" and "If the letter is not 6, then the
nuaber is not 3" both appear to be about B and 3. The Judgeaent that only 
B and 3 are relevant to the sentence results in attention being paid to 
only those cards on *Hiich these syabols are visible) hence those cards are 
the only candidates for selection. Honfever» this linguistically based 
relevance heuristic nay coabine with a directional heuristic, which is 
also linguistically based, to deteraine how the M f  p, then q ’ wording of 
the conditional sentence is interpreted.
Oirectional Bias
The linguistic origin of directional bias can be understood and 
tested by coaparing two different ways of wording a conditional sentence. 
The 'If p, then q' wording (IT) eaphasizes that p is a sufficient 
condition for q. For exsaple, the sentence ”lf he is a policeman, then he 
is over 3' 9” in height" suggests the inference from 'He is a policeman' 
to 'He is over 5' 9" in height'. This form of inference is known as 
'modus ponens' (HP). In sentences of this form the most relevant 
information on t^ich to base a conclusion is the truth or falsity of the 
antecedent. This is to be contrasted with the 'p, only if q* (01) form of 
conditional wording which, t4iile logically equivalent to 'If p, then q', 
eaphasizes that q is necessary for p. Hence "He is a policeman only if he 
is over 3' 9" in height" suggests the modus tollens (HT) inference from 
'He is not over 3' 9" in height' to 'He is not a policeman*. The 
apparently aost relevant information here would therefore be whether the 
consequent is true or false.
The differences in the frequency of forward and backward inferences 
predicted by the directional hypothesis has been tested (Evans, 1977) 
Evans and Beck, 1981) Rips and Marcus, 1977) Roberge, 1978). It has been 
consistently fotaid that subjects make more HP than HT inferences on IT 
worded conditionals, whereas they make significantly more HT than HP
inferences on 01 «»orded conditionsls. Evans (1977) used the four foras of 
conditional sentence shown in Table 3 above and the four corresponding 01 
forma, he found that the numbers of invalid 'denial of the antecedent' 
(DA) inferences remained at 38% on both IT and 01 forms. By contrast, HP 
inferences were endorsed in 100% of cases in the IT forme and 76% of cases 
on the 01 forms. Hence one effect of the IT wording is that it raises the 
probability that inferences will be made on the basis of an antecedent 
card rather than a consequent card. In the selection task this effect 
would explain the fact that many subjects select only an antecedent card. 
The IT wording also raises the probability that inference made will be a 
valid HP rather than an invalid OA inference. This would lead to 
selection of the TA card in preference to the PA card. It can be seen 
that this latter effect of IT wording would tend to counter the effect of 
matching bias on variants of the task with a negated antecedent. It would 
tend to give rise to selections of the 'not-p' card, while matching would 
result in the selection of the p card. Hence on IT worded variants with 
negated antecedents, selection of the p card rather than the 'not-p' card 
would indicate the effect of matching bias ia greater than that of 
directional bias. Hatching responses to negated antecedents will 
therefore be less predominant than matching responses to negated 
consequents, since in the latter case there is no directional tendency to 
select the TC card (iei the 'not-q' card) rather than the q card.
An explanation of this kind is required to reconcile with the 
matching hypothesis another finding of Kanktelow and Evans (1979). They 
found a significant preference for TA over FA, a result idiich could be 
claimed to support the verification hypothesis. However, contrary to the 
predictions of the verification hypothesis, they found no significant 
preference for TC over FC. When allied with matching bias, directional 
bias can explain this anomaly and it can also explain other patterns of
selection which have been taken to indicate the eaployaent of a 
falsification strategy. On doubly negated conditionals, 'If not-p, then 
not-g' and also on the singly negated 'If p, then not-q', the correct 
selection asy be made as a result of directional bias towards the 
selection of TA, and pure matching bias in the consequent card selection 
of q rather than not-q.
The coobined effects of biases
The main point to be made at this juncture is that the matching and 
directional biases, together with consideration of other possible 
non-logicsl bases of responding, can potentially explain the conmonly 
observed selections on positive IT conditionals as well as can 
verification bias and conditional or biconditional interpretation. 
Selection of p alone nay be due to matching and directional bias.
Selection of 'p and q' nay be due to pure matching. All four cards nay be 
selected as a 'safe' option which ensures that no correct selection is 
omitted. While if only one selection were omitted it would tend to be the 
not-p card, since both directional and matching biases would induce 
subjects to ignore it. In which case they would select the remaining p, q 
and not-^ cards.
The evidence with regard to the range of influence of these two kinds 
of bias appears to be equivocal. Some versions of the selection task 
elicit mainly matching responses, some elicit responses which seen to be 
principally influenced by verification and others seen to suggest that 
both biases are present. It has been suggested (Reich and Ruth, 1962) 
that kind of bias observed depends on the thenaticity of the problem, with 
more thematic content eliciting more verification responses. For example, 
in Reich and Ruth's (1982, experiment 2) highly thematic versions of the 
task, they attributed the observed responses, almost exclusively, to
verification. On the other hand, Yachanin and Tweoey (1962)* using 
theaatic problena* found evidence for both aatching and verification.
On the basis of evidence of this kind aost researchers in the area, 
»4iile accepting the plausibility of the matching hypothesis, have been 
reluctant to abandon the verification hypothesis. There has been little 
polished research into selection task performance since 1983, and the 
majority of researchers in the early 1980s (with the prominent exception 
of Evans) were interpreting their results in terms of verification bias, 
among other factors, for example, Reich and Ruth (1962) treat 
verification, falsification and matching as alternative bases on which 
subjects might respond in differing circumstances. Griggs and Cox (1983) 
consider which of these strategies best explains the data from each of 
their experiments] t^ile Krauth (1982) treats them as contributary 
components in a statistical account of responding. Significantly, Krauth 
(1982) found it necessary to introduce a verification component into his 
statistical theory in order to explain his results.
While verification and falsification presuppose a mental logic 
through which these strategies can be applied, the matching hypothesis 
suggests that responses are due to non-logical, linguistic processes. 
Viewed as contributary factors, it is difficult to see how these 
strategies night collectively determine the responses of an individual 
subject. It will be argued later that the correct approach is to regard 
verification and matching as competing explanations of experimental data. 
Griggs and Cox (1983) took this approach, but were unable to draw a firm 
conclusion as to »^ich explanation was to be preferred. It will be argued 
that such results have turned out to be equivocal because all hypotheses 
so far considered have been inadequate, although the matching hypothesis 
is correct, except in the claim that negation is always ignored. The 
explanation of differing response patterns offered by Reich and Ruth
(1982), that subjects use different strategies Mhich are affected by the 
thenaticiy of a problea'a content, depends on a particular view of 
Mtching as a 'last resort' strategy which will be considered in the next 
section and opposed throughout this thesis.
The situation M y  become clearer in the light of a more detailed 
understanding of the origin of matching bias. the one hand it may be a 
last resort «4ien any logically based response is too difficult to make.
On the other hand it may be a basis of responding which subjects use more 
readily than any logical strategy as a result of the entrenched mechanisms 
of linguistic comprehension. The question of whether either of these 
views is correct will be addressed in the present research by 
investigating the conditions under which matching responses, and other 
'non-logical' responses, occur. In order to introduce this aspect of the 
research the arguments and evidence to date will now be summarized.
The origin of matching bias
Oohnson-Laird and Wason (1977) argued that Mtching M y  be a form of 
response which is peculiar to extreme bafflement, or lack of appreciation 
of logical structure. Hanktelow and Evans (1979) also suggested that 
Mtching M y  be a last-resort strategy when subjects have no other basis 
for responding. Yachanin and Tweney (1982) suggest that both Mtching 
bias and verification bias may be "cognitive short-circuiting strategies" 
which reduce the cognitive load presented by the standard abstract forma 
of the selection task. Clearly Mtching bias allows a consistent basis 
for responding without the need for any logical processing; and 
verification bias avoids consideration of two hypotheses, that the 
conditional sentence is true and that it is false, in favour of the one 
hypothesis that it is true.
This 'cognitive short-circuiting' interpretstion sppesrs to depend on 
the sssoif>tion thst subjects are atteapting to respond logically in the 
first instance. The arguaent continues to the effect that the logical 
coaplexity of the problea soaetiaes baffles subjects to such an extent 
that they are able to respond only on the non-logical basis of aatching. 
Evans (1963a, 1983b) takes a contrary view Hhich will be argued for here 
and in later chapters. This is the view that the selection task tends to 
elicit relevance judgements as part of normal linguistic processing, and 
that these are responsible for the observed aatching responses.
An explanation of matching bias which is consistent with the 
verification hypothesis and the doctrine of mental logic is that subjects 
always become aware of the syntactic fora of a problem, although in the 
selection task they tend to interpret the conditional as s biconditional. 
Subjects are also assumed to have sufficient logical competence to solve 
the problem, although it would appear thst they do not have the 
appropriate metacognitive skill to adopt the correct falsifying strategy, 
and tend instead to adopt a verifying strategy. When subjects are 
presented with versions of the problem which baffle them as to how to 
verify the conditional correctly, they have to resort to responding on the 
basis of matching bias.
An alternative non-linguistic explanation of matching, and of other 
features of performance on reasoning tasks, has been put forward by 
Pollard (1962). He argues that on realistic versions of the task 
subjects' responses are determined by the relative availability of 
associative links between the problems' content items. These links are 
held to exist as a result of previous experience with similar items and 
contexts. With abstract content the presence of salient cues in the 
presentation is believed to be responsible for the selections. These
features of a problem determine Mtiich of the selection alternatives are 
attended to by subjects] the alternatives attracting greater attention 
being more likely to be selected. Evans (1983) concurs to the extent that 
selective attention may be iaportant in mediating correct selectiona, such 
as that of the TA card i^en the antecedent contains negation. Selective 
attention may also be involved in the mediation of superior reasoning 
performance. In constructing an accurate representation of a verbally 
expressed problem it is important that unemphasized features of it be 
considered for inclusion. It is also important that all possible 
counterexamples to a candidate conclusion should be considered.
The conditions under which matching responses occur have been 
considered by Johnson-Laird and Nason (1977a) who pointed out that on a 
disjunctive version of the tssk used by Wason and johnson-Laird (1969), 
matching to both of the named items occurred in only 19X of responses.
The tssk required siAijects to select cards which could prove the truth (or 
falsity) of a sentence like 'Every card has a square which is black on one 
side, or a line which is crooked cm the other side*. The cards showed a 
black square, a white square, a crooked line and a straight line. The 
most frequent response (75X) was the correct double mismatching case} 
’white square and straight line'.
Johnson-Laird (1969a) based an explanation of this result on his 
finding (3ohnson>Laird, 1969b) that subjects who had gained insight into a 
logical tssk tended to lose it when the task involved comprehension of a 
more complex description, and to regain it when simpler descriptions were 
subsequently presented. He attributed the loss of insight to the 
difficulty of understanding the sentence concerned. In the case of the 
selection task, he argued that the greater linguistic complexity of 'If p, 
then q' compared with 'p or q' appears to be one of the factors which give 
rise to matching responses, due to the loss of logical insight engendered
by that coaplexity. This linguistic explanation is supported by the 
observations of subjects' performance on tasks with differing linguistic 
formulations but identical logical features.
The relation involved in the conditional selection task in its 'If 
not>p, then q' variant has the same truth-table and logical properties as 
■p or q' (understood inclusively)» and therefore both of these statements 
have the same counterexample (-p & -q). Despite their identical logical 
properties» the former commonly elicits the responses associated with 
matching bias while the latter rarely does so. Even when such responses 
to the disjunctive task do occur it is not clear that they are the result 
of matching bias rather than the result of validly deriving a second 
counterexample (p and q) to an exclusive interpretation of the 
disjunction. The main point is that, apart from this possibility of 
exclusive interpretation of the disjunction» these two forms of words are 
logically identical. Hence the responses to the conditional selection 
task cannot be attributed to its logical difficulty in any formal sense. 
The phrase 'logical difficulty' can also be taken to refer to the 
difficulty of carrying out the cognitive operations required to generate a 
logically correct solution. However, such an interpretation of the phrase 
robs it of any explanatory power. What is required is a description of 
the cognitive operations concerned and of how they differ between the 
conditional and disjunctive forms. To this end an independent variable 
must be identified «d^ich is such ss to make a difference in the difficulty 
of these two forms of the task.
There are two differences between conditional and disjunctive wording 
which appear to support the 'linguistic difficulty' hypothesis, first, 
the words 'If..., then...' and '... or ...'» when used in formal logic, 
are treated as sentence-forming operators on sentences (Lemaon, 1965» 
p.6). In the case of both 'If p, then q' and 'p or q'» formal logic
requires p and q to be sentences. By contrast, it is cotanon in natural 
language for p and q to be single »wrds in the cases of 'p and q* and 'p 
or q'. For exaaple, it is correct to say 'You aay have coffee or tea' or 
'You nay have coffee and tea'. There is, however no analogous 
gramatical utterance which contains the f o m  'If coffee, then tea' 
without expanding 'coffee* and 'tea' into propositions as in 'If you have 
coffee, then you may have tea'. The senantics of 'and' and 'or' deteraine 
the relation between p and q. However, as just reurked, in natural 
language 'If p, then q' requires p and q to be sentences. Relations 
between sentences aay be coaplex, causal or intentional relations. Hence 
there is no siaple seaantic criterion of validity for 'If p, then q'. In 
the case of 'p and q' and 'p or q', p and q may soaetiaes be sentences, 
but if they have the same subject they are easily converted to, and 
understood as, relations between predicates. For exaaple, 'The letter is 
B or the letter is C  can be converted to 'The letter is B or C .
A second difference between these two linguistic forms is that the 
seaantic siaplicity of 'p or q' renders it easily understood in a 
truth-functional way. It is readily apparent that it is made true by the 
truth of p and by the truth of q. It is even sore readily apparent that 
it is made false by the falsity of both p and q, whether it is understood 
inclusively or exclusively. The availability of a counterxample serves as 
a good test of the truth-functional coaprehensibility of a sentence with 
abstract content. This kind of comprehension makes possible what will be 
called 'direct' inferences about 'p or q' by making direct use of semantic 
composition (Johnson-Laird, 1963, p.49). Reasoning in this way has been 
described above as the substitution of truth values for the constituent 
propositions, p and q. Hence when both p and q are false, 'p or q' is 
converted to 'false or false'. Semantic knowledge of 'or' indicates that 
its use is appropriate only if (at least) one of the constituent 
propositions is true. This enables one to conclude, from purely semantic
considerations, that the whole coaplex proposition 'false or false' is 
necessarily false.
The status of the semantically more coinplex 'If p, then q* is very 
different in this respect. People do not usually appreciate that when p 
is false it follows that 'If p, then q' is true. Nor do they appreciate 
that i^en q is true it follows that 'If p, then q’ is true. Instead they 
try to make sense of 'If p, then q' via an understanding of the 
intentional or causal relations between p and q (Johnson-Laird, 1983, 
p.32). By contrast with the disjunctive selection task, the conditional 
selection task does not permit subjects to make direct inferences to the 
counterexample. These considerations suggest that the lack of a means to 
make direct inferences to the counterexample may lead to an attempt at 
comprehension via Judgements of relevance, when content and context 
suggest no richer relation between antecedent and consequent. The lack of 
a route to comprehension vis direct inference must surely have soiae 
negative effect on comprehension, and the relevance Judgements associated 
with matching bias appear to be the result.
Importantly, Griggs snd Cox (1983) have sought empirical evidence for 
the cognitive short-circuiting view of matching, which attributes it to 
logical rather than linguistic complexity. They compared performance on 
four versions of the selection task. Two of these were thematic versions 
of the problem which are known to produce facilitation. The other two 
were abstract versions with different types of content; recodsble and 
non-recodable. The recodsble content included items such as 'vowel' and 
'even number' which when negated are easily recoded into positive form; 
'consonant' and 'odd number'. The non-recodable content items were 
specific letters and numbers such ss 'B' and '3'.
They found that matching bias was predominant only on abstract
versions with non-recodable content item] and that this was apparent only 
when frequencies of choice for each logical alternative (TA, FA, TC and 
FC) were considered.
This aethod of identifying Mtching bias was first devised by Evans 
and Lynch (1973). Their criteria are;
(1) more TA selections on conditionals with a positive antecedent than on 
those with a negative antecedent|
(2) more FA selections on conditionals with a negative antecedent than on 
those with a positive antecedent;
(3) more TC selections on conditionals with a positive consequent than on 
those with a negative consequent;
(4) more FC selections on conditionals with a negative consequent than on 
those with a positive consequent.
However» when the selected combinations of cards were considered 
Griggs and Cox found equal frequencies of matching and verification.
These were the most frequent response types on abstract problems» but were 
much less frequent than logically correct response types on the 
facilitatory thematic problems. On the grounds that their thematic 
problems with familiar content elicited many correct responses» Griggs and 
Cox (19B3) conclude that "... matching and verification bias are cognitive 
short-circuiting strategies that will be abandoned when problem content 
cues in familiar knowledge from memory ...". Here the authors appear to 
suggest that when the content is familiar there is no attempt at formal 
reasoning» and therefore no possibility of failure due to 'logical 
difficulty'. Familiar material directly cues a strategy based on memory 
of similar situations.
Although Griggs and Cox apparently disagree» it seems possible that 
matching is also directly cued in response to other features of the
problen's content. The avsilability of a seeaiingly appropriate relevance 
heuristic may prevent any attenpt at the more detailed linguistic analysis 
required for a foriaal solution.
An apparent arguiaent against the view that matching occurs without a 
prior atteapt at a foraial solution is that verification bias would not be 
observed if this were the case. In experiments where verification bias is 
allegedly observed, the subject is taken to be atteapting a form] 
solution and persisting with an inadequate performance of such formal 
reasoning. If the verification hypothesis is correct, then it would 
appear that matching would occur only after a coaipletely abandoned attempt 
at a formal solution. If, on the other hand, subjects do not coamonly use 
s verification strategy, then there would be little evidence to suggest 
that they attenpt any kind of logical strategy based on either 
verification or falsification. This, in turn, would suggest that matching 
is directly cued by linguistic complexity as opposed to being a response 
to logical difficulty. Evidence that subjects do not attempt to verify 
the conditional would also remove the last vestiges of support which the 
selection task data may be taken to give to the doctrine of mental logic. 
If subjects neither falsify nor verify, then there appears to be no 
evidence for the use of a strategy based on a logic in the mind.
Content effects In the selection task
In addition to the investigation of linguistic effects in reasoning, 
which is the main topic of interest in the present research, the selection 
task has been extensively used to investigate the effects of content on 
reasoning. In particular, much research effort has been expended in 
testing the hypothesis that realistic or thematic content facilitates 
performance. This research impinges on the present topic in the sense 
that linguistic factors such as familiar wording, in addition to familiar
content iteas, nay facilitate perfonunce. It aay also be necessary to 
distinguish between content effects and linguistic effects in versions of 
the selection task t^ich have been found to result in superior 
perforaance. This topic will be considered after the experiaental 
background has been outlined.
The earliest indication that theaatic content could facilitate 
perforaance on the selection task was obtained in an experiaent by Wason 
and Shapiro (1971, Experiaent 2}. Subjects were shown four cards with the 
naae of a town on one side and s aeons of transport on the other. They 
were then asked which of the cards they would need to turn over in order 
to decide whether the d a i s  expressed by a sentence such as "Every tiae I 
go to Manchester I travel by car" was true or false. In the control 
condition an abstract, universally quantified sentence was used, such as 
"Every card which has a D on one side has a 7 on the other". This 
condition elicited 2 out of 16 correct solutions while the theMtic 
version elicited 1 0  out of 16.
Subsequently, Oohnson-Laird, Legrenzi and Legrenzi (1972) presented 
subjects with an array of envelopes and asked thee to pretend that they 
were postal workers and to determine whether a regulation such as 'If a 
letter is sealed, then it has a 90 lire stsap on it' was violated. Of the 
66 responses, 39 were correct. This study was replicated by Golding 
(1981) with subjects over the age of 45, who aay have reaeabered a similar 
British postal regulation «4)ich ceased in 1966. These subjects gave 13/22 
(59t) correct responses. A group of subjects under the age of 45 gave 
only 2/22 (9X) correct responses. Hence it appears that the facilitation 
observed here depends on experience of the relevant rule, or a similar 
one.
There have been several piblished replications of the Wason and
Shapiro (1971« Experiaent 2) study. In one of these Bracewell and Kidi 
(1974) observed considerable facilitation ( 7 H  correct) in the theaatic 
condition; but this nay have been because aiiijects were told that the 
relevant rule mss not reversible. This instruction did not, however« 
facilitate performance on an abstract problen (8.3H correct).
Furthemore, when the order of clauses in the thematic conditional was 
reversed, "Every tine 1 90 to Ottowa, 1 travel by car" being changed to "I 
travel by car every tine I go to Ottowa", the latter version elicited only 
16.66S correct responses. It therefore appears that the facilitation 
observed was due to an interaction between the non-reversibility 
instruction and the form of wording used in the thenatic version. Lesser 
degrees of facilitation were observed by Gilhooly and Falconer (1974), 
with 22s correct solutions in the theatatic condition, and by Pollard 
(1981), with 3 3 . ( 4 / 1 2 )  correct on the thesMtic version and 0/12 correct 
on the abstract version. Van Duyne (1974), using universities and major 
fields of study as content, observed 58t correct responses on a 
conditional version of the task, and 30S correct on a universally 
quantified version.
By contrast, Yachanin and Tweney (1982) obtained only 1/80 correct 
responses using as content canpus locations and nodes of transport. Brown 
et si (1980) and Griggs and Cox (1962) also failed to find any 
facilitation on problems concerning towns and neons of tr an^rt.
Finally, Hanktelow and Evans (1979) found no facilitation using items 
of food and drink as content.
Hence there appears to be no reliable effect of the inclusion of 
concrete items in the problem. Where contrasting results have been 
obtained it is usually pMsible to argue, as does Griggs (1963), that the 
content itens in the facilitatory version were such as to cue nenory of a
proainent countrrrxaaple to a faailiar relation between the«. For 
exaaple, one of the conditionals on which Van Duyne (1974) observed 
facilitation was "Every student who studies physics is at Oxford". The 
selection alternatives associated with this conditional were Physics» 
Spanish, Oxford and Caabridge. However, Caabridge has a high reputaion 
for physics, of which fact the experinental subjects (undergraduates at 
University College, London) would probably have been aware. Hence the 
counterexample of Physics and Cambridge could have been cued by memory. 
Similarly, the other facilitatory conditional was "If s student studies 
philosophy then he is at Caabridge", with the selection alternatives of 
Philosophy, Physics, Caabridge and Oxford. This conditional also has a 
prominent counterexample; subjects would probably have knotwi of Oxford's 
high reputation in philosophy, and Oxford and Philosophy is the 
counterexample to the quoted conditional. Yachanin and Tweney's (1962) 
failure to replicate Van Duyne's findings can be explained by the fact 
that they did not use conditionals with well-known counterexamples.
The studies using towns and modes of transport as content are 
unlikely to have generally well^cnown counterexamples. However, it is 
possible that the facilitation observed is a result of the use of content 
items which are plausible or familiar in subjects’ experience. This 
possibility is strong enough to justify scepticism regarding the effects 
of thematicity as such, unless the thematic problems concerned are 
designed in such a way as to eliminate the possibility of memory-cuing. 
After mestory cuing was suggested by Hanktelow and Evans (1979) 
experimenters appear to have avoided using content which could elicit this 
form of facilitation. Subsequent research has yielded only one published 
instance of a replication of the thematic content effect (Pollard, 1981) 
with a analler effect (331 correct), and with a small (12 siiijects) 
sample. During the same period there have been several failures to 
replicate the effect using towns and modes of transport and other types of
content (Brown et al, 1981| Golding, 1981| Griggs and Cox, 1962} Reich and 
Ruth, 1982| Yachanin and Tweney, 1962}. Hence it appears that theaaticity 
alone does not produce facilitation.
Facilitatory versions of the problea have tended to include 
conditionals in the form of regulations familiar to subjects, such as 
those used in the original 3ohnson-Lsird et al (1972) study and Golding's 
(1981) replication with older subjects. Similarly, performance is greatly 
facilitated on the Drinking Age Problem used by Cox and Griggs (1961), 
where a Florida law known to the subjects was used: "If a person is 
drinking beer, then the person must be over 19". The facilitation 
observed on such problems is most plausibly explained (Griggs and Cox, 
1963) by supposing that subjects are cued by meonry of the rules involved, 
or analogous rules, together with their counterexamples.
Experience of the precise rule involved is not necessary, since 
D'Andrade's 'Sears problem' (replicated by Handler, 1960 and Griggs and 
Cox, 1962, 1963) is highly facilitatory even though it involves a rule 
which would not have been directly experienced by subjects. The 
participating subjects were asked to imagine that they had the Job of 
checking sales receipts at a Sears store, and were told "...to make sure 
that any sale over $30 had been approved by the section manager"; the 
approval being indicated by a signature on the back of the receipt. This 
particular form of word is not necessary for facilitation. Griggs and Cox 
(1963) used the conditional sentence; "If a purchase exceeds $30, then the 
receipt m(£t have the signature of the department manager on the back".
In both of these versions of the experiment subjects were then shown four 
receipts, two face up showing amounts of $75 and $25 respectively, and two 
with the other side uppermost, one with a signature on it and one without. 
In two such experiments using the second formulation described above 
Griggs and Cox (1963) obtained a total of 32/40 correct responses.
Subjects would not need to have experience of checking receipts in order 
to appreciate the nature of the counterexaaple, a receipt for over $>0  
with no signature on the back. The familiarity of the general relation 
between the itema* more important and valuable transactions being more 
likely to require authorization, would suffice to cue the counterexample} 
or as Griggs (1983) puts it, subjects may reason by analogy from 
experience with similar rules.
Griggs (1983) has objected that these reliably facilitatory versions 
of the task all require reasoning from a rule to a required course of 
action, which seems to be a psychologically different process from the 
original task of reasoning about a truth-functional statement. In the 
former case the rule is assumed to apply, it has no truth-status as such, 
and the task is to ensure that it has been obeyed. In the latter case a 
iriiversal generalization (expressed by the conditional sentence) may be 
true or false, and appropriate evidence must be selected on which to base 
a decision about its truth status. Hence, in the former case, not only 
may the counterexample be available from memory due to the familiar 
content of the rule, but also the action-guiding nature of the rule may 
initiate a search for that counterexample. Therefore, presentation of the 
problem in a form which includes a procedural rule may be a necessary 
condition for substantial facilitation. This kind of wording may suffice 
to cue a search for a counterexample to the rule, which will be found if 
the rule is familiar or of a familiar kind. It is therefore possible that 
the substantial facilitation observed on the Sears problem and its like is 
not an effect of content as such, but of content in the context of a 
somewhat altered problem.
More recently Cheng and Holyosk (1985) and Cheng et al (1986) have 
used semantically differing descriptions of the task. These included 
tasks which incorporated a rule giving permission for an action (named on
the p card) only Mhen a certain precondition (naaied on the q card) is 
satisfied. On such rules of the fora 'If you wish to do p, then you oust 
first nake sure that q'» they otoerved significantly acre correct 
responses than when the relation was presented in a causal or 
truth-functional guise. It seeias that when the task is presented in this 
fora subjects tend to ensure that the action has not been carried out 
without the required permitting precondition being satisfied. Hence they 
tend to select the cards which could indicate that the rule has been 
violated: that the action 'p' has occurred without permission 'q' (ie{ 
when 'not-q' is true). The Sears problem therefore appears to be 
facilitatory because it is a case of this kind: acceptance of a receipt 
for over requiring permission indicated by the manager's signature. 
Cheng et al (1986) suggest that subjects' performance is determined by 
"pragmatic reasoning schemas" acquired through experience with instances 
of the the relevant kind, rather than by the use of syntactically based 
inference rules. Cheng and Holyoak (198$) demonstrated that training 
using pragmatic rules and examples produced facilitation «^ich was 
significant when either wss used alone, and greater when both were used.
By contrast, training in the truth-functional logic of conditional syntax 
produced no significant facilitation in performance on the selection task.
Although this evidence suggests the predominance of pragmatic factors 
in reasoning, it does not necessarily follow that pragmatic schemas in the 
form of inference rules are involved. It may be that experience with 
scenarios involving permission, for exsap^^* produce an outline idea of 
what such scenarios tend to have in common: a permission 'frame', to use 
Minsky's (1977) teradnology. This outline structure may then be completed 
by siiistituting the content items in the problem under consideration.
This would provide a mental model of the problem, which could be used to 
reach a solution as described earlier. Mvere realistic problem are less 
fscilitatory, this could be because the scenario is not of a familiar
kind, and 8iA>jacts therefore lack a euitable frame; hence they may resort 
to making relevance judgements. Alternatively, the most strongly cued 
frame may not reflect, for exanple, the conditional structure of the 
problem. It may be that an incomplete frame is cued mhich has slots for 
an antecedent and a consequent, but not for their negations. This idea 
prompts the further suggestion that the concept of a frame may be 
psychologically implemented as s mechanism of selective attention of the 
kind suggested by Pollard (1982). It may take the form of a complex of 
associative links generated by experience Mith similar material. The use 
of such 8 frame could refine the ability to direct attention to those 
features which have turned out to be important in the past. Hence where 
relevant areas of experience are cued, the problem is more likely to be 
represented accurately and completely, and the representation is more 
likely to be systematically interrogated. However, when the task fails to 
cue a suitable frame s 'default* frame M y  be cued which generates 
relevance judgements.
The use of frames as opposed to inference rules allows attentional 
control over the items which are included in the representation of a 
problem. The presence of 'slots' in the frame (in Minsky's terminology: 
'unassigned terminals') would initiate a search for something to fill 
them. This possibility does not arise on the inference rule view, since 
the information currently represented determines which rule is to be used. 
Frames therefore allow problems to be solved via the assignment of 
subgoals (eg; Wickelgren, 1973, Chapter 6 ). A frame nay be extended by 
the attachment of a sii)frame which generates the missing information from 
available information, thus completing the input to the main frame. 
Inference rules appear to lack this attenticw>directing property.
Proponents of the doctrine of mental logic have argued that familiar 
content is faciliatatory because subjects use information which is not
explicitly included in the preaises of a problea in order to solve it. 
Experiments such as that of Golding (19B1) suggest that subjects do use 
knowledge of faailiar counterexaaples (in the case of Golding's 
experiaent« the fact that an envelope bearing a lower value staap must not 
be sealed) in solving the problem. In cases such as the 'permission 
scenario' problems of Cheng and Holyoak (1985) it is possible that 
subjects are cued to use the more general knowledge that it is i^wrtant 
not to act without the required permission.
The view that computation is influenced by content is also advocated 
by proponents of the doctrine of mental logic (eg; Rips» 1966). They 
point out that a context involving mechanical causation, for exaaple, may 
cue the use of rules of inference belonging to a causal logic, rather than 
trutfH-functional rules of inference. In the case of the Cheng and Holyoak 
(1985) 'permission scenario' problems, it could be argued that anyone who 
has the concept of permission also has the inference rules of a 
'permission logic' available for use when cued by an appropriate context.
Hence an i^)ortsnt question which is raised by the phenomenon of 
facilitation by content is whether content influences the representation 
of a problea, the performance of computations on that representation or 
the use of additional information. The previously suggested idea that the 
use of a suitable frame may be cued by realistic content is consistent 
with all three of these alternatives. A frame, in addition to cuing a 
certain kind of representation, also lends itself to certain computational 
routes to a solution rather than others and contains iaplicit information 
concerning what items would be relevant to a solution. This suggestion is 
more compatible with the mental models view of reasoning than with the 
doctrine of mental logic. (3ohnson-Laird (1963), in the concluding 
section of Chapter 15, gives examples of forms of procedure that could 
play a part in thinking by the napping of propositional representations
into Mdels. A frame would be a special fora of procedure trf^ ich 
deteraines the structure of a aodel).
Fraae theory also peraits an alternative explanation of coaaonly 
observed patterns of inference such as nodus ponens which aay sugçest the 
existence of inference rules in the Bind. A fraae which is frequently 
cued by a particular topic or fora of words could lead to the building of 
isoBorphic Bodels from which a siailar type of inforaation would tend to 
be extracted. Such frequently used procedures would have effects which 
could have led researchers to aistake regularities for the application of 
rules.
Suamary and Discussion
Two hypotheses concerning performance on Wason's selection task have 
been discussedt the verification hypothesis and the Batching hypothesis.
It was argued that, for positive IT conditionals, responses i^ich have 
been explained in terms of verification bias can also be accounted for in 
tema of aatching bias in conjunction with directional bias. The evidence 
when negation is included has been seen to be equivocal. Host versions of 
the task elicit some responses which indicate first-order matching and 
others which have been attributed to verification. One aim of the present 
research was to try to resolve this equivocation.
froB the t«y in which the verification hypothesis has been described 
it should be apparent that it shares a conceptual basis with the doctrine 
of mental logic. It presupposes that 8ti>jects have a repertoire of rules 
of inference, and ei^lains errors as a result of their being cued by the 
task to select one which can be used to verify the conditional relation. 
However, the phenomenon of verification itself presents a challenge to the 
rational underpinnings of the doctrine of mental logic. This conflict
occurs because the existence of errors resulting fros verification 
suggests that subjects' mentsl logic is iaperfect because they use a rule 
which can only verify the conditional stateaent when they ought logically 
to be atteapting to falsify it. On the basis of this view of subjects' 
perforaance it has been argued that people are irrational (see Cohen, 
1981). This is an unacceptable conclusion because it underainea the 
reasoning process >4iich leads to it.
lha view that Batching is a short-circuiting response to logical 
baffleaent also iaplies acceptance of the doctrine of mental logic. 
According to this view matching occurs only when a problem proves to be 
too difficult for the 'logic in the aind' to produce a solution. In other 
words, the failure of a logical and syntactically based strategy forces 
subjects to fall back on a strategy based on pragmatic and semantic 
considerations.
According to this cognitive short-circuiting view of matching, the 
difficulty of the task ought to depend entirely on the logical properties 
of the propositions »d^ich are esgiressed in the premises of the task. 
Variations of the wording in which logically equivalent propositions are 
expressed ought not to change the difficulty of the task. Superior 
performance on the logically equivalent disjunctive selection task 
suggests that the conditional selection task is not logically difficult in 
this sense.
The matching hypothesis, by contrast, can be seen to be more 
consistent with Johnson-laird'a semantic model of reasoning since it can 
be regarded as a response to the search for meaning and relevance in the 
premises of a problem. Errors can therefore be regarded as being the 
result of relevance judgements t^ich are cued by pragmatic features of the 
problea. According to this view, the real nature of the difficulty would
sees to lie in the processing involved in foraing an adequate 
representation of the conditional Mhich could lead to a clear 
identification of a counterexaaple. This Mould explain i^y perforaance ia 
also greatly facilitated when the problea is expressed in a realistic 
aanner which allows a sensible interpretaton or the counterexaaple itself 
to be retrieved froa long-tera aeaory.
It has been suggested that realistic versions of the task cue the use 
of a fraae t^ich facilitates the forastion of an adequate representation 
of the problea and the derivation of an appropriate response based on that 
representation. In abstract versions of the task, errors asy occur 
because there is insufficient contextual information to cue an appropriate 
fraae. In the absence of such contextual inforaation errors may occur, 
not as a result of logical difficulty, but becsiee the task M y  be 
inadequately represented on the basis of pragaatically'^ased relevance 
judgeaents. This possibility will be investigated in the research to be 
r ^ r t e d  here by the use, in addition to the selection task, of other 
tasks which do not involve conditionals and, while containing aisleading 
pragmatic cues, can also be shown to have ainiaal logical difficulty.
THE SOURCE OT BIAS IN WASW'S SELECTION TASK
Experiaent 1
As aentioned in Chapter 1, one of the aost iaportant and well 
doctaiented findings of research using the selection task is that the 
nature of its content has a considerable influence on people's ability to 
solve it. Very faailiar and plausible content can produce considerable 
facilitation in the selection task. On the one hand this asy be an all or 
nothing effect, in the sense that only very plausible versions of the task 
using faailiar relations between the content items have any effect on 
perforasnce. On the other hand, it aay be that the level of insist into, 
and performance on, the problem aay be proportional to the realism of its 
content. Reich and Ruth (1962) observed a preponderance of matching 
responses on a less thematic version of the selection task, and a 
preponderance of what appeared to be verification responses on a more 
thematic version. They suggested that less thematic versions of the task 
tend to elicit 'primitive' matching responses, while more coherent 
thematic content elicits more insightful verification strategies. In 
coanon with the great majority of recent studies using thematic material 
in the context of arbitrary and unfamiliar conditional relations, they 
found little evidence of a further level of insight to the extent of fully 
insightful falsification.
In Chapter 1 it was noted that several authors have suggested that
matching bias may be a result of subjects' lack of an alternative strategy 
on logically difficult problems (Johnson-laird and Wason, 1977| HankteloM 
and Evans, 1979( Yachanin and Tweney, 1962). Evans's alternative vie« of 
matching as a linguistic bias was also outlined, and it was suggested that 
the difficulty of the task may be a result of the linguistic properties of 
certain relational expressions. Reich and Ruth (1982) attribute matching 
bias to the abstract nature of problem content rather than to its logical 
difficulty. Their aim is, however, to distinguish between the conditions 
in which matching rather than verification occurs, and they have little to 
say concerning why responses are made on the basis of one or other of 
these biases.
It is not clear why abstract problem content should cause the 
abandonment of any form of hypothesis testing, so that verification is 
replaced by matching. However, Reich and Ruth's results require an 
alternative explanation if this suggestion is to be rejected. The 
explanation which will be proposed here is based on an idea i^ich has been 
aired fairly recently in the literature, the iaplications of which have 
not been extensively explored.
Yachanin and Tweney (1962) and Griggs and Cox (1963) have suggested 
that when content items are binary, for example "If there is not a vowel 
on one side of a card, then there is not an even number on the other 
side", subjects will tend to recode the negated items into a positive 
form. Hence "not a vowel" may be recoded to "a consonant", and "not an 
even nuot>er" to "an odd number". This suggested tendency to convert 
negated items to positive ones depends, according to these authors, on the 
naturally binary status of the content items. However, this may not be 
the only factor which can lead subjects to perceive content items as 
binary. In an appropriate context seemingly norwrecodable content items 
may became recodable. for example, the previously mentioned formulation
'If there is not a B on one side of s card, then there is not s 3 on the 
other side', although apparently non-recodsble, aay becoae recodable in 
the following circunatances. The task may be formulated in such a way 
that only two antecedent terms and two consequent terms are mentioned in 
the problea instructions, either explicitly or implicitly, and only these 
items appear on the sets of cards presented to subjects. In such contexts 
there may be a tendency to substitute the remaining positive term for a 
negated one. Hence given the conditional 'If there is not a '8 ' on one 
side of a card, then there is not a '3' on the other side', where only 
'6 ', 'C, '3' and '4* are shown on the four cards and mentioned in the 
problem instructions, subjects nay tend to convert the sentence to 'If 
there is a 'C on one side of a card, then there is a '4* on the other 
side'. If, on the other hand, sii)jects are explicitly told in the 
preliminary instructions that there are four possible antecedent items and 
four possible consequent items, as in Hanktelow and Evans (1979), this 
tendency may be largely eliminated.
It is also possible that in addition to naturally binary items there 
are naturally multiple ones. This seems intuitively less obvious, and it 
may depend either on sii)jects' experience with a nunber of alternatives to 
a denied choice or on the difference in kind between possible antecedents 
and consequents, so that an alternative item is not readily regarded as a 
substitute for a negated item, for example, the content in Hanktelow and 
Evans's (1979) problea, items of food and drink, may be naturally multiple 
in one of these ways. Subjects may be more familiar with situations in 
which choices between items of food involve more than two possibilities, 
and the items of food have only edibility in common and are otherwise of 
different kinds tdtich may not be regarded as appropriately substitutable 
for one another. Hence, confronted with the sentence "If 1 do not eat 
haddock, then I drink gin", subjects may be unlikely to substitute 
"macaroni" for "not haddock" even if the choice were between only these
two item. This say be because subjects are accustoaied to a wider ctwice 
of food iteae, or because the items are of such different kinds; denied 
the choice of haddock and chipa> for example, one would be unlikely to 
select macaroni and chips as an alternative. Hence the effect of telling 
subjects in advance that there are four items of food and four items of 
drink to be considered may be reinforced by the naturally multiple nature 
of the problem content items.
It will be recalled that the verification hypothesis assumes that 
subjects take negation into account and the matching hypothesis assumes 
that they do not. Hence the conversion of negated items into their 
positive alternatives would make a difference to responses only if 
selections are made on the basis of a matching strategy. Given that 
subjects may convert negated binary items to the positive alternative, the 
matching hypothesis predicts that the positive item would then be regarded 
as the topic of the conditional sentence and judged to be relevant. Hence 
subjects may select the cards referred to »tften negation is taken into 
account, dismissing the other cards as irrelevant. Vachanin and Tweney 
(19B2) refer to this possibility as "higher^rder matching" and in what 
follows the form of matching previously described will be termed 
"first-order matching".
A further possible effect of multiple content is that subjects may be 
more likely to select a named card because of the lack of a salient 
alternative. This would be so whether or not the item was negated. Where 
an item is mentioned positively, and there are three possible 
alternatives, subjects may see little point in testing just the 
alternative presented in the four-card array. This alternative nay be 
judged to be irrelevant since without also testing the other two possible 
alternatives nothing would appear to be settled. Attentions! factors may 
also operate against the selection of more vaguely defined multiple
alternatives. With binary content the alternative selection is clearly 
defined and therefore aore likely to be judged to be relevant and to have 
attention specifically directed to it. Following the considerations of 
availability discussed by Pollard (1962}« the probability of the selection 
of the unsentioned card would be greater when it is the only possible 
alternative selection. Hence aultiple content M y  be expected to produce 
nore first-order Mtching selections on all variants of the problea.
The higher-order aatching hypothesis predicts the saae responses as 
verification bias on negated iteas, but unlike the verification hypothesis 
it does not apply where selections are made in response to positively 
aentioned iteas. In these latter cases first-order Mtching is the only 
possible Mtching response. Hence, higher-order Mtching predicts that if 
both an antecedent card and a consequent card are selected in response to 
a conditional tW^ich contains s negated item, the cards selected will be 
the TA and TC cards. If, due to directional bias, only an antecedent card 
is selected in response to s conditional in which the antecedent is 
negated, the selected card will be the TA card. Hence i ^ r e  negation is 
involved, higher-order Mtching makes the same predictions as the 
verification hypothesis: selection of TA alone or of TA and TC. Where 
negation is not involved, first-order Mtching bias would also result in 
the same selections as verification bias. Hence this extended theory of 
Mtching biss can provide an alternative explanation for all the 
selections attributed to verification bias. If these selections are in 
fact due to two types of Mtching then the proportion of responses 
attributable to each of then should be influenced by the extent to iWiich 
the content of the problem is perceived as binary and recodable.
As previously noted, Reich and Ruth (1962) attributed differences in 
subjects' selections to the degree of theMticity in the two different 
versions of the task used. They concluded; "Hatching ia only in evidence
M^en the stiaulus iiaterial is low in theastic content (Expt 1), and ia 
replaced by verification «<hen the stiaulus Mterial ia high in theaatic 
content (Expt 2)". The less thematic probleas (Experiaent 1) of Reich and 
Ruth (1982) contained overtly aultiple content iteas. By contrast» their 
acre theaatic probleas (Experiaent 2) contained soae naturally binary 
content iteaa. Furthersore, in all of these sore thematic probleas only 
two antecedent and consequent items were mentioned which, as argued above, 
would tend to favour perception of the content items as being binary.
Hence in these experiments high theaaticity was confounded with binary 
content and low theaaticity with aultiple content. Reich and Ruth took 
their results to show the occurrence of more first-order Batching with low 
theaatic content. An equally valid interpretation of their results is 
that they show the occurrence of more first-order matching with aultiple 
content iteae; a result in accordance with the extended matching 
hypothesis proposed above.
Accordingly, the present eig>eriaent was designed to investigate the 
effect of high or low theaaticity, and of binary or aultiple content 
items, on performance in the selection task. A version of one of Reich 
and Ruth's (1962) high theaaticity (Experiaent 2) probleas was used in the 
high theaaticity conditions of the present experiaent. Reich and Ruth's 
wording of this problem was as followst
"Rick is spending his suaKr holidays fruit picking. The farmer he 
is working for is very keen that only ripe fruit should be picked to 
prevent wastage. He tells Rick to judge the ripeness by the colour."
Since 'ripeness* suggests a binary interpretation, 'not ripe* 
suggesting 'unripe' or a synonym, the version of the problea used in the 
present experiaent (in both the theaatic binary and theaatic aultiple 
probleas) was as followsi
"Rick is spending his sutiMer holidays fruit picking. The farser he 
is working for ia very keen that only fruit in perfect condition should be 
picked» to prevent wastage. He tells Rick to Judge the condition by the 
colour."
In the binary version of this probles used in the present experiaent 
subjects were presented with the four variants of the problem including 
negation, and only two conditions of the fruit ("ripe" and "hard") and 
colours ("red" and "yellow") were mentioned in the problem instructions 
and on the cards. The four conditional sentences were worded as in Reich 
and Ruth (1982); "When the fruit are yellow they are ripe" and its three 
negated variants. In the multiple condition the colours mentioned were 
selected from four possibilities ("yellow", "red", "purple" and "green"); 
and there were four possible conditions of the fruit ("sweet", "rotten", 
"hard" and "ripe").
The abstract binary problem included the conditional sentence "If 
there is a 'B' on one side of a card, then there ia a '3' on the other 
side" and its three negated variants. The instructions explicitly stated 
that only 'B', 'C, '3' and '4' could appear on the cards, and only these 
symbols appeared on the cards associated with each of the four variants of 
the problem. In the abstract nultiple problem the instructions merely 
stated that each card had a letter on one side and a number on the other. 
The set of cards illustrated in the instructions, and the set for each 
variant of the problem, contained different letters and numbers.
The aim of the experiment was to investigate whether abstract or 
thematic versions of the task have any effect on response patterns, or 
whether the differences observed by Reich and Ruth (1982) were due to the 
binary or multiple nature of the content items. The extended matching
hypothesis predicts thst on probless with binary rather than oultlple 
content iteas, subjects will be «ore likely to attend to and select cards 
which are not nentioned in the conditional sentence. Hence their 
responses to binary problems will be characterized byt
a) More 'TA, T C  and 'TA only' responses to negated items.
b) Fewer 'p,q' and 'p only' selections.
According to Reich and Ruth (1982) the differences in responses will 
occur between the thematic and abstract problems; with the thematic 
problems being associated with the two differences» a and b, described 
above.
The verification hypothesis can also be construed as a rival 
explanation of first-order matching responses. So construed» all 
selections of 'TA» T C  and 'TA alone' can be included as 'verification 
responses'.
Subjects
Thirty part-time students participated in the experiment. The 
majority were attending classes in 'A'-level psychology at Cauldon College 
of Further Fducstion, Stoke-on-Trent. The remainder were Open University 
students attending a suaner school at Keele University.


3) Höre first-or<ler M t c M t >9 «ith Multiple content ite«8 .
4) Höre higher-order Matching with binary content items.
The subjects participated as two groups of 12t the reaaining 6 
participating individually. Each was presented with two instruction 
sheets with accoapanying four-page booklets containing the problems. They 
were told that they were being given two sets of four probleas to solve, 
each set having an associated instruction sheet. They were asked to 
attempt the problems in the order in which they were presented.
After completion of the experiment, subjects being allowed as much 
time as they required, they were asked to indicate whether they had 
previously encounterd the four-card problem concerned. All subjects said 
that they had not.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION.
The verification hypothesis and the extended matching hypothesis make 
specific predictions when a single antecedent card, or one antecedent and 
one consequent card are selected. The forms of matching to which 
selections are attributable are indicated on Table 1.1. first-order 
matching predicts the selection of p alone or p & q on all four variants. 
Higher-order matching predicts the selection of -p when the antecedent is 
-p, and 'TA,TC on the three negated variants (see page 42).
The verification hypothesis construed as a rival explanation of

Frequencies with ««hich subjects chose s H  possible card ccMbinations for each 
variant of each probles.
Card
Coabination Abstract
Binary
Theaatic
Binary
Abstract
Multiple
Theaatic
Multiple
pq p-q -pq -p-q pq p-q -pq -p-q pq p-q -pq -p-q pq p-q -pq -p-q
• * + 4- * * * 4 • • * ♦ * * ♦ 4
TA only 4 1 2 2 3 2 2 6 6 0 2
•
3 2 2 1
FA only 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1
TC only 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 1 0
FC only 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
TA,FA 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0
♦ ♦ ♦ + * 4 + + • ♦ ♦ ♦ • + 4 4
TA.TC 7 4 7 6 B 7 7 5 6 1 6 6 8 4 4 4
TA.FC 1 0 2 3 2 1 0 1 0 0 4 3 0 0 5 0
•
3
FA.TC 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 0
FA,FC 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3
TC,FC 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
TA,FA,TC 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
TA,FA,FC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TA.TC.FC 1 1 2 I 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0
FA.TC.FC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
All cards 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0
No cards 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
I : Correct selection
* : Predicted selection for first-order a«tchinq. 
+ s Predicted selection for higher-order Hatching.
In this, and subsequent slailsr iablaa, these latter sysbols appear 
above and to the right of the rmaber to which they refer.
Nunbers of selections consistent with first^rder and higher-order 
•atching and verification for each problen.
Abstract Thematic Abstract TheMtic
Binary Binary Multiple Multiple
first-order matching 20 16 25 29
Higher-order matching1 20 23 15 15
Verification 36 36 35 28
Table 1.2 sunaarizes the data in Table 1.1 in te rw of the nuabers of 
responses attributable to atatching and verification on the four versions 
of the probleia. Table 1.3 groups the data for the abstract and theaatic 
probleas.
Table 1.3
Types of selection on the abstract and thamtic probleae.
Abstract Thematic
first-order matching 45 45
Higher-order matching 35 38
Verification 71 64
The differences between the nunbers of matching responses to the 
abstract and theaatic probleais are clearly miniaalt and are not 
significant. Hence hypothesis 1 is si^ported. Contrary to the findings 
of Reich and Ruth (1972) there were fewer verification responses on the 
thematic problems (64) than on the abstract ones (71). A two-tailed 
Wilcoxon test indicates that the difference is not significant« as 
predicted by hypothesis 2. The data from the two abstract and two 
thematic problems were therefore coabined for further comparison.
The top row of Table 1.4 below siamaarizes the data shown in Table 1.2 
as percentages of total responses in order to facilitate comparison with
two other studies which included binary and aultiple content items. 
Comparing the binary and multiple versions in the present experiment, 
there were significantly more first-order matching responses on the 
aultiple problems (p < 0.01, one-tailed Nilcoxon) and significantly more 
higher-order matching responses on the binary problems (p < 0.05, 
one-tailed Hilcoxon) in accordance with hypotheses 3 and 4. The combined 
tendency to reduced first-order matching and increased higher-order 
matching on the binary versions is highly significant (one-tailed 
WilcoKon, p < 0.002). Only 4 of the 30 subjects showed an opposite 
tendency, and 16 showed differences in the predicted direction.
Of the 24 correct 'TA,fC selections shown in Table 1.1, 11 occurred 
on the 'If p, then not-q’ variant, where the correct response is 'p,q'. 
These responses are therefore more plausibly attributable to first-order 
matching than to a logical response strategy.
The difference in verification, binary 71 and multiple 64, falls well 
short of significance; as it also does between the abstract and thematic 
conditions (see above) in accordance with hypothesis 2. The results of 
the present experiment are firmly against the hypothesis that thematicity 
elicits verification responses since there were, in fact, 7 fewer 
responses to the thematic problems t^ich could be attributed to 
verification. This result also casts doubt on «^ther any of the observed 
responses are due to verification, since the effect of aultiple and binary 
content on responses suggests that they are largely a result of matching. 
Since, in the light of the present result it seems unlikely that responses 
are influenced by thematic content in any consistent manner, the results 
of Reich and Ruth (1962) may be usefully reanalyzed in terms of the 
aultiple or binary nature of the problems in their study.
The results of Griggs and Cox (1963) are also relevant to the
question of the existence of s verification strategy. In their Cxperiaent 
1 they coapared perforaance on an abstract selection task using nusbers 
and letters as content with perforaance on the Sears problea. In their 
Experiaent 2 they used s similar abstract problem Mhich referred to 
consonants and even nurt>ers. This changes the content froa aultiple to 
binary» since 'not a consonant* can be converted or recoded to 'a vowel* 
and *not an even nuaber* can be recoded to 'an odd number*. This change 
MSS made in order to aake the problem more comparable with the Sears 
problem, t^ich also has recodable (binary) content.
Frequency of three types of response on binary and piultiple content 
problems, as a percentage of all responses observed in each of three 
experiments.
BINARY PROBLEMS
First-order Higher-order
Matching Matching Verification
Experiment 1 30 36 60
Reich & Ruth 29 37 58
Griggs & Cox 20 25 35
MULTIPLE PROBLEMS
First-order
Hatching
Higher-order
Hatching Verifies
Experiment 1 45 25 53
Reich & Ruth 43 6 24
Griggs 4 Cox 38 14 29
In Table 1.4 the relevant features of the results of Reich and Ruth 
(1962) and Griggs and Cox {198}) are presented in the same way as the
results of the present experiaeot. The figures are shoMn ss percentages, 
for coflpariaon. There appears to be a resarkably consistent effect for 
binary content. In each case there is a saall but consistent predoninance 
of higher>order matching. With mjltiple content, firat^rder matching 
bias is consistently more in evidence, at similar levels in all three 
studies} while higher-^rder matching, although consistently less in the 
multiple condition, varies considerably between the three studies. The 
very low figure (6 ) in Reich and Ruth's Experiiaent 1 nay reflect the 
naturally multiple nature of the content items ss discussed in Chapter 1. 
These items of food and drink are known to elicit a high proportion of 
first-order matching responses from the results of Manktelow and Evans 
(1979, Experiment 2), of which Reich and Ruth's Experiment 1 was a 
replication. The negation of one of them nay not readily suggest its 
positive substitution by the alternative item in the array of cards.
An alternative way of looking at the data is to observe the extent to 
which the basis of responding differs between the binary and multiple 
conditions. This provides a measure of the extent to which the basis of 
subjects'responding has changed between the binary and multiple 
conditions. In the Griggs and Cox study these differences are very 
similar to the differences observed in the present experiment. Griggs and 
Cox did not include single antecedent card selections in the predictions 
of first-order matching bias and, as a result, failed to recognize the 
magnitude of the difference resulting from multiple or binary content. In 
any event, this comparison was not envisaged by their experimental design. 
Their omission of single antecedent card selections is justifiable only In 
the sense that it does not follow from considerations of matching bias 
alone. However, a linguistic explanation of such choices in terms of a 
directional bias, due to greater apparent relevance of the antecedent, was 
discussed in Chapter 1. It was argued that such choices should be 
included in the predictions of the matching hypothesis, just as the
verific«tion hypothesis is taken to predict single antecedent card choices 
arising froa a tendency to aake a conditional rather than biconditional 
interpretation of the conditional sentence in the task.
The data of Reich and Ruth also show a difference in the frequency of 
first-order aatching with the two types of content. This difference is 
similar to that observed in the present experiaient, and the absolute 
figures are also very siailar. The considerable reduction in higher-order 
aatching on their multiple problem (Reich and Ruth, 1962} Experiment 1) 
was not observed in the present study, and an explanation for this has 
been offered above in terms of the degree of emphasis placed on the 
existence of the four possible food or drink items, and also their 
possible 'naturally multiple* status. The considerable reduction in 
higher^rder matching may be a result of subjects' greater awareness of 
the existence of multiple alternatives. This could have deterred them 
from converting a negated item to the positive alternative presented in 
the array of four cards, since the other alternatives may well have 
remained salient. The minimal tendency towards higher-order awtching is 
partially reflected in the greater incidence of first-order aiatching on 
this multiple problem; but for soaie subjects first-order matching tended 
to occur only in the choice of a consequent card. This aspect of the data 
will be discussed in detail in the context of Experiment 6 (Chapter 5). 
Despite soaw variation in the absolute incidence of the responses 
described (which are not unexpected in view of the widely differing 
formulations of the problems concerned), the consistency of the change in 
responses associsted with the inclusion of binary or multiple content 
itesks on fonts of aatching bias suggests that the effect is reliable.
There atay also appear to be evidence of a higher incidence of 
verification responses where binary content is included. Since all
higher-order utching responses are also classifiable as verification 
responses) a sufficiently large change in the incidence of the former Mill 
produce a significant change in the latter. This is what seems to have 
occurred in Reich and Ruth's experiments. In the case of their binary 
problem the effect is increased by the existence of 6 'p only' selections 
on the 'If P) then not-q' variant (which coirt as verification responses, 
but 8 8 first-order rather than higher-order matching) compared with only 3 
such responses to the equivalent multiple problem. This variation in 
nunber of selections of an antecedent card only is small enough to be 
explained by the very different context of the problems concerned.
Since the effect of binary content is predicted by the extended 
matching hypothesis, but not by the verification hypothesis, the falsity 
of the latter hypothesis is strongly suggested. At the same time an 
alternative explanation has been offered for the responses which have been 
attributed to verification bias, and evidence from two other studies has 
been shown to support the suggested explanation.
The fact that results such as those observed in Reich and Ruth's 
Experiment 2 can occur in soiae (binary) versions of the selection task has 
not previously been given a detailed alternative explanation to that 
offered by the verification hypothesis. The existence of such data could 
therefore have led to the continued acceptance of the verification 
hypotheses by some experimenters. Higher-order matching offers an 
alternative explanation of any selection task experiment (past or future) 
which includes content iteais which can be perceived as binary in any of 
the ways described above, for example, the results of Yschanin and Tweney 
(1982) were described in Chapter 1 as showing evidence for both matching 
and verification. These authors were, however, the first to offer 
higher-order matching as an alternative explanation of the 'verification 
responses' observed. In the light of the present results it seems that
their suggested explsnstion is probsbly the correct one. Yschsnin and 
Tweney used content iteas which were binary» but did not eaphasize the 
fact to s(i)jects. On the basis of the present results with binary 
probleas, and those of Griggs and Cox (1983) and Reich and Ruth (1962)» 
one would expect to observe responses based (at approxiaately equal 
levels) on both types of Matching responses. Hence proponents of the 
doctrine of Mental logic are no longer in a position to cite such studies 
as enpiricsl support for the existence of a verification bias. Such a 
bias» if it existed» could only be iapleaented by s logic in the aind with 
the ability to pick out iteas t4iich instantiate the truth of the 
antecedent and consequent of the conditional sentence.
The occurrence of higher>order matching in experiment 1 suggests that 
the conversion of negated binary items is carried out by means of direct, 
truth-functional inferences of the kind described in Chapter 1. In this 
case the premise 'The letter is 6 or C  stated or implied in the task 
instructions, and the antecedent of the conditional 'The letter is not B'» 
permit semantic composition to derive Tslse or the letter is C .
Knowledge of the semantics of 'or' allows the conclusion 'The letter is C  
to be derived by direct inference. Vfhere there are four possible 
antecedent symbols, the premise implied by the task instructions would be 
of the fora 'The letter is B or C or D or C .  Semantic composition with 
the antecedent 'The letter is not B' yields 'False or the letter is C or D 
or E't from which follows 'The letter is C or D or C .  Hence no useful 
direct inference can be made in this case, unless only the two letters on 
the cards in the currently presented array are considered by the sU>ject.
It appears that subjects sometimes do consider only the items in the 
currently presented array, and higher-order matching is therefore reduced 
but not entirely eliminated by nultiple content items. Such an effect is 
only possible when two antecedent and two consequent cards are displayed

Experiaental evidence for the occurrence of direct inferences has 
been presented from two sources: the disjunctive selection task (Wason and 
Johnsoo^.8ird, 1979) and the observed occurrence of higher-order matching 
on the conditional selection tasks in the experiments discussed in Chapter 
2« The inference involved in converting a negated item to its positive 
alternative has been shown to be followed by few correct solutions in the 
selection task. It does not therefore occur as part of a logical 
strategy, but generates the responses which have been attributed to 
higher-order matching, none of which is the correct response. Hence these 
inferences are psychologically different from the processes underlying 
correct solution of syllogisms and other problems, where a valid reasoning 
strategy is implicated and there is no direct inference route to the 
solution. The existing evidence does not indicate whether the negated 
items are converted to positive ones prior to making the relevance 
judgement responsible for the matching response, or subsequently in such a 
way as to revise a relevance judgement which has already been made. The 
latter alternative seeias more probable since the topic of the sentence 
would need to have been decided, at least provisionally, before it would 
be apparent what items were sufficiently relevant to merit conversion to 
positive form. In either case this conversion process appears to be part 
of the process of forming a representation of the problem's premises.
It has been argued that where, because of the linguistic complexity of 
the premises, direct inferences are not cued (perhaps because similar 
complex situations are rarely encountered, and no appropriate frame has 
developed) subjects respond on the basis of a relevance judgement. It was
also argued in Chapter 1 that the logical difficulty of the problea ia not 
a factor in deteraining the basis on which the response is made. As 
evidence for this view, it was noted that a variant of the conditional 
selection task using wording of the fora 'If not>p, then q' tends to 
elicit few correct responses. Yet 'If not>p, then q' is logically 
equivalent to the *p or q' sentence (interpreted as exclusive disjunction) 
used in the disjunctive selection task} and this latter task elicits a 
high proportion of correct responses. It is therefore the linguistic 
coaplexity of the former task which gives rise to its difficulty.
Subjects do not attempt the logical task because the conditional wording 
is too complex to reveal what that task is. They therefore do not become 
aware of any logical difficulty for two reasons; they do not understand 
the logical structure of the problem and, if they were to do so, the 
logical structure ia the sane as that of the 'p or q' problem irfiich is 
easily solved.
A potential problem in arguing as above is that all the evidence for 
the suggested conclusion has been derived from studies using a problem 
(the conditional selection task) which, despite the above objections, is 
frequently judged to be logically difficult by proponents of the cognitive 
short-circuiting hypothesis. Clearly they must insist on this point in 
order to argue that it is the logical difficulty of the conditional 
selection task, rather than its linguistic complexity, which gives rise to 
matching.
Proponents of the doctrine of mentallogic might follow up this 
insistence by arguing that all reasoning is truth-functional, and the 
difficulty of making direct inferences about conditionals is simply s 
difficulty of reasoning in this way, rather than one of comprehension. 
This argument, however, leaves no room for explanation of the observed 
differences in performance. If all reasoning were truth-functional, then
reasoning about 'p or q* (understood as exclusive disjunction) and 'If 
not>p, then q' would be of equal difficulty since their truth>tables are 
identical. They assert the sane proposition in different ways, and 
therefore have identical logical properties. Differences In perforatsnce 
on probleas using these foriulations aust therefore be due to difficulties 
in coaprehending the conditional wording. If both were coaprehended 
correctly, the reaaining logical task would be the ssae in both cases.
Alternatively, it could be argued that no reasoning is 
truth-functional; that humans reason only by the construction and 
evaluation of mental aodels. This could not, of itself, explain the 
difference in perforaance with 'p or q ’ and 'If not-p, then q', because a 
complete and accurate set of mental models of each of these premises would 
be identical in their logical properties. The difference would again have 
to lie in the greater difficulty of forming an accurate representation of 
the conditional premise, even though it would be identical to the 
representation of the disjunctive premise. This would amoint to saying 
that the difficulty lies in appreciating the complete set of truth- 
eoBdltims of the cooditlenaland hence of going from a propositional 
representation of it to one which reveals its logical structure. Again, 
the difficulty must arise at s stage in the processing before the logical 
structure of the problem has become apparent. It is therefore misleading 
to call it a 'logical difficulty' rather than a linguistic one, since no 
theory of logical reasoning is capable of distingui^ing between two 
linguistic structures with identical logical properties «>d abstract 
content.
A third possibility is that the difference in responses to 
conditional and disjunctive formulations is to be explained in terms of 
the pragmatic implications of these forms. Conditional formulations may 
imply that the antecedent and consequent are relevant to each other in a
way which is to be taade apparent by their content and context. Hence 
conprehension of context-free conditionals with abstract or arbitrary 
content is difficult. Coaprehension of disjunctives, at least those which 
do not include negation, nay be less dependent on content and contextual 
factors. Disjunctions, unlike conditionals, nay iaply a lack of autual 
relevance between the content items rather than the existence of such 
relevance. There is therefore no need for further information in order to 
elucidate the nature of the disjunctive relation prior to forming an 
adequate representation of it.
One wayof circumventing these alternative interpretations of the 
evidence obtained from the selection task research is to use different 
problems in order to test the cognitive short-circuiting hypothesis. The 
three experiments which follow adopt this approach. In Experiments 2 and 
3 the element of 'logical difficulty' is intentionally minimized in order 
to investigate whether responses continue to be made on the basis of a 
pragmatically-based heuristic strategy. Experiment 4 was designed to 
investigate the extent to »hich subjects cotprehend sentences on the basis 
of their syntactic fora. If the influence of syntax on perceived meaning 
proves to be minimal when pragmatic cues are present, then it would follow 
that such cues would forestall comprehension of the logical structure of 
the sentence, i^ich is primarily conveyed by its syntactic structure.
Hence a pragmatically-based response, would be attributable at most to 
difficulty of comprehension, and not to difficulty of logical processing 
once that comprehension has been achieved. Subjects' own evaluation of 
the difficulty of the sentences concerned will be included in the results 
of Experiment 4, in order to decide whether difficulty of comprehesion is 
a factor in pragmatic processing, or whether subjects automatically 
comprehend on the basis of pragmatic cues without attempting to use, and 
therefore without becoming aware of difficult syntactic structure.
To return to the purposes of Experiments 2 and 3, an empirical test 
of the cognitive short<ircuiting hypothesis «(ould involve observing what 
occurs when a logical probleni is demonstrably of only moderate difficulty, 
because subjects respond to it correctly for logically valid reasons.
Other subjects could then be given a task which could be completed either 
by solving the original logical problem or by making a relevance 
Judgement. If subjects were to respond on the basis of a relevance 
judgement, it could not then be argued that they did so because the 
logical route to the solution was too difficult.
In Experiment 2, a problem which requires some logical reasoning is 
presented to subjects in order to determine how difficult it is. The 
(Measure of difficulty adopted is the proportion of subjects who fail to 
show complete insight into the problem. This procedure was carried out as 
a separate experiment since, if very few or no sii)Jecta showed insight 
into the problem, there would be no point in conducting Experiment 3 using 
the same problem. However, given a reasonable level of insight into the 
problem in Experiment 2, it is to be used again in Experiiwnt 3 in order 
to determine whether subjects tend to respond on the basis of formal 
reasoning of which they should be capable, or to base their responses on 
relevance Judgements.
Experiment 2
The first of the two experiments outlined above was designed to 
establish a base level of performance on a logico-matheiMtical problem. 
The problem was described to subjects as follows:
"All the leaves fell froa a tree in 10 days. On each of those days 
100 acre leaves fell froa it than fell on the previous day. How many 
leaves fell on the second day?"
Subjects Mere asked to atteapt the problea and to Mrite dOHn their 
solution and the steps used in their arrival at the solution. They were 
also asked to write down the nuaber of days they had to consider.
The correct solution to this problen is arrived at by appreciating 
that the first sentence entails that no leaves fell on the day before the 
first day (day 0). Hence, since 100 aore leaves fell on day 1 than day 0, 
as entailed by the description of the problea, 100 leaves auet have fallen 
on day 1, and hence 200 leaves on day 2. Hence it would be necessary to 
consider 3 days: day 0, day 1 and day 2.
Subjects Mho answered correctly with "200 leaves" and showed their 
working as "0 +100 +100 s 200" and said that they had to consider 3 days 
were deemed to have total insight into the problem. Subjects who answered 
correctly with "200 leaves” but showed their working as "100+100 = 200" 
and said that they had to consider only 2 days were deemed to have 
answered thro u^ guessing, and therefore not to have insight into the 
problem. Failure to respond was similarly classified.
Subjects
The sitijects in the experiment were 20 students at Keele University 
•4^ 0 participated individually.
Materials and Procedure
Subjects were presented with printed sheets contsining the problea 
snd questions described above and allowd as long as they required to 
respond.
Of the 20 subjects 7 showed total insight into the problem as 
described in the introduction. Another 3 gave the correct answer but 
possibly on the basis of guesswork, since they responded that they had 
considered only two days and their working was "100 * 100 s 200". Seven 
subjects gave answers containing sn unknown value "x", all except one of 
these being "x + 200". The remaining 3 subjects gave no answer. From 
this result it was concluded that about 3 H  of subjects in the population 
sampled could be expected to have total insight into the problem.
Experiment 3
This experiment was designed to investigate what proportion of 
subjects drawn from the sane population as Experiment 2 would reject an 
apparently relevant but actually contradictory additional premise to the 
problem used in Experiment 2. The conclusion was to be reached by 
comparing the proportion of subjects «4x1 rejected the additional premise 
with the proportion who showed total insight into the problem presented 
alonei 35X. This would indicate the extent to which subjects tend to 
respond on the basis of a relevance judgement, rather than on the basis of
80i»e deductive reasonin9 irfiich many of them would be capable of carrying 
out.
Subjects
Twenty students at Keele University participated individually in the 
experiment.
Subjects were presented with printed sheets containing the same 
problem as in Experiment 2, both in its original form and with the 
additional premise "200 leaves fell on the first day".
Design and Procedure
Half of the subjects were presented with a printed sheet which 
described the original problem first, followed by the version of the 
problem with the additional premise. The other half of the subjects were 
presented a printed sheet with these versions of the problem in reverse 
order, in order to control for possible order effects. All were asked to 
consider both problems and then to state which version of the problem,if 
any, would allow then to answer it with a definite numerical answer; to 
answer the question if possible; to show their working and to say how many 
days they had to consider. Subjects were allowed as long as they required 
to respond.
All 20 subjects gave the sane response. They chose the version of 
the problea with the additional inconsistent presise« gave their working 
ss ”20CklOO s 300" and said that they had to consider only two days.
Since 7 of the 20 subjects participating in Experiaent 2 showed total 
insight into the original problea, a siailar nuaber could be expected to 
show total insight in the present experiaent. However, no such logical 
insight was deaonstrated by the subjects in the present experiaent. Froa 
this it is concluded that when s relevance judgeaent is a possible basis 
for responding to a problea, a response is likely to be aade on that basis 
rather than on the basis of s deductive reasoning strategy. This appears 
to have occurred in the present experiaent in spite of the fact that the 
required deductive reasoning should have been within the capabilities of a 
substantial proportion, about 35S, of subjects.
It therefore appears that solutions based on relevance judgeaents are 
not always satisficing options in the face of logical difficulty.
Instead, it seeas that the existence of an alternative basis for 
responding, by asking relevance judgements, can in suitable circuastances 
deteraine the way in i4iich a problea is stteapted. This can occur even 
when, as here, soae subjects are capable of arriving at a logically 
correct solution using deductive reasoning.
The relevance judgeaent concerned in the present experiaent is 
invited by a preaise which is separate froa the premises of the original 
problea. This separation was necessary in order to offer subjects the 
opportunity to reject the apparently relevant preaise and to reason on 
another basis. In this respect the falling leaves problem differs froa 
the selection task where the apparently relevant inforaation is ei^edded
in the original premises, heverthelesa, the results at least confir« that 
subjects participating in the selection task could be responding on the 
basis of a relevance judgeaent without in any sense becoaing aware of the 
alleged logical difficulty of the task. The theoretical case outlined 
above appears to be strong enough to put the onus on the cognitive 
short-circuiting theorists to deaonstrate that perforaance on the 
selection task is a result of its alleged logical difficulty.
In a recent study Byrne (1966) showed that in sn easy conditional 
reasoning task involving aodus ponens inferences additional apparently 
relevant inforaation made such inferences significantly less frequent. 
Byrne found that given the prenises 'If it is raining then she will get 
wet', and 'It is raining', aost subjects concluded that 'She will get 
wet'. However, when an additional premise was added to the task: 'If she 
goes out then she will get wet', si^iificantly fewer subjects drew the 
conclusion. In Byrne's experiment subjects appeared to be reasoning on 
the basis of pragmatic considerations and assuming that the additional 
preaiise is relevant. Hence reasoning on this basis appears to be a 
preferrreo option even when there is little question of logical 
difficulty.
Why do subjects appear to abandon nodus ponens reasoning under these 
conditions? One possibility is that they were not using such an inference 
rule in the first instance. If subjects were making the original 
inference using mental models, then the pragutic relevance of the second 
premise would lead to an extension of the model including the possibility 
that 'She might not go out'. Hence by continuing to reason on this basis 
subjects would be unable to reach a firm conclusion. Where the content of 
a problem is realistic and plausible, subjects are likely to approach the 
problem prs^utically and to use the more salient inforaation in the 
construction of mental models.
On «ore abstract problens subjects M y  tend to use truth-values 
rather than the actual content iteats in representing the preaiaes of the 
problea. Howevert this is likely only in the case of probleas which allow 
direct inferences to be Mde. The results of research using the 
disjunctive selection task suggest that one of the conditions leading to 
relevance’based solutions is that, as in the problea used in Experiaent 3, 
there is no direct inference route to the solution. Where such a route 
exists, as in the disjunctive selection task, subjects are aore likely to 
respond on that basis rather than on the basis of a relevance judgeaent.
As remarked in Chapter 1, Johnson-Lsird and Waaon (1977) suggested 
that "Hatching M y  be a response peculiar to extreme bafflement, or lack 
of appreciation of logical structure". It has been demonstrated above 
with what readiness sub>ct used relevance judgements in responding to the 
version of the Falling Leaves Problem in the present experiment, a not 
particularly baffling problem. This suggests that subjects comprehend the 
task in a way which does not reveal its logical structure. Hence subjects 
would not be baffled even if a baffling logical structure were involved. 
Comprehension takes place on the basis of pragMtic relevance judgements 
which, in the case of the selection task, result in matching responses.
Evidently coaprehension of logical structure occurs only when a 
logical relation is expressed in a siaple linguistic form such as *p or q* 
or when the logical structure appears in a fuiilisr context. In the 
latter case it seems that sibjects are really comprehending the pragMtic 
structure of the task which, in the most facilitatory cases, is isomorphic 
with its logical structure. It seems reasonable to suppose that similar 
processes are involved in the comprehension of all verbally presented 
complex probleas. Hence, in the case of the selection task, the 
coaplicated process of forming an adequate representation of its logical

Experinent 4
INTRODUCTION
In the pursuit of an explanation of subjects' responses in the 
selection task it has been necessary to explain specific behaviours in 
terse of the way in Mhich they are detemined by more general cognitive 
processes. first'Kirder satching has been explained in terns of the 
relevance judgenents involvedi the relevance Judgesents being cued by the 
process of linguistic coaprehension. With the unfaeiliar and artificial 
material in the selection task subjects appear to reach solutions by 
making any direct inferences and relevance judgements which are possible. 
The results of Experiments 2 and 3 suggest that responses are soaietimes 
made on the basis of relevance judgements rather than on the basis of a 
logical strategy, even though the use of such a strategy is within the 
capabilities of the subject.
In order to solve a problem by use of a logical strategy it would be 
necessary to process its coaponent sentences syntactically in order to 
determine the logical relations between the items mentioned in the 
sentences. This suggests that the tendency to comprehend sentences on the 
basis of the relevance judgements they give rise to, rather than on the 
basis of their syntactic structure, may be an ir«tance of a more general 
phenomenon. It may be that sentences tend to be co^irehended primarily on 
the basis of pragmatic factors rather than on the basis of their syntactic 
structure. In other words, the grawaatical structure of the sentence as a 
whole may not be routinely used in comprehending it. This is analogous 
and related to the failure to use logical structure in comprehension, 
since the formal logical structure of a sentence is conveyed by its 
syntactic structure. It is therefore possible that matching bias is a
result of the prisscy of prsgMtic processing (not just relevance 
judgeaerts) in coaprehension.
In order to test the hypothesis that cosprehension sosetines takes 
place by use of s pragaatic rather than syntactic processing strategy» a 
sentence can be used of which pragaatically based processing would yield a 
different interpretation froa syntactically based processing (seaantic 
processing being included as a necessary precursor of pragaatic 
processing). Such s sentence has been aentioned by Bennett (1976) wtw 
reaarks that nurses and first-aid trainees are soaetiaes taught 'No head 
injury is too trivial to be ignored'. The intended aeaning of this 
sentence is that no head injury is too trivial to receive attention, hence 
processing which takes the sentence's graaaatical structure fully into 
account would reveal it to say sooiething absurd and contrary to the 
intended aeaning. By contrast, pra^Mtic processing, being a heuristic 
process for asking sense of a sentence, would yield a plausible 
interpretation.
If subjects are mainly affected by pragutic features in their 
interpretation of this sentence, they could be expected to find it a 
reasonable one to use in the circumstances. If, on the other hand, 
subjects understand the sentence by subjecting it to syntactic analysis, 
then they will appreciate that, formally speaking, it fails to express the 
intended meaning. Hence the hypothesis can be tested that the relevance 
judgements which give rise to matching bias are a special case of the 
prsgpastic processing of normal comprehension. Requiring subjects to 
evaluate the sentence for accuracy and comprehensibility serves as a test 
of whether subjects understand the sentence with or without passing 
through a stage at which it seems to them to be baffling. This would 
indicate whether the sentence is siiijected to syntactic processing in the 
course of cornprshandlnc Wason and Reich (1979) conducted an experiment
using sentences of this for« «ith differing levels of plsusiOility 
Tm o  exasples are] 'No sissile is too s m II to be banned' and 'No 
error is too gross to be overlooked'. In all 6 sentences the 
adjective 'agreed' «ith the verb in the sense that it is plausible 
that the sataller a sissile is, the less one sight be inclined to 
ban it. Contrast the sentence 'No head injury is too trivial too 
be i ^ r e d ’, where it is iaplausible that the sore trivial an 
injury is, the less one would be inclined to ignore it. All 16 
subjects correctly paraphrased two of the sentences, irf^ ile the 
siaallest nuaber of correct paraphrases of a sentence was three.
Hsson and Reich (1979) report that in their experience the 
'head injury' sentence is alsost invariably sisconstrued to sean 
that no head injury is too trivial to be noticed. The predoainance 
of this plausible interpretation of the sentence suggests that it 
tends to be understood on the basis of pragmatic considerations. 
However, it is not clear «^ther this reflects subjects' initial 
route to coaprehension. They aay make an initial attempt to 
understand it on the basis of its semantic content and syntactic 
form, and as a result of its complexity fall back on pra^Mtic 
cues. In this case subjects could be expected to report that the 
sentence is badly expressed and difficult to understand. A high 
rating of the sentence would suggest that subjects initially 
cosf)rehend it on a pragmatic basis. This would lend support to a 
view suggested earlier: that matching bias results froa an initial 
tendency to make pragmatically based relevance judgements, rather 
than from a failed attempt to analyse the logical structure of the 
selection task.
Eleven subjects participated on a voluntary basis. All were native 
speakers of Engliah, and the najority were isiiversity students or 
graduates. Their ages ranged froa 11 years to 70 years» and their 
linguistic experience ranged froa that of a schoolboy to that of a 
professional translator.
A printed sheet was given to each subject containing the following
Understanding Sentences
1 am trying to coapare readers' understanding of sentences written in 
different ways.
As a test of this I aa taking as an exaaple soaething a teacher of 
first-aid aight want to say. Suppose that he wants to tell his pupils 
that they oust always take notice of any head injury, however ainor. Or, 
to put it another way, that they oust not igiore any head injury.
Soae ways of saying this seea better than others. In order to test this 1 
have listed some sentences which aight be used. In order to coapare a 
wide range of sentences I have included soae which are probably stupid.
Please give each of the following sentences a aark froa 0 to 10 depending 
on how well it will be understood by learners to aake the teacher's point 
about head injuries. If you think the sentence will be understood to aean
the opposite to «^at is intended, or does not aalte any sense, or that 
nobody could be expected to understand it, please give it zero ’0 ’ narks. 
If a sentence is perfectly clear and accurate, so that no nistake could be 
nade, give it 10 narks.
HARK OUT or 10
1. Always treat any head injury
as thou^ it night be serious. —
2. Never ignore any ninor
head injury. —
3. No head injury is serious. —
4. That a head injury which does 
not appear to be nore than 
trivial nust not be ignored
■ust not be forgotten. — -
5. If soRteone has a head injury
which seems to be trivial, it 
is still a good idea not to 
ignore it. —
6. No head injury is too trivial
to be iywred. —
7. A head injury nay seen to be 
trivial, but it could turn out 
to be serious, and it should
not therefore be ignored. —
6. Minor head injuries can
be serious. —
9. The more trivial a head injury, 
the more it requires attention. —
10. No head injury is too
negligible to be neglected. —
Design and Procedure
Subjects were presented with the printed sheet snd ssked to coaplete 
it with their u r ks for each of the ten sentences. The ssin conparison to 
be aade was in the narks given to sentence 6, the target sentence, and 
sentence 5 which sees» to convey what is intended reasonably clearly and 
contains the same negatively weighted words: 'trivial' and 'ignore'. The 
other sentences were included to ensure that subjects were giving 
appropriate narks to difficult sentences such as sentence 4, and zero 
•arks to sentence 7 which is opposite in nesning to that intended. The 
additional sentences would also serve to nake the sonewhat aisleading 
guise of the experinent nore plausible to subjects.
RESULTS
TABLE 4.1
Harks given to the 10 sentences in ascending order of total narks. 
Sentence no. 3 9 4  10 8 5 7 2 1 6
Total narks 0 17 51 72 82 65 91 92 100 102
The target sentence (sentence 6) was given the highest total nark 
(102) even though other sentences such as 1, 2, 5 and 7 seen to be clear 
and accurate. This score was significantly higher than that given to 
sentence 5 (85 narks), (p <0.05, one>tsiled Wilcoxon Hatched-Pairs 
Signed*Rank Test), although sentence 5 expresses the intended neaning 
without containing any anomalous features. It is, however, sufficient for 
the present purpose that the target sentence (sentence 6} was ranked at 
least as high as some non-anonalous sentences with the sane intended 
neaning.
In view of the fact that a strict and literal interpretation of
sentence 6 revesls that it has iiplications which are both absurd and 
contrary to the intended aeaning, it is clear froa subjects' hi9h ranking 
of it that the sentence is understood priaarily by pragstatic aeans rather 
than syntactically. Turtheraore» this was the case in spite of the fact 
that subjects were asked to evaluate the sentences, id^ich should have 
engendered a acre than usually critical and analytic reading.
Discussion of Experiaents 1 to A
In Chapter 1 a nunÉwr of questions were raised concerning the reason 
why subjects frequently aake erroneous responses to the selection task.
One of these questions concerned the kind of bias which the observed 
responses reveal. The results of Experiaent 1 suggest that the aajority 
of responses result froa laatching bias of the first or second order, and 
that there is little evidence of verification bias. A second question 
concerned the origin of matching bias and whether it is due to the logical 
difficulty of the task or to the linguistic coaplexity of its wording. It 
was argued that in view of the prevalence of correct solutions to a 
disjunctive version of the task (Nason and 3ohnson-iaird, 1969) the 
logical difficulty of the logically equivalent conditional version of the 
task could not explain the results obtained. Experiaents 2 and 3 lend 
support to this view by showing that heuristically based responses can 
occur even when a problem involves a logical task of only moderate 
difficulty.
A further requirement of the 'logical difficulty' explanation of 
matching is that the selection task be comprehended in a way which revesls 
its logical structure. Comprehension of this kind requires complete 
syntactic processing of the relevant sentences. In Experiaent 4 it was 
observed that a linguisically complex sentence was comprehended primarily

In the preceding chapters it has been argued that the difficulty of 
the selection task is due to the linguistic coaplexity of its conditional 
wording. Cifiirical support for this view has been given by the results of 
Wason and Johnson^Laird's (1969) disjunctive selection task experiment. 
Other researchers however, notably Van Ouyne (1974) and Legrenzi (1970), 
have used versions of the task with wording which was not in conditional 
form and included disjunctive formulations. Van Duyne and Legrenzi did 
not observe any significant facilitation when these other formulations 
were used. Their experiments will be described in detail later, but for 
the moment a common feature of all previous experiments using alternative 
wording is to be considered. This is the fact that all such wordings have 
been formulated by the experimenters involved, and may therefore have been 
difficult for subjects to comprehend. In the next experiment to be 
described this feature was avoided by using forms of wording which had 
been previously elicited from the particular subject concerned. This 
should ensure that the wording is easily comprehensible to the subject, 
thus ensuring a fairer test of its facilitatory potential. In addition, 
analysis of subjects' own formulations of the relation concerned night 
suggest the existence of a form of wording which is preferred by a 
majority of subjects and could prove to be generally facilitatory.
Experiment 3
This experiment can be regarded as consisting of two distinct halves.
In the first half sii)Ject8 were presented with a form of truth>table 
relating to four conditional sentences. These sentences referred to an 
imaginary card game in which only certain pairings of a letter-bearing 
card and a number-bearing card are acceptable. The four tables related to 
the four variants which are possible when negation is included in the 
conditional sentence "If the letter is 'B', then the number is *3' ".
Subjects were asked to formulate a rule i4>ich would inform an 
imaginary partner in the card gaaie which pairs of cards should be 
accepted. They were not allowed to mention letters other than 'B' or 
numbers other than '3', in order to elicit equivalents of the negated 
forms of the conditional sentence.
In the second part of the experiownt sibjects were presented with 8 
variants of the selection task. Tour of these contained the standard 
wording as quoted above, and its negated variants. The other 4 contained 
the wording that the subjects had produced in the first part of the 
experiment. The only difference was that 'B' and *3' were changed to 'V 
and '6* respectively, and the items on the pairs of cards changed to 'V, 
'W, '6' and *7*. This change was made so that if subjects happened to 
recall a truth-table associated with one of their formulations it would 
not be possible to derive the counterexample to their formulation directly 
from it.
The first part of the experiment was therefore designed to provide 
evidence regarding the principles which underly verbal formulations of 
this kind of logical relation by competent language users. It should also 
show whether any formulation was generally preferred. The second part of 
the experiment should indicate t^ether subjects are able to perform better 
on the selection task « ^ n  the relation between the content items is 
described in their own words, and therefore in a way which would be
familiar to thea.
Subjects
Eighteen undergraduate students of Keele University participated in 
the experiment on a voluntary basis. Six of them had to be eliminated 
from consideration. In two cases there was a failure of the equipment or 
program and a further two subjects felt unable to continue with the second 
part of the problem, and would have been pressed for time had they done 
so. The remaining two subjects seemed to miss the point of the first part 
of the experiment, and entered only letters and numbers. As a consequence 
they could not respond to the 'own wording' versions of the selection 
task, and they also produced no correct solutions to the standard 
selection task.
The problems were presented using Apple II microcomputers with 
monitors to display the instructions and problems and disc drives to store 
responses. Responses were entered using the computer keyboards.
Two printed instruction sheets were also provided which contained the 
same instructions as those displayed on the monitor screen. The subjects 
could therefore refer to earlier instructions if they had been forgotten. 
The exception to this was that the first instruction sheet related to the 
first part of the experiment, and was replaced by the second instruction 
sheet when the first part of the experiment had been completed. The text 
of the instructions is shown in Appendix B. The problems presented to
subjects are described in the M in text below.
Subjects were tested individually, the procedure being carried out by 
the computer program. After extensive instruction (described in Appendix 
6} they were presented in turn, and in randomized order, with the four 
tables shown below and asked to type in their own words an instruction 
which would convey to an imaginary partner which pairs of cards were 
acceptable. They were not allowed to mention 'C or '4', and were 
instructed to mention 'B' and as few tines as possible. If subjects 
accidentally mentioned 'C or *4' the computer gave an audible warning, an 
error message was displayed on the screen describing the mistake, and the 
subject was invited to try again. If subjects pressed 'Return' without 
entering anything, a similar procedure resulted.
The four tables are shown together with the standard conditional 
wording relating to then. This wording was not, of course, seen by 
subjects until the second part of the experiment.
B 3 Accept 
B 4 Do not accept 
C 3 Accept 
C 4 Accept
If the letter is '6', then the nunber is '3*.
B 3 Do not accept 
B 4 Accept 
C 3 Accept 
C 4 Accept
If the letter is 'B', then the number is not '3'.
B y Accept 
6 4 Accept 
C 3 Accept 
C 4 Do not accept
If the letter is not 'B'» then the number is '3*.
B 3 Accept 
B 4 Accept 
C 3 Do not accept 
C 4 Accept
If the letter is not 'B'» then the number is not '3'.
After more instructions (see Appendix B) subjects were presented with 
eight selection tasks in randomized order, four of these were worded as 
in the conditional sentences associated with the above tables, and four 
were in the subject's own words as entered in the first part of the 
experiment, except that in all cases 'B's were changed to 'V s and '3's to 
’6's. In each case the associated table shown to siiijects was as follows:
Subjects were told that denotes a facenjown card, and were asked 
to type the symbol on the card paired with any face>down card they would 
need to turn over in order to decide whether the pair was acceptable 
according to the associated instruction.
If subjects typed anything other than 'V*, 'W, '6', '7* or 'none' 
they were informed of their error, and invited to try again. Typing
resulted in s message to type the syabol on the card paired with the 
intended face-down card. The responses were stored on disc with 
indications as to which variant of the problem they related.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The forms of wording produced by sii}jects in the first part of the 
experiment are shown in Table 3.1. Since subjects were free to use any 
fora of words they found appropriate, responses were formulated in various 
ways. However, a useful first indication of the underlying fora of a 
response was provided by the items which were negated. These negated 
items differ for each of the three main logically equivalent ways of 
expressing the relation concerned. For example, the formulations which 
are logically equivalent to the positive conditional 'If p, then q' (no 
negation) are 'Not both p and not-q' (q negated) and 'Not-p, or q (p 
negated). Subjects' formulations, although sometimes idiosyncratically 
expressed, tended to confirm the structure initially suggested by the 
position of these negations. There was only one response (see paragraph 
preceding Table 3.2) «4iich could not be interpreted as being a logical 
equivalent of the relevant conditional.
Nuabers of instances of the fonts of wording used in Experiaent 5
Table b.l
Conditional
Equivalent p -> q p -> -q - p  -> q -p -> -q Total
General fora
of subjects' 
wording
Specific fora (where different) next to nuaiber
p only if q 2 p 01 -q 0 -p 01 q 0 q 01 p 2 4
-(p 4 -q) 6 -(p4q) 11 -(-p4-q) 4 -(-p4q) B 29
-p V q 3 -p V -q 1 p V q 7 p V -q 0 11
Others 0 0 0 p V (-pAq) 1 1
Unclassifiable 1 0 1 1 3
Exaaples of su b le ts*  wording, on which th is  tab le  is  based, 
are given in Appendix C.
Twentyoine (601) of the responses could be clsssified as having the 
fora 'Not both p and not-q'. This is a foraulation irfiich iMi»diately 
calls attention to the counterexa^ile to the problea, 'p and not-q', and 
higher-order aatching responses to 'p* and 'not-q' would produce the 
correct solution as a result of a relevance Judgeaent alone. The aoat 
frequently obseved variant of this fornulation was the one with aininal 
negation '-(p i q)' t^ich constituted 11 (38S) of the instances. The aost 
highly negated variant ’-(-p i -q}' was least frequent with 4 (14S) of the 
instances.
The next aost frequent formulation (23S) was 'Not-p or q'. A 
disjunctive fora of the selection task with the wording, "Every card has a 
square which is black on one side, or a line »Aiich is crooked on the other 
side" was used in Wason and Oohnson-Laird’s (1969) experiment which has 
previously been discussed. It will be recalled that it elicited corrects 
solutions in 73S of cases. The additional negation (not-p) in the 
foraulation 'not-p or q', compared with 'p or q' increases its difficulty. 
However, this generalized representation of the wording is sli^tly 
aisleading since seven (64S) of the eleven disjunctive foraulations were 
in response to the 'If not^, then q' table, i^ r e  no negating tera is 
required because the disjunctive fora is, in fact, 'p or q' (see Table 
5.1).
Conditional formulations were uncoamon. There were 4 (8t) 
formulations using an 'only i f  fora of wordings two being of the fora 'p 
only if q' for the positive conditional, and two being 'q only if p' for 
the doubly negated conditional 'If not^, then not-q' ('q only if p' being 
logically equivalent to 'If not-p, then not-q'). Hence 'only i f  
conditional wording was used only « ^ r e  there was no other possible
wording which would completely eliminate the need for negation. No 
subject produced even one 'If, then' conditional. This miÿit suggest that 
conditional wording, particularly in the 'If, then' fora, is an unfamiliar 
way of expressing relations of the kind concerned. If this were the case 
it night account for some of the difficulty of the standard selection 
task. On the other hand, the absence of 'If, then' conditionals in 
subjects' formulations may be an artefact of the particular task they were 
presented with. Since the whole task is to specify the conditions under 
which pairs of cards must be accepted or rejected, the whole response must 
have the semantic force of a biconditionali s pair can be accepted 'If, 
and only i f  certain conditions are satisfied. To express the required 
conditions themselves in a conditional form would therefore require the 
emt>edding of one conditional within another. An example of such a 
formulation would be; "If a pair is such that if the letter is a 'B' then 
the number is a '3', then accept it. Otherwise reject it” . (The second 
sentence changes the form of the »A^ole rule from a conditional to the 
required biconditional by adding the 'and only i f  element). Sentences of 
this fore are surely unlikely to be considered maximally comprehensible. 
This may be contrasted with the equivalent conjunctive rule; "If a pair 
contains a 'B' without a '3', then reject it. Otherwise accept it".
Because this experiment required siAijects to include their statement 
of the relevant relation within a broader rule, the responses cannot be 
taken to indicate reliably how the relation would have been described if 
this requirement had been absent. In particular, the infrequency of 
conditionals may be misleading. However the choice of alternatives to the 
conditional form cannot be affected by avoidance of multiple embedding of 
the same kind of relation. Subjects' preferred formulations are therefore 
of evidential value.
It is notable that each of the four variants of the relation has
exactly one kind of fonulation which avoids negation of individual iteae 
(as opposed to the global negating function of the first 'not' in 'Not 
both p and not-q'. Of the 44 responses using these foraulations, 22 ( 301) 
of responses were of the one which avoids negation, compared with a chance 
probability of 33S that the least negated forn would be selected. This 
tendency to avoid negation, coabined with a tendency to prefer the '~(p 
&-q)' foraulation appears to underly the very strong preference for the 
'-(p i q)' variant in the appropriate case, with 11 out of 12 (92S) 
responses being of this kind.
Of the four remaining responses, three were unclassifiable. These 
three responses were made by the sane subject and contained direct 
references to the truth table such as "Accept first three cards". In the 
subsequent selection task these three formulations elicited the selection 
"None" from the subject concerned. The remaining response which could not 
be classified with any of the others was made in response to the 'If 
not-p, then not>q' table. It was worded "If the letter is '6' then 
accept; if the letter is not 'B' and the nurt>er is '3' then accept". The 
nearest equivalent logical fora to this appears to be 'p or (not>p and 
q)'. Since the counterexaaple is 'not-p and q' in this case, it seems 
that this response was simply a mistake. Probably the subject intended to 
make 'reject' the final word, in which case it would have constituted a 
correct instance of the '-(-p & q}' case of the general form '-(p & -q)'.
Nunbers of correct responses to each foraulation of the relation
Table 5.2
Conditional
equivalent p -> q p -p -> q -p  ->  -q Total
p only if q 1 0 0 1 2
-(p 4 -q) 4 6 4 4 20
-P V q 1 1 4 0 6
Total 6 9 8 5 26
Standard
formulation 5 4 1 2 10
Table 5.2 shows the nuabers of correct responses on subjects' own 
fornulstions of the task and on the standard foraulations. The difference 
in the nuabers of correct responses (28 / 48 on own foraulations» 10 / 48 
on standard foraulstions) is highly significant (p s Q.005, one>tailed 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Rank Test).
Hence it appears that subjects are likely to formulate the problem 
for themselves in ways mhich facilitate solutions. Sevety-five percent of 
subjects' own formulations were of a potentially facilitatory kind if 
these are taken to include the 'Not both p and not-q' formulations and the 
positive disjunctive formulation 'p or q'. This suggests that where 
relations such as those obtaining between the items in the selection task 
are encountered in people's experience of the world, speakers will discuss 
them with hearers in such terms that the latter are likely to make the 
correct inferences. Hence normal linguistic practice is likely to 
minimize the difficulty of the inferences which hearers are required to 
make. Subjects' performance on the conditionally worded selection task 
may therefore be a poor guide to the validity of the inferences they are 
likely to be called upon to make in real-life conditions.
Where 8iA>jects’ o«r> fornulations were used, 2 0  of the 28 correct 
responses (see Table 3.2) occurred in resporae to the 29 'Not both p and 
not-q' fornulations in the four forns possible «W e^n the negation of p and 
q is penautated. This formulation proved to be the most facilitatory, 
with a 69X frequency of correct solutions. This facilitation could arise 
because the counterexample is more obvious vhen a 'Not both p and not-q' 
formulation is used, or because higher^rder matching would result in the 
correct response. The question as to which of these coT^itive routes is 
involved in the observed facilitation will be further investigated in 
Chapter 5.
Disjunctive formulations elicited 6 correct responses with the 11 
formulations which were of this kind (53t correct), but 4 of the 6 correct 
responses occurred on the positive 'p or q' formulation, and could not 
therefore be explained by any kind of matching bias since the correct 
response is -q'. It therefore appears that disjunctive formulation 
makes the counterexample more available, probably because, as previously 
argued, the semantic criterion of validity of 'either p or q' is easily 
seen to include the falsity of 'neither p nor q'.
One subject gave correct responses to his two 'only i f  formulations, 
while the other subject who produced two such formulations selected all 
four cards when this wording was included in the selection task.
As remarked above, it remains unclear whether the facilitation 
observed with the 'Not both p and not-q' formulations is due to the 
greater accessibility of the counterexample or to higher-order matching, 
or both. Moreover, the apparent indication that the 'Not both p and 
not-q' form is facilitatory is in conflict with the results of Van Duyne 
(1974) and Legrenzi (1970) which have cast some doubt on the facilitatary
nature of thia fora of «fording. Van Ouyne coapared performance on 
problems «rith conjunctive »fording, the standard conditional wording and 
two other forms of words. These four problems had symbolic content snd 
Van Duyne used different content items in each of them. Of the 24 
subjects participating, 3 responded correctly to the conditionally worded 
problem and the conjunctively worded version elicited 4 correct responses, 
first-order matching responses of *p,q' or 'p' alone were observed on the 
conditional problem in 12 cases (301) and on the conjunctive problem in 13 
cases (34S). This leaves open the question as to whether the high 
incidence of first-order matching was due to the differing content items 
between problems, »fhich could have led to the items being perceived as 
multiple, or to the particular fora of wording used by Van Duyne.
Similarly, Legrenzi (1970) used the sentence; "It is not possible for 
there to be a vowel on one side of a card and not an even nuaber on the 
other side", written in Italian. His experiments included a single form 
of binary symbolic content. He found no facilitation (1 correct response 
from 13 subjects) with a conjunctive fora of words, and there were 11 'p, 
q' first-order matching responses.
To sumnarize these contrasting observations, Experiment 3 suggests 
that the 'Not both p and not-q’ formulation is facilitatory, and the 
results of Van Duyne (1974) and Legrenzi (1970) suggest that it is not 
facilitatory and that it elicits many errors due to first-order matching. 
The reason for these conflicting observations needs to be determined, and 
an attenpt to do so is made in Chapter 3. One possibility is that the 
'Not both p and not-q' form is not normally facilitatory, but that the 
facilitation observed in the present experiment was a result of the fact 
that the sentences ««ere in subjects' own words and reflected their 
individual preferences and linguistic experience. In order to test this 
conjecture Experiment 6 compares performance on the standard wording with

Cxperiiwnt 6
In this experiaent perforasnce on the four variants of the 'If p, 
then q' worded selection task including negation was coapared with 
perforaance on four logically equivalent tasks using the conjunctive fora 
of words 'Not doth p and not>g'. The aia was to establish whether this 
latter foraulation is, by itself, facilitatory to a sufficient extent to 
account for the facilitation observed in Experiaent The experiaental 
hypothesis was that on versions of the selection task with binary content 
this fora of words would elicit acre correct solutions than the standard 
conditional wording.
Subjects
Twentyfour Keele University undergraduates participated on a 
voluntary basis.
Materials, Design and Procedure
Printed booklets were used containing a sheet of instructions and 
eight selection tasks (see Appendix D). The tasks were presented in the 
fora of diagrams of four pairs of cards. On the left>hsnd card of the 
first and second pairs were the letters 'B' and 'C respectively, and on 
the right-hand cards of the third and fourth pairs were, respectively, the
Duabers '3' and '4*. The other card in each pair was left blank to 
represent a face-down card. The instructions asked subjects to put a tick 
in the blank rectan9le(s} representing the face-doM> card(s) they would 
need to turn over in order to decide «4>ether the stateaent accoapanying 
the diagram on each page was true.
The order of presentation of the tasks was counterbalanced between 
subjects, with the constraint that the two forms of wording appeared 
alternately. The relevant sentences in the standard condition were 
expressed as "If the letter is 6 , then the number is 3"| and in the 
conjunctive condition the wording was "There is no pair which can be 
described as follows: the letter is B and the number is not 3". This form 
of words was intended to resemble in a general sense the formulations of 
subjects who used conjunctive wording in Experiment 3, since the intention 
was to establish whether the wording observed there was the source of 
facilitation. It differs from the wording of Legrenzi (1970) described 
above, and from that of Van Duyne (1974)}"It isn’t the case that a card 
has a ’B’ on one side and doesn't have a *3' on the other side". The 
wording of both these researchers applied to the double sided cards they 
used, and included, in the case of Van Duyne, only this form of words and 
in the case of Legrenzi this form of words and also a 'Not both p and q' 
variant.
Subjects, either singly or in small groups, were presented with the 
booklets of problems and asked to read the instructions. They were 
requested to proceed with the problems in the order given when they had 
understood the instructions.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 6.1 shows the frequencies with which subjects chose all

Conditional Conjunctive
Variant p->q -p->q -|>-> -q -{p4-q) -(p4q) - (-pè-q) -{-p4q)
SELECTION * • + ♦ ♦ * + ♦
TA 4 2 3 1 2 1 1 1
• • * •
fA 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 ' 0
TC 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
rc 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
TA,fA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
* ♦ ♦ •
TA,TC 13 9 13 9 3 0 2 1
• ♦ * + +
TA,FC 1 1 6 1 7 12 19 13 16
• *
FA,TC 0 1 0 0 1 1 4 1
FA,FC 0 0 0 3 1 1 0 1
TC.FC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TA,FA,TC 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
TA,FA,FC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
TA,tC,FC 3 s 3 2 4 0 1 0
FA.TC.FC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All cards 1 0 1 1 0 0 2 0
No cards 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Total
1 s correct solution 15 60
* s first-order »etching 29 30
* : higher-order «etching 3S 43
Table 6.1 shows that of the 96 solutions in each condition, were 
correct on the conditional task and 60 correct on the conjunctive task. 
This difference is significant at the p x 0.0001 level (one-tailed 
Hilcoxon). Hence the experiiaental hypothesis was confimed. The 
difference observed is larger than the difference in correct solutions 
between the two conditions in Cxperiaent 5, being in the proportion 4:1 
rather than just under 3:1. In the case of the conjunctive problen it is 
possible to attribute the 60 correct responses to Batching, since matching 
(including higher-order matching to negated iteits) to the content items 
mentioned always yields the correct answer to the conjunctive problems.
In total, there were 73 (76S) matching responses to the conjunctive 
problems, snd 64 (67!|) to the conditional problems. Of the 13 matching 
responses to the conjunctive problems which did not yield correct 
solutions, 5 were selections of the correct letter card alone and 8 were 
cases of first-order matching to negated variants.
With the standard conditional formulation in the present experiment 
all subjects showed a marked tendency to select the TA card (8 6 ) rather 
than fA (11). The main difference between subjects’ selection patterns 
was in their choices of a consequent card. The choice of a consequent 
card may indicate the basis on which its selection was made more clearly 
than the choice of an antecedent card, which might be influenced by 
directional bias. For example. Subject 14 chose the TA and FC cards on 
all four conditional variants of the task, giving four correct responses. 
This suggests that Subject 14 was using a logically correct response 
strategy. This subject was a computer science student may well have 
been familiar with the truth-conditions of conditional statements.
Two of this subject's responses could also be described as choices of 
the TA and 'q' cards; but it would clearly be inappropriate to use this
description since tf>e 'q' card m b s  selected only on /ariants of the 
problea in t4)ich the consequent m ss  negated. However, where 'q' card 
selections predoainate in a subject’s responses the existence of an 
underlying first-order matching bias is suggested. This was the case for 
S of the subjects who between them selected 26 'q* cards and only 6 '-q' 
cards.
The responses of the remaining 15 subjects were most strongly 
characterized by a tendency to select the TC card (46) rather than the fC 
card (19). This pattern of selections of these 15 subjects suggests that 
they were primarily influenced by higher-order matching bias. Indeed, six 
of these subjects responded completely consistently with 'TA, T C  on all 
four variants of the conditional task. These results indicate 
considerable variability between individuals in their tendency to match on 
a first-order or higher-order basis.
The fact that responses tend to be consistent betweeen subjects in 
the choice of the TA card and variable in the choice of a consequent card 
has implications for the analysis of selection task data. One in^lication 
is that consequent card selections on variants of the task with negated 
consequents can provide a good indication of the kind of matching bias 
which has influenced those selections. On these variants, selections of 
the 'q* card are associated with first-order matching and selections of 
the '-q' card are associated with higher-order matching. Hence comparison 
of the numbers of selections of each of these cards should provide a good 
indication of the relative predominance of the two forms of matching bias.
A further implication of the results of Experiment 6 is that, because 
of the individual variation in consequent card choice, the proportion of 
responses of the two kinds is of less interest than is its change in 
response to an independent variable such as the binary or multiple content
used in Cxperiaent 1. The relative frequency of first-^rder and 
hiqher'order autching Might vary considerably between populations and 
could disguise a binaodal distribution within a population. What is of 
■ore interest for the present research is the change in the nuMbers of 
responses of each kind which is observed in response to an independent 
variable such as binary or multiple content.
The data obtained in Experiment 1 sight usefully be reanalyzed in this 
way, and the results may be compared with those of a similar analysis of 
the other studies mentioned in connection with Experiment 1.
Implications for Experiment 1
It will be recalled that on variants of the task which have a negated 
consequent the first-order matching selection is 'q' (FC) and the 
higher-order matching selection is *-q' (TC). On such problems, the 
tendency to select 'TA.TC rather than *TA,FC* should indicate the extent 
to nWiich there is a tendency to select a consequent card on the basis of 
higher-order matching bias. The results of Experiment 1 will be 
reanalysed in this way by comparing the numbers of selections of *TA,TC 
and 'TA,rc on the problems with negated consequents. This eliminates 
from the comparison the antecedent card choicea, which could have been 
influenced by directional bias and therefore constitute more equivocal 
data.
Pwices on sentences «ith negated consequents in Experiaent 1.
Abstract Thematic Abstract Thematic
Binary Binary Multiple Multiple
TA.TC 10 12 7 8
TA,fC A 0 4 8
Diff. 6 12 3 0
Coaparing the binary versions with the multiple versions me havet 
TABLE 6.3
Choices on sentences with negated consequents in Experiment 1.
Binary Multiple diff.
TA,TC 22 15 7
TA.FC 4 12 -B
Diff. 18 3 15
The figure of '13' at the bottom right of the table represents the 
combined decrease in first-order matching and increase in higher-order 
matching when binary rather than multiple content is involved. This 
figure represents 23S (15/60) of all the responses made to the variants 
with negated consequents. It la therefore a measure of the magnitude of 
change in the kind of matching bias on the basis of which responses were 
made. The change in the basis of responding, measured in this way, 
between the binary and multiple conditions in Experiment 1 is significant 
at the p < Ü.025 level (one-tailed Wilcoxon). A similar comparison 
between the numbers of these responses in the abstract (17 - 8 : 9) and 
thematic (20 - B = 12) conditions shows a difference (12 - 9 : 3) which is 
short of significance. This again illustrates that the differences 
observed are due to the different types of matching response to multiple 
and binary content, and not to verification bias or to the realism of the 
content.
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By using this messure as s basis for conparison with the other 
results considered in discussing Cxperiaent 1 it is possible to illustrate 
the extent of this change in responding, independently of the absolute 
frequency of the two types of bias in these experiaients. The figures are 
as follows:
Choices on variants with negated consequents in two experisents. 
Griggs and Cox, 1983.
Binary Multiple diff.
TA.TC 9 3 6
TA,FC 9 18 -9
Diff. 0 -15 15
Magnitude of change s 37»
md Ruth,, 1982.
Binary Multiple diff.
TA,TC 14 4 10
TA,FC 12 12 0
Diff. 2 - 8 10
Magnitude of change = 21»
It can be seen in tables 6.3 and 6.4 that in experiment 1 there was 
more higher-order consequent matching ('TA, T C  responses) than in the 
studies of Griggs end Cox (1963) and Reich and Ruth (1982). The Reich and 
Ruth study differs from the others in that all of the change occurs in the 
frequency of higher-order matching, while the other two studies show 
approximately equal effects on both kinds of matching. However, there is 
more consistency in the overall size of the change in responses as shown
by the figures for the 'Hegnitude of change'. Tor all three studies it is 
in the range 2(^401. This figure represents the proportion of responses 
in Mhich first-order consequent «etching cesses to occur or higher-order 
consequent Matching begins to occur on the binary probleas. It also 
indicates the source of correct solutions on the multiple problems with 
negated consequents in Experiment li namely, first-order consequent 
•atching yielding 'TA,FC' responses.
CoapartsoBof Experiment 6 with other studies
The 'TA,rc row of Table 6.1 shows the numbers of correct solutions 
to each of the 8 variants of the problems. The four conjunctive variants 
in columns S to 6 are arranged in order of logical equivalence to the 
conditional variants in columns 1 to 4 respectively, ie; '-(p4-q) in 
column 5  Islogically equivalent to 'p -> q' in column 1 , and the same 
applies to columns 2 6 6 , 3 & 7 and 4 & 6 . Comparing numbers of correct 
solutions on each conditional sentence with its conjunctive equivalent, 
there was little difference between the amount of facilitation observed on 
each of the four variants of the sentence.
Van Ouyne (1974) and Legrenzi (1970) found no facilitation using 'Not 
both p and not-q' wording compared with 'If p, then q' wording, in their 
initial forms (ie$ without varying negation). In the present experiment 
the comparable positive conditional "If the letter is B, then the number 
is 3" elicited one correct solution, while its conjunctive equivalent 
"There is no pair which can be described as followst the letter is 6 and 
the number is not 3" elicited twelve correct solutions. This difference 
is significant at the p < 0.001 level (one-tailed sign test). Hence it 
has been confirmed that under the conditions of the present experiment the

£xperi«ent 7
It ttas been noted obove that in Experiaent 6 results were obtained 
which contrasted with those of Van Ouyne (1974) and Legrenri (1970) whose 
findings showed no facilitation when conjunctive wording was used. The 
facilitatory effect of conjunctive wording in Experiaent 6 was also 
supported by the results of Cxperiaent 5, t^ere subjects own conjunctive 
formulations resulted in a high proportion of correct responses. It 
therefore appears that some unremarked difference between the problems 
presented to subjects in Experiments 5 and 6 and those used by Van Duyne 
and Legrenri must have been responsible for the difference in 
facilitation. Since the wording of the problems in Experiment 3 was 
elicited from the subjects themselves, and a similar 'natural' style of 
wording was used in Experiment 6 , it seems that the crucial difference in 
the wording might have been the logic-^sed formality of phrases used by 
the other experimenters. In the case of Van Duyne's wording the phrase 
'It isn't the case that ...' always occurred in his conjunctive problems; 
and Legrenzi's conjunctive problems all began with 'It is not possible for 
there to be (in Italian; 'Non e possìbile che ci sia To
attribute such considerable differences in facilitation in a post hoc 
manner to such a vaguely defined variable as 'naturalness' would be to 
abandon the investigation before it had properly begun. It was therefore 
decided to attempt to discover i^ther a single definable feature of the 
wording was responsible for the differences observed. The method adopted 
was a 'binary chop’ elimination strategy. This would involve formulating 
the conjunctive problems in a way i^ich was intuitively about half way 
between the formulations in Experiment 6 and those of Van Ouyne (1974).
If the facilitation were to disappear under those conditions, the next 
•ove would be to use a foraulation half way between the nost recent one on 
that used in Cxperiaent 6 . If, on the other hand, the facilitatory effect 
were to persist with the new fomtulation, then a fomulation even closer 
to that of Van Duyne could be tried.
The two conditions in the present experiment are therefore identical 
to those in Experiment 6 , except that the conjunctive versions of the task 
are worded ”lt isn't the case that a pair contains both a letter t^ich is 
'B' and a number which is not '3'", and the three variants generated by 
permutating the occurrence of the negating term 'not'. It will be 
recalled that the wording in Experiment 6 was "There is no pair which can 
be described as follows: the letter is B and the number is not 3". The 
general experimental hypothesis was that the conjunctively worded variants 
would elicit more correct responses than the conditionally worded 
variants. In view of the results of Experiment 6 it seems plausible that 
the effect of Van Duyne's wording was to minimize, rather than to 
completely eliminate, the apparently strong and robust phenomenon of 
higher-order matching. Van Duyne's results also support this conclusion, 
since he observed 4 / 2 4  correct (higher-order matching) responses. In 
addition, the wording in the present experiment was a hybrid of the 
wording in Experiment 6 and that of Van Duyne (1974). It was therefore 
hypothesized that there would be more correct responses to the particular 
variant of the conjunctive problem 'Not both p and not-q' than to the 
particular conditional variant 'If p, then q'. The main aim of the 
experiment was to eliminate possible sources of the differences in 
facilitation previously described; and this would be achieved whether or 
not the facilitation hypothesis was supported. An intermediate result 
would provide grounds for accepting an explanation based on the 
'naturalness' of the formulation used.

Conjunctive
Variant p->q p-> -q -p->q -p-> -q -(p4q) -'(-p*-q) “(-p4q)
SELECTION • • ♦ ♦ • * ♦
TA 3 3 4 3 4 3 1 0
* * * •
EA 0 2 U 2 0 0 2 2
TC 2 U 0 0 0 0 0 0
rc 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
TA,FA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
* * ♦ ♦ *
TA.TC 7 3 5 6 2 0 3 3
* ♦ • ♦ ♦
TA.rC 1 2 b 3 3 b 7 7 e
♦ *
fA.TC 1 2 3 0 1 4 3 2
• •
EA.FC 2 0 0 3 3 1 1 2
TC.FC 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
TA,FA,TC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TA,FA,FC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TA.TC.FC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FA.TC.FC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
All cards 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0
No cards 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Total
I X Correct seJaction 13 27
* X First-order RMtching 26 25
* : Higher-order oatching 21 21
There were 13 correct solution« of the conditional probleas and 27 
correct solutions of the conjunctively worded problems. This difference 
is significant at the p < 0.02 level (one*tsiled Wilcoxon). Hence instead 
of the fourfold increase in correct solutions in Experiment 6 in the 
conjunctive condition, correct solutions were only slightly more than 
doubled in number. Seven of the correct responses to the conditional 
problems were produced by two subjects who also gave correct solutions to 
all the conjunctive problems. If these subjects are separately classified 
as using a logical strategy, the difference in correct solutions for the 
remaining subjects is threefold (conditional 6 , conjunctive 19).
The incidence of matching responses was remerkably similar in both 
conditions. First-order matching accounts for 26 (3BS) responses to the 
conditional problems and 23 (37S) to the conjunctive problems.
Higher-order matching accounts for 21 (31X) responses to both sets of 
problems. This yields a total of 47 (691) matching responses to the 
conditional problems and 46 (6 6X) in the conjunctive condition. The 
similarity of these figures suggests that the majority of subjects were 
consistently responding on the basis of matching bias, and that 
higher-order matching is responsible for the greater number of correct 
responses to the conjunctive problems. This finding is consistent with 
the results of Experiment 6 , except that there was rather more 
higher-order matching on the conjunctive problems in that experiment (43%, 
compared with 31S in the present experiment). This difference, if it were 
found to be reliable, might be attributable to the more natural wording of 
the conjunctive problems in Experiment 6 .
A more important difference between the present results and those of 
Experiment 6 is that the difference in correct solutions to the positive 
conditional (2) and its conjunctive eguivalent (3) is not significant. At 
first sight, this result appears to confirm Van Duyne’s (1976) finding of
no oignificant difference between these two variants of the task.
However, the difference between perforaance on these two variants was 
coBparable with that observed between the other iogicaUy equivalent 
variants (see Table 7.1). Since the coabined effect was significant the 
lack of significance in the particular coaparison concerned nay be due to 
the saallness of the saaple. Hence, i^ile it seeas justifiable to 
conclude that the present experiaent has shown a genuine reduction in 
higher~order aatching and correct responding to the conjunctive problems 
compared with experiment 6 , the present result may represent an attenuated 
demonstration of the effects observed in Experiment 6 . The observed 
responses nay be a result of wording i^ich night have been less 
comprehensible than that used in Experinent 6 ; but there appear to be no 
grounds on which to base a stronger or nore specific conclusion. In order 
to confirm and explain Van Ouyne's (1974) finding a further experiaent is 
required using wording even more siailiar to Van Duyne's, and with nore 
subjects participating, in order to observe whether a further 'binary 
chop’ would eliminate the overall facilitatory effect observed in the 
Experiment 7. Experinent 8 was therefore devised in order to fulfil this 
requirement.
Exp«riaent i
This experiaent was intended to be a partial replication of that of 
Van Duyne (1974)t coaparing perforaance on selection tasks having 
conjunctive and conditional wording identical to the wording used by Van 
Ouyne (1974). To this end it was also necessary to present the stiauli as 
four double-sided cards, rather than four pairs of cards as in the 
previously described experiaents 5, 6 and 7. It was also an extension of 
Van Ouyne's study in the sense that all four variants which are made 
possible by the inclusion of negation were used for both the conditional 
and conjunctive versions of the task. Hence comparison is again possible 
with Legrenzi's (1970) study in which two of the four variants of the 
conjunctive foraulation (Legrenzi's Experiaents 2 and }} were compared 
with each other and with a conditional formulation (Experiment 1).
The broad experimental hypothesis was that there would again be more 
correct solutions of the conjunctively formulated task. Of greater 
interest was whether the conjunctive fora without internal negation *-(p & 
q)' would prove to be aaximally facilltatory as in Legrenzi's (1970) 
Experiaent 3, and whether the '-(p A -q)' fora would produce ainimal 
facilitation as in Legrenzi's (1970) Experment 2 and the study by Von 
Duyne (1974). Since the comparable conditions in the present experiaent 
were identical with those of Van Ouyne (1974), a similar result is to be 
expected for these conditions.
Subjec^
Twentyw^ine undergraduates of Keele University and of the Open 
University participated on a voluntary basis.
Design Materials and Procedure
These were as in CKperinent 6 , except that the stimuli used were 
diagrams of four double-sided cards showing respectively the symbols 'B'« 
'C'p *3' and *4’, and subjects were asked in the printed instructions 
which of these they would need to turn over in order to decide «4>ether the 
accompanying statement was true or false of the cards.
In the conditional form the statement was expressed in the words; "If 
a card has a B on one side, then it has a 3 on the other side", and by the 
three negated variants of this sentence. The following is an example of 
the negated wording; "If a card doesn't have a B on one side, then it 
doesn't have a 3 on the other side".
In the conjunctive form the wording was; "It isn’t the case that a 
card has a B on one side and doesn't have a 3 on the other side", and the 
three variants made possible when different combinations of the content 
items are affirmed or negated. Each subject attempted all B problems (4 
conditional and 4 conjunctive) which were presented in counterbalanced 
order with the constraint that conjunctive and conditional problems 
alternated and, as far as possible, each variant appeared equally 
frequently in each serial position. All the ir.temal nagativeR ware 
worded as shown above (ie; "doasn't have a B" and "doesn't have a 3"), 
Compare E^cpeiinents 6 and 7  where all internal negatives were worded 
as "not B" and "not T  (see p.l05 for examplea of the conjimctive 
wording).
RESULTS A W  DISCUSSION
Table 8.1 shows the frequencies with which subjects chose all 
possible card coabinations for all variants of the conditional and 
conjunctive foraulations. Selections on conjunctive foraulatione are 
described in relation to the equivalent conditional foraulation aa in 
Table 6.1.
Conjunctive
Variant p->q p-> -q -p->q -p-> -q -(p4-q) -(p4q) -(-p4-q)
SELECTION1  * • ♦ • • ♦ ♦
TA 9 8 8 7 2 8 2 3
• • • •
FA 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 2
TC 2 1 2 0 3 0 1 0
FC 0 2 0 1 2 0 2 5
TA,FA 2 0 2 0 1 1 1 1
• + ♦ ♦ *
TA.TC 14 0 10 7 15 2 3 3
• ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
TA.FC 1 0 13 1 2 1 14 10 4
• «
FA.TC 0 0 2 0 0 2 5 0
• •
FA.FC 0 0 0 7 1 0 0 11
TC.FC 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 0
TA,FA,TC 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
TA,FA,FC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TA.TC.FC 0 1 2 4 2 0 1 0
FA.TC.FC 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
All cards 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
No cards 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Total Total
1 8 Correct solution 16 29
* s First-order Matching S3 59
♦ s Higher-order matching 32 20
As in Cxperinents 6 and 7, there were more correct responses to the 
conjunctive problem (29) than to the conditional problem (16)} (p < 
O.OS one-tailed Wilcoxon). Hence the experiaental hypothesis was 
confirned.
Table 6.2 shows the percentage figures for correct responses to the 
two conjunctive variants inentioned in the introduction to the present 
experiaent and for three coaparable experiaents which were aentioned 
previously.
TABLE 8.2
Percentage of correct responses to two conjunctive variants of the 
selection task in four studies.
-(p & -q) -(p A q)
Experiaent 6 3 46
Van Duyne (1974) 17
Legrenzi (1970) Expt 2 - 77
Legrenzi (1970) Expt 3 7
It it noteworthy that in the conditions irfiich are directly coaparsble 
with those of Van Ouyne (1974) and Legrenzi (1970) subjects' selections 
were siailsr to those observed by these researchers. There was little 
facilitation in the -(p A -q) conditions, and considerable facilitation in 
the -(p A q) condition. The low level of correct responses to the -(p A 
-q) variant (3S) aay be contrasted with the level observed in Experiaent 7 
(29t) and more strongly with perforaance in Experiaent 6 (KIX). In the 
present experiment, the tendency to respond correctly to the -(p A -q) 
variant seems to have been replaced by s tendency to give the first-order 
aatching response 'p, q'. Fifty-two percent of the responses were of this 
kind.
In the conjunctive condition 24 of the 29 correct responses occurred 
on the two variants of the problea with neither or both content iteas 
negated} 14 correct responses on 'Hot both p and q' and 10 correct 
responses on 'Not both not*^ and not-^'. Where the content items differed 
in terns of negation, correct responses were rare} 1 on 'Not both p and 
not*<}’ and 4 on 'Not both not-p and q". It will be recalled that Van 
Duyne (1974) and Legrenzi (1970) observed few correct responses to the 
'Not both p and not^' formulation. This is in accordance with the 
broader pattern of results in the present Experiment 8 and may be due to 
an effect of the nmtwr of internal negations on the type of matching 
observed. On the doubly negated 'Not both not-p and not^' fora there 
were only 6 first-order matching responses, while on the positive 'Not 
both p and q' fora there were 22 such responses. The other two forms 
elicited respectively 20 and 16 such responses.
Since performance on the problems appears to have been more affected 
by matching biases than by logical strategies, as in the previous two 
experiments, it will be useful to compare the incidence of the two kinds 
of bias in both conditions, for this purpose, in Table 8.3, variants of 
each condition are paired, not by logical equivalence, but by similarly 
negated content items. On the conjunctive problems, unlike the 
conditional problems, there is no reason to expect a directional effect on 
selections. Therefore the selection of either conjunct alone - not just 
the p or not-p card - is taken to demonstrate first-order or higher-order 
matching bias. Selections of consisting of both one letter and one 
number are treated similarly in both conditions.
Incidence of tun types of Mtching response on conditional and 
conjunctive probleas with four types of content.
Higher-order First-order -> s Conditional
Mtching Mtching & s Conjunctive
-> i -> 6
P> 4 - 23 22 (14)
P.-q 0 3 (1) 21 (13) 20
-P i q 18 7^(4) 2 18
-Pi-q 14 14 (10) 7 6
Variants of the problen where matching to one number card and one 
letter card yields the correct response are indicated by The actual
number of correct responses is shown in parentheses. The difference 
represents single-card Mtching selections.
Potential sources of the correct solutions are, therefore, 
first-order matching on 'If p, then not-q' and 'Hot both p and q', and 
higher'-order awtching in the other conjuKtive conditions. Correct 
solutions to other conditional variants were very infrequent, varying from 
0 to 2. The influence of these biases on the distribution of correct 
(two-card) solutions is clearly considerable, correct solutions occurring 
at very close to 2/3 of the frequency of responses showing the relevant 
bias.
On the conditional problems the incidence of first-order Mtching 
responses was at least as high (46S or 53/116) as for any of the multiple 
content conditionals previously discussed, despite the binary content of 
the present version. In fact both forM of Mtching were present in very 
similar proportions to those observed on the multiple version of
115
Cxperiaent 1. The ri9ures for «etching responses «»erei first-order, Cxpt 
6 , 46S; Cxpt 1, 45)1; higher-order, Cxpt 8 , 26)1; Cxpt 1, 25%. This high 
incidence of first-order «etching «(ould explsin the occurrence of 13 
correct solutions to the 'If p, then not-q' vsrisnt, where the 'p,q' 
response produced by first order «etching is, in fact, the correct 
response. The other three variants elicited respectively only U, 1 and 2 
correct responses.
hence, for both the conjunctive end conditional proble«s, an 
explanation of the distribution of these two kinds of bias would also 
constitute an explanation of the origin of the correct solutions. Table 
6.3 shows that the distribution of these matching tendencies is similar in 
all conditional and conjunctive cases except those with '-p,q' content.
The high incidence of first-order matching responses to both versions of 
the problem in the present experiment clearly requires explanation, since 
this feature of the responses stands in marked contrast to the responses 
observed in the previous experiaents. Hence only performance on the 
negated forms requires any detailed examination because, where the content 
is 'p,q', only first-order matching is possible and it occurs with similar 
frequency on both formulations.
Conditional Problems
Considering the conditional cases first» the distribution of 
first-order matching bias may be compared «ith that observed in the 
previous three experiments.
TABLE 8.4.
Incidence of first-order matching responses to negated conditional
problems
Experiment 9
p -> -q
4
-p -> q 
1
-p ->-q 
1
Experiment 6 8 0 4
Experiment 7 8 5 3
Total 20 4 10
Experiment 6 21 2 7
Clearly a very similar distribution of first-order matching is being 
observed» but first-order matching responses are much more frequent 
overall in Experiment 8 . The reason for this latter feature can only be 
the wording of the conditional sentence» and not the references to 
double-sided cards for the following reason. The conditional problems in 
Experiment 1 resembled those in the present experiment in referring to 
double-sided cards. In addition, the abstract problems in Experiment 
1 had content similar to that used in the present experiment. Despite 
these similarities» first-order matching was much less frequent on the 
binary problems in Experiment 1 than on the (binary) problems in the 
present experiment. The difference in responses to the conditional 
problems would therefore appear to be due to some other feature in respect 
of which the conditional problems in Experiment 8 differ from those in 
Experiment 1. This feature could also be expected to be common to the 
problems used by Legrenzi (1970) and Van Ouyne (1974)» since they elicited
siailar responses to those observed in Ckperiaent 8 .
There is ■ consistent way in ahich the wording in the present 
experiaent is siailar to that used by Legrenzi (1970) and differs from 
that used in Experiaents 1, 6 and 7. The present wording; "If a card has 
a 6 on one side, then it doesn’t have a 3 on the other side" separates the 
negating expression ’doesn't' froa the negated tera '3' in a way that the 
wording in the other experiaents ’not 3' does not. This is snalagous to a 
feature of the conjunctive wording in Legrenzi's (1970) Cxperiaents 2 and 
3 where the wording was "un nuaero dispari" and "non ci sia un nuaero 
pari" respectively. The closeness of the negating tera ’dis-' in 
'dispari' (in Italian "dispari" is the only word for "odd", as though the 
only English word for "odd" were "uneven") in the first case is to be 
contrasted with the distance of the negating tera 'non' froa 'pari' in the 
second case. The Italian word order 'not there is' rather than the 
English 'there is not' makes the even greater distance possible. It 
therefore seeas that the prevalence of first-order aatching on the 
conditional probleas is due to the relative difficulty of converting 
'doesn't have a 3' to 'has a 4', coapared with converting 'not 3' to '4'. 
It therefore appears that Van Duyne's (1974) wording (identical to that 
used in the present experiaent) is sufficient to considerably reduce 
higher-order aatching in favour of first-order matching. In Experiaent 1 
it was observed that i^ r e  content differs between sequentially presented 
problems, there tends to be »ore first-order matching. The fact that Van 
Ouyne's content iteas differed betweeen probleas in this way could 
therefore have added to the effect of the wording of the negated terms in 
such a way as to counteract the potentially facilitatory effect of the 
conjunctive wording. In the present experiaent, however, the content was 
the same for all probleas and identical to that used in the previous 
experiaents. Hence the observed effect is here attributed to the verbal 
foraulation of the problem.
As shown on Tsble 8.4, first-order iMtching bias occurred ms t  
frequently on the conditional variant with a positive antecedent M f  p, 
then not-q' (2 1 cases) than on the two with negated antecedents (a total 
of 9 cases). This difference is highly significant (p < 0.002( two-tailed 
sign test) and is entirely consistent with the well-established tendency 
to select TA rather than FA which was discussed under 'Directional Bias' 
in Chapter 1. The 'If p, then not-q' variant elicited the majority of the 
correct responses, 13/16. First-order aatching appears to be largely 
responsible for the correct solutions to this variant of the proble*. The 
predoainence of first-order Batching on this variant appears to be a 
consequence of the previously mentioned tendency to select TA rather than 
FA. Alone among the negated variants, 'If p, then not- q' has a TA card 
which is the same as the p card. Whether an antecedent card is selected 
because it is the TA card or because it is the p card, first-order 
matching will appear to determine the antecedent card selection on this 
variant of the task. Hence more first-order matching is observed on this 
variant than on the two variants with negated antecedents! 'if not-p, then 
q' and 'If not-p, then not-q'.
Conjunctive Problems
Performance in the present experiment differs considerably from that 
observed in the previous experioients. This difference occurs on the two 
singly negated forms 'Not both p and not-q' and 'Not both not-p and q' 
where, by contrast with the previous experiments, first-order matching 
predominates. However, the doubly negated fora 'Not both not-p and 
not-q'in the present experiment elicited more higher-order (14) than 
first-order (8 ) matching responses.
It would appear that this difference between variants of the 
conjunctive problen iiuet be attributed to the different ways in which the 
content itena are negated. The wording of the two variants which elicit a 
preponderance of first-order Mtching responses are as followst
"It isn't the case that a card has a B on one side and doesn’t have a 
3 on the other side"
"It isn’t the case that a card doesn't have a 6 on one side and has a 
3 on the other side"
The only explanation of this effect which appears to be consistent 
with the different responses to the doubly negated fora; "It isn't the 
case that a card doesn't have a B on one side and doesn't have a 3 on the 
other side", is that the external negation "It isn’t the case that" is 
understood by subjects to cancel only one internal negation "doesn't have 
a", the two negatives raking a positive. For example, the wording "It 
isn’t the case that a card has a 6 on one side and doesn't have a 3 on the 
other side" ray lead subjects to infer correctly that "Every card which 
has a B on one side has a 3 on the other side", or rake s similar 
inference which would suggest that the relevant items were B and 3. From 
this point only first-order matching is possible, yielding the response 'B 
and 3'. On the other singly (internally) negated conjunctive variant "It 
isn't the case that a card doesn't have a B on one side and has a 3 on the 
other side" subjects may again infer, this time invalidly, that "Every 
card «4iich has a B on one side has a 3 on the other side" and go on to 
give the same first-order matching response: 'B and 3'.
Where there are two internal negatives, the external negative appears 
to lose its cancelling function, and higher-order matching is used to deal 
with the internal negation. In the previous experiments negation was more
closely associated with the negated itea» (ie; 'not 6' and 'not 3').
Hence subjects are aore likely to understand the negations to aodify the 
associated i t em rather than to cancel another negative, and higher^rder 
aatching is cosMon even on the singly negated variants. Only in the case 
of the doubly negated variant in the present experiaent is higher-order 
mtching the aore frequently observed fora (see Table 6.3). While it is 
plausible that two negatives can yield a positive, three negatives are 
aore likely to be seen as continuing to yield negation rather than 
cancelling one another. The external negative could be thought to cancel 
one of the internal negatives, but there would be no way of deciding 
vtfiich. Hence the two internal negatives aay be sore easily taken to 
aodify the content item which, being binary, are easily converted to 
their positive alternatives, leading to a higher-order mtching response.
This explanation is inevitably 'post hoc', in addition to being very 
speculative. However, the cases coapared differ so little in their 
wording that there appears to be no other independent variable on which to 
base an alternative explanation. Although the way in which the problea 
foraulations affect responses m y  not be precisely ss suggested, the 
features of those formulations tW^ich are responsible for the effect appear 
to have been identified by the elimination of other possibilities, and by 
consideration of the effect of the wording on responses to the problem.
Discuasion of an apparently similar effect
There is an interesting similarity between the effects of the number 
of negated i t em in the present experiment and the findings of Roberge 
(1974, 1976a, 1976b, 1976} using disjunctive reasoning tasks. Roberge 
used problem involving exclusive disjunction such as " 'Either there is a 
P or there is a Q, but not both', 'There is not a P', 'therefore ...' ".
He found that while there were fewest errors on the positive rule (p or q)
quoted above, sinqly negated disjunctions ('p or not-q', 'not-p or q') 
elicited alaost twice as many errors as the doubly negated variant 'not-p 
or not-q'.
Evans (1962) ofered two "siaple" interpretations of these results.
The first of these is that a disjunction with one negative is 
linguistically unnatural and leads to interpretations! confusion and high 
error rates. This seeas iaplausible on two grounds. First, there were no 
less than three spontaneously produced responses of precisely the fora 
which Evans declares to be 'linguistically unnatural’t 'not-p or q', in 
Experiment 9 above. Second, to say 'Either he has not yet arrived or he 
has already left' seeas as natural as 'Cither he has not yet arrived or he 
has not waited for us'. Evans's second "siaple" interpretation is that 
"the double-negative disjunctive tends to be converted into an affiraative 
form. That is, the subject given 'Either not p or not q' drops the 
negatives, and treats it as though it were 'Either p or q'". He points 
out that where, as in Roberge's experiawnts, the disjunction is stated to 
be exclusive, these two formulations are logically equivalent and dropping 
the negatives can lead to correct solutions. However, this equivalence 
does not obtain on inclusive versions of the task (or on singly negated 
disjunctions). Hence dropping the negatives leads to error in these 
cases, and superior performance on the doubly negated inclusive variant is 
not observed.
An interpretation which Evans does not consider is that subjects take 
p and q to represent the complete set of possibilities (in Roberge's 
studies each disjunct concerns the presence or absence of an upper case 
letter), and convert negated disjuncts to their positive alternatives. 
Hence 'not-p or not-q' would be converted to 'q or p'. This is logically 
equivalent to the 'p or q' produced by simply dropping the negatives. The 
way in which this transformation is here suggested to occur is similar to
the first sts9e of higher>order Matching, and on the doubly negated fora 
it would lead to correct responses. For singly negated disjunctives this 
process would result in conversion of 'p or not-g' to 'p or p', and of 
'not>p or q' to 'q or q'. Here such a conversion is invalid and would 
lead to errors.
Although part of the present research suggests this alternative 
explanation of Roberge's data, it would require further experinental work 
to take it beyond the status of conjecture. However, whether this 
conjecture or the explanation offered by Evans (1962) is correct, neither 
appears to assist in explaining perforaance on the doubly negated 
conjunctive in Experinent 8, since the responses observed could not have 
arisen in either of these ways. If sU>jects atteapting the doubly negated 
conjunctive task had dropped the negatives, or converted the negated 
conjuncts to assertions of the other conjunct (which seens iaprobable when 
one is stated to be a letter and the other a nuaber), this would have led 
to first-order matching in either case. However, the doubly negated 
conjunctive variant elicited more higher-order matching, and this is 
consistent only with conversion of the negated letter to the other letter 
and the negated number to the other number. If Roberge's results suggest 
anything relevant to the result of Experiment 6, it is that subjects nay 
be more likely to convert negated items into positive ones when two such 
items are present. This is possibly because the greater complexity of a 
statement containing two negatives is more likely to cue subjects to 
simplify the problem by converting the negated items to positive ones.
GENERAL DISCUSSION OF EXPER1HCNT5 1 TO 8
Experiment 6 finally allows the results of Experiment S to be 
explained, and those of Experiments 6 and 7 to be reconciled with the 
findings of Van Duyne (1974) and Legrenzi (1970). The facilitatory effect
of subjects' own fomilstior« was shown in Cxperiaent 6 to have been 
largely due to the preference for the 'Not both p and not-q' foraulation. 
This foraulation la facilltatory in that it can lead to the correct 
solution through first-order Batching in the special case 'Not both p and 
q', and through higher-order Batching on the negated variants. However, 
higher-order laatching also depends on the closeness of association of the 
internal negations in the wording with the negated teras, and perhaps also 
on the separation of the external negation froa the reaiainder of the 
sentence, since this would explain the larger effect in Cxperiaent 6 than 
in Experiaent 7.
This needs qualification, since higher-order Batching tends to 
persist in the esse of the doubly negated conjunctive sentence, however 
the negation is worded. A possible explanation is that the presence of 
three negatives in the doubly internally negated '-(-p A -q)' rather than 
two (as in the singly negated variants) inhibits the tendency to regard 
the negating teras as aodifying each other so as to yield a positive 
interpretation.
The effect of separating negations froa the terms they negate may 
also be responsible for some of the first-order matching observed on 
problems with multiple content items such as Hsnktelow and Evans's (1979) 
Experiment 2 and its replication by Reich and Ruth (1982). In these 
experiments negation is always separated froa the negated term by a verb; 
for example, "If 1 do not eat chips, then 1 do not drink brown ale". This 
may have enhanced the first-order matching tendency in these experiments.
In Reich and Ruth (1982), Experiment 2, the interpolation of other 
words between "not" and the negated term is present in only 2 of the 4 
problems used. However, in both problems used in Experiment 1 (Chapter 2)
"not" iMwdiately precedes the negated tera. This asy account for the 
relatively greater frequency of higher-order aatching in Experiaent 1 than 
that observed in the other studies with which it was coapsred (see Table 
1.4},
The aain iaplication of Experiaent 1 is that the so-called 
'verification responses' which have frequently been observed are 
apparently due to higher-order matching. It was shown that this fora of 
aatching is acre frequent when content iteas are binary« and that with 
overtly multiple content items first-order aatching predominates. This 
effect of content is most pronounced in the selection of consequent cards 
because many subjects tend to select the TA card even when the conditional 
has a negated antecedent and the problem has multiple content items. This 
feature of antecedent choice was attributed to directional bias which 
increases the salience of andus ponens inferences as a result of the the 
'Iff then' wording. There is therefore a stronger tendency for subjects 
to select a card which corresponds with the whole antecedent« including 
any negation. When the stage of selecting a card is reached (by contrast 
with the stage of comprehending the conditional) the choice is always 
binary as there are only two antecedent cards in the array. For example« 
in Reich and Ruth's (1962) Experiment 1 on conditionals with a negated 
antecedent, there were 33 selections which included a single antecedent 
card and therefore showed a definite preference for one or other of these 
selections. In spite of the strongly overt multiple content« 14 of these 
33 antecedent card selections were of the TA card. The strong tendency to 
first-order matching was therefore attributable largely to consequent card 
selections. The effect of multiple or binary content in Experiaent 1 
(Chapter 2) was also more clear in the case of consequent card selections« 
as described in the discussion of Experiment 6.
Cxperiamts 2 and } investigated whether the production of responses 
on a non-logicsl basis (eg; on the basis of Batching) is a fali-back 
strategy which will be observed only when the logical difficulty of the 
task is beyond subjects' abilities. In Cxperinent 3 it was shown that all 
subjects responded on the basis of a salient premise in the falling leaves 
problea. This occurred even though it was highly probable that sone of 
the subjects were capable of solving the logical problem when the salient 
premise was absent as in Experiment 2, and therefore of realizing that the 
salient premise contradicted the other premises. It was therefore 
concluded that pragmatic response strategies may be used even though 
subjects are capable of using a logical strategy. Detailed theoretical 
reasons have been advanced for accepting that nofV'logical strategies are 
cued as a part of the process of comprehension or representation of 
premises. In particular it was argued that the difference in performance 
on the conditional and disjunctive selection tasks requires such an 
explanation. Hence it appears that matching bias ia initiated before the 
logical task can be attempted, and that it forestalls such an attempt. 
Experiment 3, although not directly evidential with respect to matching 
bias, can be regarded as illustrating this forestalling of logical 
processing by a salient pragmatic feature of a problem. This was compared 
with the effect on HP inferences of Byrne's (19B6) highly salient but 
logically irrelevant extra premise: "If she goes out, then she will get 
wet".
Since it was argued that pragmatic judgements originate as part of 
the process of comprehension, it remained to be demonstrated that 
comprehension can take place on the basis of the pragmatic features of 
sentences without subjects' becoming aware of the effect of their 
syntactic form on their meaning. Such a conclusion was suggested by the 
result of Experiment 4, in which subjects rated a sentence as very clear 
and accurate although consideration of its syntactic structure would have
lid to the opposite conclusion. When relstionsl sentences such ss 
conditionals are coaprehended in this way, there is no structure to which 
rules of logical inference can apply. However, inferences can be made on 
the basis of the sentences' seaantic content and pragaatic force (ie; by 
truttwfunctional reasoning and the aanipulation of aental models). Such 
inferences will be valid if the processing is correctly carried out to 
coapletion. Whether subjects are capable of this will depend on the 
content of the problea and the demands of the task, such as the number of 
models required to represent a syllogisa (JohnsarH.aird, 1963).
If the premises include familiar relations between realistic content 
item, then reasoning aay well proceed on the basis of pragmatically based 
inferences. Whether this results in logically correct responses will 
depend on whether the pragmatic aspects of the premises are congruent with 
their logical aspects. For example, the permission schema underlying the 
Sears problem is congruent with the syntactic force of the conditional 
premise, while the fruit-picking problem in Experiment 1 appears to cue an 
inccngruent relevance-based pragmtic judgement which yields matching 
responses.
This raises the question ss to iWwther the pragmatic and logical 
aspects of people's spontaneous utterances tend to be congruent. It nay 
appear at first sight that such congruence is essential for effective 
communication, since otherwise the recipients of a communication might 
tend to draw conclusions which the communicator did not intend and would 
hold to be false. However, if both speakers and hearers attend only to 
the prs^Mtic force of utterances, most difficulties will be avoided. For 
example, "Mo head injury is too trivial to be ignored" appears to convey 
the intended message in spite of the fact that its syntactic force (iei 
its meaning as determined by consideration of its syntactic structure) is 
incongruent with the intended meaning. In order to notice the
inconqrupnce one has to be aware of the syntactic for* of the sentence. 
Howeveri where relational inforaation concerns an unfaailiar topic, as in 
the abstract selection task, there is no pragmatically based expectation 
as to «^at is intended. The only possible pragmatic judgement is one 
concerning the relevance of the content items. It is therefore possible 
that competent speakers will tend to formulate such information in such a 
way that these relevance judgements will accord with the logical 
properties of the relation.
In Experiment i a conditional relation was presented as a trutivtable 
in terms of acceptable pairs of cards. Subjects most frequently expressed 
this relation in the form '^ k)t both p and not-g'. This formulation is 
such as to produce correct responses « 4 ^  used with binary content in the 
selection task, since it leads to responses made on the basis of 
higher-order matching which coincide with the logically correct responses. 
This would account for the fact that in Experiment 3 subjects made 
significantly more correct responses to selection tasks formulated in 
their own words, which were predominantly of the form '-(p & -q)'.
In Experiment 6 other subjects performed significantly better on the 
*-(p & -g)' formulations than on the 'p -> q* formulations. It therefore 
appears that speakers may spontaneously formulate their utterances in ways 
which aid comprehension. Speakers may anticipate the probable pragmatic 
inferences of hearers, and modify their utterances accordingly.
Experiments 7 à 6 were designed to investigate why Van Duyne (1974) 
and Legrenzi (1970) did not observe facilitation with the '-(p i -g)' 
formulations. The results of Experiment B suggested that when negation is 
separated from the negated item as in the formulations of these 
experimenters, and when there is a single negated item as in the 
experimental conditions employed by them, then the facilitation is lost
because, with the conjunctive foraulation, higher>order matching is 
largely replaced by first-order matching. In other words, at larger 
separations between the negating term and the negated item a different 
pragmatic judgement is made. It is still a relevance Judgement, but one 
which ignores the more distant negating term, possibly because it is 
regarded as cancelled by the external negation to yield a first-order 
matching response. This effect is not observed on the doubly negated 
variant, which suggests that the external negation is not easily regarded 
as cancelling two internal negatives.
The case against verification bias
t#iile discussing the combined effects of biases, in Chapter 1, it was 
remarked that many researchers continue to interpret performance on the 
selection task in terms of verification bias. Continued acceptance of the 
verification hypothesis supports continued acceptance of the doctrine of 
mental logic, since verification is based on the use of logical rules 
which can show that a statement is true. It has been argued that the 
effect of multiple content casts serious doubt on the verification 
hypothesis, since it seems implausible that the presence of more 
alternative content items would cause subjects to abandon the use of a 
verification strategy. So called 'verification responses’ are more 
plausibly regarded as higher-^rder matching responses, which tend to be 
replaced by first-order matching when multiple content items are included 
in the task. This occurs because it is more difficult to convert a 
negated item to s positive one when there is laore than one positive 
alternative.
It is possible to argue against this, albeit post hoc, by insisting 
that what have been described as higher-order matching responses are 
really due to verification bias; and that the additional cosplexity of
Multiple content causes loss of the insight required for the use of a 
verification strategy. However) the case against verification bias is 
further strengthened by the results of CxperiMent 8. In that experisent 
it was observed that there was such »ore first-order satching on the 
conditional proble»s when the negating ter* was at sone distance fro* the 
iten negated. Table 8.4 shows the incidence of first-order *atching in 
Experi*ent 6 and in other experiments using conditional probleMs with 
negatives which iwediately preceded the negated ite*. It seems unlikely 
that this slight reforaulation of the problems could lead to the loss of 
insight required for the use of a verification strategy, resulting in 
first-order matching. Furthermore, in the case of the conjunctive 
problems the higher-order matching responses, when regarded as the result 
of a logical strategy, aiaount to responses based on falsification. 
Higher-order matching yields correct solutions to these conjunctive 
problems. In other words, it would be necessary to argue that different 
types of logical strategy are cued by different formulations of the 
problem, and that the insight necessary for either of them is lost when 
the negative is relocated. Then one would have to say that, in the case 
of the conjunctive problems, the logical insight required for 
falsification is regained when there are two internal negatives. Thus, in 
order to interpret the results of experiment 8 in terms of verification 
bias the verification hypothesis requires so much post hoc modification 
that it ceases to be tenable. This conclusion is further ji»tified by the 
evidence in favour of the hypothesis that subjects tend to simplify the 
problem by converting negated items to positive ones when this is easily 
done, and when the abundance of negatives more strongly motivates such 
simplification. This explanation is also supported by the observation in 
Experiment 3 that subjects tend to minimire the nuaber of negatives in 
formulating similar relations in their o mi words.
The THOG Problen
The aia of the present chapter is to consider whether the processes 
inplicated in responses to the selection task are also involved in the 
generation of patterns of response to the THOG problea. following a 
discussion of some published evidence concerning this question, two 
experiaents of ay own will be described. The first of these concerns an 
attempt to devise a pragmatically facilitatory version of the THOG 
problem. The second experiment investigates the effect of changing the 
foraulation of the problem in two ways. One of these involves the use of 
conjunctive wording, which was found to be facilitatory in the selection 
task. The second involves a change which may make it easier to form a 
complete representation of the problem structure. It will be recalled 
that in the selection task some erroneous responses were considered to 
originate at the representational stage rather than at a later stage when 
'logical difficulty' could be important. A similar explanation of 
erroneous responses to the THOG problem may be possible.
The THOG problem was devised by Wason (1977), and it provides an 
alternative paradigm on which biases in reasoning can be investigated.
The problem, in the standard abstract form currently in general use is as
\
follows:
At the bottom of the page are four designs: BLACK DIAMOND, WHITE 
0IAH0^C, BLACK CIRCLE and WHITE CIRCLE. You are to assume that 1 have 
written down one of the colours (black or white) and one of the shapes 
(diamond or circle). If a figure has either the colour or the shape 1
have written down, then it is called a THOC. If a figure has both the 
colour and the shape I have written down, it is not s TH0C> If a figure 
has neither the colour or shape 1 have written down, it is not a THOG.
1 now tell you that the BLACK DIAMOND is a THOG.
What can you say, if anything, about whether each of the other 
designs is a THOG?
There follows an illustration of the four shapes, arranged in a 
vertical column, with a space next to the last three for subjects’ 
answers. Subjects may be asked to use '1' or a tick to indicate that the 
design is a THX, '2' or a cross to indicate that it is not a THOG or '3' 
or a question nark to indicate that there is insufficient information or 
that they are unable to decide.
Correct solutions to the problem are uncommon. Wason and Brooks 
(1979, Experiment 1) obtained only 3 correct solutions from 14 subjects 
and Newstead, Griggs and Warner (1982, Experiments 1 and 2} obtained 4 
correct solutions from 30 subjects on the standard abstract version of the 
problem. The most common form of response to the problem (Wason, 1977; 
Wason and Brooks, 1979) is the ’mirror image' error or ’Type A intuitive 
error’ (Griggs and Newstead, 1983) in which subjects identify the white 
diamond and black circle as THOGs while the white circle is deemed not to 
be a THOG. Another comaion error is for subjects to say that the white 
circle is not a THOG, and to be unable to decide about the other two 
figures; Type B intuitive error (Griggs and Newstead, 1963). Wason and 
Brooks (1979) were the first to describe these forms of response as 
'intuitive errors' which, it will be argued, seem to be attributable to a
for* of Mtching response.
The source of intuitive errors in the THQG problew
Since the black disaKtnd is stated to be a THX, subjects M y  tend to 
identify figures with features in cowion with it as THXs and, perhaps 
with More certainty, to identify figures with nothing in cowaon with it as 
not being THXs. Both of these responses would suggest that subjects 
producing then have no insight into the logical structure of the problen. 
Although particular shapes and colours are not naaed in the disjunctive 
rule, one of each is naned in describing the positive exsnple of a THOG: 
the black dianond. It is therefore predictable that if any matching 
resposes are Mde, they will be made by matching to these features. Hence 
the Mtching hypothesis M y  be taken to predict the responses described as 
'intuitive errors', whatever the logical criteria for a figure's being a 
THOG.
Griggs and Newstead (1963) tested the Mtching hypothesis by using 
versions of the problem with different logical criteria. Hatching 
responses were observed in two of these; NOT-THOG end DENIAL-THX. The 
NOT-THX problem is identical to the T H X  problem except that subjects are 
told that the black diamond is not a THX. Of the 40 subjects 
participating, 10 gave Type A responses, the correct response to this 
problem, and there were 2 Type 6 responses. The DCMAL-THX problem uses 
the following rule: 'If, and only if, a design either does not include the 
colour that I have written down, or does not include the shape that 1 have 
written down, or does not include both the colour and shape I have written 
down, then it is a THX'. The correct response is that it is iaf^ossible 
to classify any of the designs. There were 16 intuitive errors from the 
33 subjects participating. In both of these experiments intuitive errors 
were the most frequent responses, thus lending support to the Mtching
hypothesis Mhich predicts the*.
Griggs and Newstead (1987) also investigated performance on the 
AMI-THOG and NOT-ANTl-THOG problems. In the ANT1~TH0G problem subjects 
were told: 'There is a particular colour and a particular shape such that 
any of the four designs which has both of then, or neither of them, is 
called a THOG. If the black diamond is a THOG, could any of the other 
designs be a THOG?'. The NOT-ANTl-THOG problem is similar except that 
subjects are told that the black diamond is not a THX.
Griggs and Newstead (1983) observed 9/20 correct answers (i4iich are 
the same as the correct answers to the THOG problem) on the ANTl-THOG 
problem. Incorrect responses were varied. The matching hypothesis would 
have predicted a tendency to respond with the sane intuitive errors ss are 
observed on the THOG problem. However, ANTI-THOG is an easier problem 
because the rule is formulated in a conjunctive manner rather than a 
disjunctive one. Thus the relevant rule can be redescribed as saying that 
figures with the particular shape and the particular colour are THOGs and 
figures with neither are THOGs. The word 'or' in the AUl-THOG rule 
therefore has little semantic or pragmatic force. In addition, the 
consequences of the description in the ANTI THOG problem are iimnediately 
apparent. Since a THOC contains both or neither of the features 
concerned, two THOGS will have no feature in conaRon. Hence this 
conjunctive version of the THOG problem, like the disjunctive version of 
the selection task mentioned previously (Wason and Johnson>Laird, 1969), 
appears to be so linguistically simple that subjects are not likely to 
adopt a matching strategy. Instead they may be reasoning 
truth-functionally and making the appropriate direct inference, rather 
than making the kind of relevance judgement which leads to a matching 
response.
On the NOT-MTl-THOC probleei, «here the correct response is the sane 
ss s Type A intuitive error on the THOG problem, the nstching hypothesis 
Mould predict a tendency to give the correct response. Only 2 responses 
of this kind Mere observed, and in 6 of the 18 erroneous responses 
subjects stated that there was insufficient information to decide about 
any of the figures. It has been argued throughout this thesis that 
matching is not merely a response to bafflement and logical confusion.
Only if an alternative to that account of matching is accepted does an 
explanation become possible ss to why so few matching responses are 
elicited by the K0T~AM1-TH0G problem:a particularly difficult problem on 
the evidence of only 2/20 correct solutions. It is argued throughout this 
thesis that matching is not a product of bafflement, but a product of 
normal linguistic processing. It was suggested that the account of Evans 
(1963a, 1963b) is correct (see pages 14 & 13): matching results from 
making relevance Judgements. HOMever, in a departure from the account 
given by Evans, it has also been argued that subject sometimes take 
factors such as negation into account in making relevance Judgements; 
hence the phenomenon of higher-order matching. On other Mords, subject do 
not simply make Judgements of Mhat is relevant, but also make Judgements 
as to those items are relevant (eg; negated items may point to the 
relevance of their positive alternatives). Using this conception of 
matching it becomes apparent that subjects attempting the NOT-ANTI-THOG 
problem might find it difficult to see how the information that 'the black 
diamond is not a THOG' relates to the conjunctive rule in the problem.
This difficulty can arise because there are three ways in which a 
conjunctive relation (eg; 'p i q'} can be false (ie; '>p & q', ' p i  ->q' 
and '-p & 'q'), but only one way 'p i q' in which it can be true.
In two of these three asys the black diamond can fail to be a THX. 
Hence subjects atay be unable to make any relevance Judgement based on the 
fact that the black diamond is not a THX, since it is not possible to 
decide which of these two possibilities is instantiated by this
infornetion. They M y  thereforete cued to reepcnd that thoro is 
insufficient InforMtlonto decide whether the other three figures are 
THOCs: the Most frequently observed response to this problea. Hence, 
soaewhst paradoxically in the context of the 'logical difficulty' view of 
Matching, the problea aay be too difficult to elicit Matching responses. 
This possibility can arise only if matching responses are regarded, as 
argued throughout this thesis, as the product of nomtal linguistic 
processing and not merely responses to bafflement and logical confusion.
Griggs and hewstead also used the above experiments to evaluate the 
alternative hypothesis that intuitive errors are due to what Bruner et al 
(19M) call the 'connon element fallacy's the presupposition that positive 
instances of a concept must have features in connon. According to this 
hypothesis, subjects make the assumption that a THOG must have at least 
one feature in coamon with the black diamond, and reason logically 
thereafter. This hypothesis entails different predictions from those of 
the matching hypothesis only if matching bias is supposed to occur by 
'perceptual matching' to the features of the positive example. Griggs and 
Hewstead (1983) adopt a perceptual view of matching rather than the 
linguistic account presented in this thesis. This explains their 
inability to account for the absence of matching bias on the N0T«ANT1«TH0G 
problem, since the linguistically based explanation suggested above is not 
available to them. When a linguistic account of matching is applied to 
the THOG problem, it would seem that subjects reach a pragmatically based 
understanding of the problem which includes a judgement that the features 
of the black diamond are relevant in deciding whether something is, or is 
not, a THOG. Classifying the figures on the basis of whether they match 
one of these features would result in responses which are 
indistinguishable from those which have been attributed to the coamon 
element fallacy.
Cvsns (1962, p.207) takes a view of the coanon element fallacy which 
is similar to the explanation proposed above, and considers it to be "... 
akin to matching bias". Evans (1983, p.l58) also points out that a 
perceptual explanation of matching bias (such as that adopted by Griggs 
and Ivewstead (1963)) is hard to reconcile with its dependence on 
conditional rather than disjunctive rules in the selection task, and 
(ibid, p.l39) its occurrence when truth-tables are to be evaluted or 
positive examples constructed. The previously described effects of 
negatives in the context of binary or multiple content in the selection 
task also militate against a perceptual explanation of matching bias. The 
effect concerned illustrates that matching is not simply perceptual but is 
sensitive to context, since when the same stimuli are presented in binary 
rather than multiple guise first-order matching is considerably reduced. 
True, it is replaced by higher-order matching, but this involves a 
linguistic conversion of the item and is not therefore a perceptual 
phenomenon. When matching bias is regarded as a linguistically penetrable 
phenomenon, it appears to be the more acceptable explanation of intuitive 
errors in the THOG problem.
The explanation of performance on the THOG problem as the result of 
subjects' susceptibility to the common element fallacy, when this is 
regarded as a psychologically real logical fallacy, has a parallel in the 
selection task research, where responses due to (higher-order where 
possible) matching have been attributed to a 'verification fallacy'. Such 
explanations unnecessarily introduce considerations of the presence of or 
^sence of 'logical insight'. They are st a level appropriate to 
evaluation of the cognitive processes concerned ('fallacy' is a term of 
negative evaluation), rather than at the lower level appropriate to 
description of these processes. Explanation in terms of matching bias 
therefore has greater psychological reality and is also preferable by the 
criterion of Occam's razor, since it avoids invoking the extra (and
soaenfhat indefinite) variable 'logical insight'.
It has been argued in previous chapters that lutching tends to occur 
when subjects are unable to forn a complete structured representation of 
the premises of a problem. Opinion is divided as to whether this is the 
case for subjects attempting the THOG problem. Mason and Brooks (1979) 
found that 711 of subjects in two experiments correctly stated the two 
possible combinations of a colour and a shape which could have been 
written down: the 'alternative hypotheses'. However, subsequent 
completion of the problem did not indicate any facilitation as a result of 
this. Mason and Brooks concluded that subjects understood the premises, 
but were not thereby cued to, or were unable to, perform the required 
combinatorial analysis. Hore recently Smyth and Clark (1966) reached a 
similar conclusion using a 'realistic' version of the problem. By 
contrast Griggs and Sewstead (1962), argue that subjects' understanding of 
the problem is not complete, since their representation of the problem 
does not include the items not written down and the relation of these 
items to the items which are written down. Their experiments will be 
described in the context of Experiment 10 and an attempt will also be made 
to reconcile these apparently conflicting accounts.
The effect of realistic content in the THOG problem
There have been several attempts to devise fscilitatory versions of 
the task. One approach to this is to use realistic content, as in the 
selection task, facilitation produced in this way has been attributed to 
memory-cuing (hewstead et al., 1962) when the content is very realistic 
and the correct response is in accordance with experience. Hence when a 
version of the problem was used which required subjects to choose between 
'a haiburger and syrup', 'pancakes and mustard' and 'a hamburger and
■ustard' as ccMrt)inations which the experiaenter would eat, and the correct 
answer was that he would eat only 'a hasburger and mustard', even and 
9-year-old children showed excellent performance ( 7 H  correct). However, 
on another version of the problem for which the correct answer is that the 
experimenter would eat only 'pancakes and mustard' there were no correct 
answers.
Arbitrary combinations of concrete content items produce little 
facilitation (Mason, 1977; Newstead et al., 1982: Experiment 1). If the 
conclusions concerning the source of facilitation in the selection task 
are to be seen to apply to a wider range of reasoning paradigms, it would 
be desirable to discover whether a version of the THOG problem can be 
devised which, through the incli«ion of plausible content, can facilitate 
performance in a manner analogous to the Sears problem version of the 
selection task. This task is made more difficult by the fact that people 
tend not to use disjunctive descriptions, familiar examples of such 
descriptions are therefore predictably difficult to find. This problem 
may be circumvented by couching a version of the THOG problem in 
prescriptive terms. Such prescriptive formulations are common to all of 
the reliably highly fscilitatory versions of the selection task which have 
been described in the literature. Disjunctive prescriptions, as opposed 
to descriptions, are connonplace (eg; "You may have coffee or tea"), hence 
this might appear to be the direction in which a search for a facilitatory 
THOG could most profitably be pursued. The experiment which follows 
represents one attempt along these lines.
EXPERIMENT 9
In an unpublished study the present author (Turner, 1962) obtained some 
facilitation using versions of the problem which incorporated familiar 
relationa between the content items in the THOG problem. One such version
of tl>e problen, trmed the CARDS problem, appeared to be highly 
facilitatory, but Griggs (personal communication) found no significant 
facilitation with this version of the problem during pilot studies. Since 
the experiment conducted by Turner (19B2) involved individual subjects ««ho 
were kno««n to the experimenter, it was suspected that some of the 
facilitation might have been due to an experimenter effect. It was 
therefore decided to investigate «Aether the CAROS problem would produce 
facilitation when subjects participated in groups rather than individually 
as in the earlier study, and the experimenter had no previous acquaintance 
with the subjects.
In the CARDS problem the content items stand in a relation to one 
another which may be familiar to subjects. The relation of exclusive 
disjunction with which the THOG problem is concerned is represented in the 
CAROS problem as obtaining betwen the shapes and parities of playing 
cards. The disjunctive rule is not explicitly stated since it is to be 
derived by subjects from information contained in the problem (see below 
under 'Haterials'}, from which it follows that an acceptable combination 
must contain either the point-scoring colour or the point-scoring parity, 
but not both. This relation is isomorphic with the relation obtaining 
Det««een the written down colour and the written down shape in the standard 
THOC problem.
Thirty Keele University students participated on a voluntary basis.

4 solved only the CARDS problen correctly. This difference falls Just 
short of significance using s one-tailed sign test (p s 0.063).
However) Griggs (personal conmunication) ran an experinent using the 
CAROS problen which was identical to the present experiment except that 
the CARDS problem was always presented first, and the word 'colour' was 
spelled 'color', the subjects being 24 University of Florida students.
The results were the same as those of the present experiment, with 1 
subject responding correctly to both problems and 4 correct solution on 
the CAROS problem only. Therefore a one-tailed sign test again yields a 
significance of p s 0.063.
Using Rosenthal's (1978) formula for combining probabilities from 
independent studiest
N
p s (pi + p2 ♦ ...) / N!
2
p s (0.063 4- 0.063) / 2 
2
p s 0.126 / 2
p s Q.OOB
Hence the combined result is significant at the p < 0.01 level. It 
seems unlikely that Griggs's experiment could have been affected by the 
fixed order of presentation, since in the present experiment, of the four 
subjects who responded correctly to the CARDS problem, two did the THOG 
problem first and two did it second. Hence it might appear that a small 
but reliable degree of facilitation has been observed on the CARDS problem 
through the use of a familiar arithmetical relation which is isomorphic 
with the relation of exclusive disjunction in the THOG problem. The 
smallness of the degree of facilitation may be due to the fact that 
although the relation concerned is a familiar one, the context in which it 
is presented is that of an arbitrary rule. It therefore remains a
possibility thst if such a relation were incorporated into a «ore 
realistic and sensible rule, as for evaaple in the Sears version of the 
selection task, a greater degree of facilitation night be observed.
On the other hand, it may be that the CARDS problem is facilitatory, 
not because it includes a familiar relation, but because the relation of 
exclusive disjunction is not formally stated in the problem. Smyth and 
Clark (1966) argue that a formal statement of the disjunctive rule gives 
subjects the impression that the problem is insoluble because of the 
presence of t«*o unknowns. They take the widely held view (which is 
challenged in this thesis) that the intuitive errors observed are the 
result of a form of matching which is induced by logical difficulty. The 
logical difficulty, according to Smyth and Clark (19S6), consists in the 
apparent insolubility of the problem when subjects form the impression 
that it involves two unknowns.
They used a problem which involved "being my half-sister", which they 
defined disjunctively as "If and only if the description of a woman's 
parents includes either the mother 1 have written down or the father 1 
have written down, but not both, then that woman is ay half-sister". They 
asked subjects to consider the four possible pairings between 'ny father’, 
'ay mother', 'George' and 'Jane': given that the parents of one 
half-sister are 'my father and Jane'. When the disjunctive definition was 
not included in the instructions, 14 out of 19 subjects correctly 
responded that only 'my mother and George' could also be parents of 'my 
half-sister*. When the disjunctive definition was included in the 
instructions there were only 11 out of 30 correct responses. The central 
problem is much simpler than the THOG problem since it can be solved even 
without a positive example. The fact that 'my mother' and 'my father' ere 
included in the list of people, instead of the names of another woman and 
man, removes the possibility of considering alternative hypotheses as to
which of the parents of a particular half-sister is also one of ay 
parents. When the terns 'ay mother' and 'ay father’ were replaced by 
'Nary' and 'Tom', and the disjunctive definition was included, perforaance 
was no better than on the standard THOG problem.
As noted above, Smyth and Clark (1986) concluded that, on the first 
version of the problem, using the teras 'ay aother’ and 'ay father', the 
presence of the disjunctive rule suggested to subjects that there were two 
unknowns in the problem, and that it was therefore insoluble. They argue 
that in the standard THOG problem the disjunctive rule has the same 
effect: subjects decide that the problem is insoluble and are therefore 
deterred from testing the alternative hypotheses. Smyth and Clark (1986), 
using the harder version of their half-sisters problem which lists only 
two male and two female names, asked subjects to state the alternative 
hypotheses; in this case the pairs who could be 'my parents'. They found 
that 20/30 subjects were able to list the correct pairs, but only 3 of 
these 20 subjects went on to give a correct answer to the problem. This 
is comparable with the observations of Wason and Brooks (1979) who found 
that 9/14 subects could state the alternative hypotheses in the THOG 
problem, but only 3 went on to give correct solutions. Both Wason and 
Brooks (1978) and Smyth and Clark (1966) argue that the difficulty of the 
problem is a computational one and subjects do not attempt, or cannot 
perform, the combinatorial analysis required to test the alternative 
hypotheses as to what the 'written-down' features might be. This view 
seems to be contradicted by the fact that Smyth and Clark's subjects 
perfomed less well when the disjunctive rule was included in the easy 
version of the half-sisters problem which uses the terms 'ay mother' and 
'my father') and therefore contains no unknowns and requires no hypothesis 
testing.
In the case of the THOG problem, the argument rests on the assumption
that combinatorial analysis and hypothesis testing are required in order 
to solve the problem, howeveti it may also be solved by representing the 
relation involved as a conjunctive one. Complete comprehension of the 
premises of the THOG problem could result in a representaton which 
includes the set of two written down features and the set of two features 
which are not written down.
Not Written Down
From the fact that a THOC oust combine a colour and a shape» and only 
one of these must be from the 'written down' list, the following 
elaboration of the representation may occur:
Written Down 
colour 
shape
Not Written Down 
* shape s THOG
+ colour = THOG
Such a representation of the premises of the problem might enable 
subjects to see that «W e^n 'black' and 'diamond' are substituted for one of 
the THOC-making coabinations, only 'white' and 'circle' remain to form the 
other allowable combination. It is therefore possible that the presence 
of the disjunctive rule (contrary to the view of Smyth and Clark, 1986) 
actually encourages hypothesis testing: a strategy which subjects appear 
to find difficult to execute correctly.
The easy version of the half-sisters problem (Smyth and Clark, 1986) 
illustrates more clearly than the THOG problem how subjects might 
represent the relation involved as a conjunctive one. The parents of a
htlf-sister aust be 'one of ay parents and a person who is not one of ay 
parents'. The presence of the disjunctive and asyametrical definition of 
a half-sister may prevent some subjects from understanding and 
representing the relation as s conjunctive one. This would explain why 
subjects fare worse on this problem, which does not require hypothesis 
testing, when the disjunctive rule is included. The formal statement of 
the rule may cue s strategy which is not the optimal one; not only for 
this easier problem, but also for the standard THOC problem if subjects 
who solve it tend to do so in the manner described above.
A way of investigating whether subjects do, in fact, reason in the 
way outlined above is suggested by the experiments of Griggs and Newstead 
(19B2). They pointed out that the features which are not written down, 
although implicit in any formulation of the problem, are not named or 
defined in the versions of the task usually presented to subjects. They 
suggested that this asyimetrical formulation of the problem is part of its 
difficulty. It is precisely in the formal statement of the rule that the 
asyametrical presentation is most apparent. It is also in this formal 
statement that the disjunctive relations between the elements of the 
problem are emphasized, at the expense of the conjunctive ones. The 
disjunctive and asynnetrical wording nay cue subjects to attempt the 
problem by forming alternative hypotheses; only to find that they are 
unable to decide between the alternatives. It will be recalled that 
subjects who generate the appropriate hypotheses, when instructed to do 
so, do not produce more correct solutions. If subjects who solve the 
problem correctly do so by first generating such hypotheses, then this 
finding is difficult to explain. On the other hand, if subjects who 
spontaneously solve the problem do so by following the conjunctive 
solution-path suggested above, then an instruction to generate the 
hypotheses would inhibit correct solutions, as msy the disjunctive and 
asymmetrical wording of the problem. Such features of the problem's
presentation asy cue the iogically valid t>ut deaanding hypothesia-testing 
strategy at the expense of the conjunctive solution-strategy »fhich 
subjects Might be more inclined to adopt and better able to follow.
If these considerations are brought to bear on the results of 
Cxperiaent 9, the possibility arises that subjects do better on the CARDS 
problea than on the THOG problem because they represent the relation 
between the cards in the conjunctive for* suggested above. They are not 
cued to think mainly of only one colour and one parity of the cards, nor 
of the disjunctive relation between them.
A more general objection to the 'cooibinatorial analysis' account of 
how subjects sometimes solve the THOG problem correctly is that the idea 
of a combinatorial analysis system in the mind may be open to the sane 
objections as that of a logic in the mind. With a full reprentation of a 
problem, a solution may be reached without the use of logical or 
combinatorial analysis. It nay be that whenever subjects solve the THOG 
problem correctly, they do so by seeking a solution which is consistent 
with a representation of the kind described above, in much the same way as 
Johnson-Lsird (1963) has suggested that they solve syllogistic and other 
types of problems.
Following from these considerations, the next experiment to be 
described will be concerned with investigating whether subjects perform 
better tWien the disjunctive and asymmetrical features of the THOG problem 
are removed. Removal of these features night cue the kind of 
representation suggested above, and the derivation of a solution from that 
representation.
Experiaent 10
It has been mentioned above that Griggs and Newstead (1982) concluded 
that the THOo problea is solved acre easily when the version of the 
problem presented to subjects explicitly names and defines both halves of 
its structure. In the case the standard THOC problea these halves consist 
of the items which are stated to be written down and the items ntfiich are 
not stated to be written down. In their experiments Griggs and Newstead 
(1982) used for comparison the standard THOG problem described above, 
which lacks any explicit mention of the colour and shape which have not 
been written down. They suggested that this asymmetrical formulation of 
the problem is a major source of its difficulty, and compared subjects' 
performance on an abstract version and some thematic versions of the 
problem (described below) which name and define, with equal emphasis, all 
of the items involved in the problem. Performance on these latter 
problems was found to be significantly superior to that on the original 
asymmetrical THOG problem. They concluded that this symmetrical 
presentation of the problems was responsible for the facilitation they 
observed. However, their fscilitatory problems differed in other respects 
from the THOG problem: notably in having conjunctive wording which could 
have cued subjects to adopt the conjunctive solution-path described above. 
Hence no unequivocal interpretation of their results is possible. In 
order to illustrate this point the confounding variables in their 
experiments will be described.
An examination of the wording used by Griggs and Newstead reveals 
that in every case in which a symmetrical rule was used and there was 
superior performance, the rule used was not only symmetrical but was also
expressed in a conjunctive fora. The conjunctive nature of the 
foraulations is not iwaediately apparent. For instance, it «ay take aore 
than one reading of the following exaaple of Griggs and hewstead's (1962) 
problems before it is realized that the word 'similarly' has the logical 
force of 'and', and is the principal logical connective in the problem.
In the drug problem (Griggs and ^ew8tead, 19B2; Experiment 1) the 
instruction was, "You must give the patients potassium either in an 
injection or orally every day, but of course you ptust not give them both 
the potassiun injection and the potassi<j» pill. Similarly, you must give 
the patients calcium but not both the calcium injection and the calcium 
pill". Subjects were shown the following table and told that Answer 1 
represented a correct combination.
Injection Drug
Answer 1 Deroxin Frisone
Answer 2 Deroxin Triblomate
Answer i Altanin Frisone
Answer 4 Altanin Triblornate
Subjects were asked whether each of the other three answers was 
correct or not. Clearly they were able to choose only among coabinations 
of an injection and a pill (misleadingly termed "Drug" in the table). The 
nieans of administration of the drug is not a variable which subjects need 
to consider in solving the problem. The instruction can therefore be 
summarized as "You must give the patients calciia* and potassium", since 
the content of the dose is all that subjects need to consider. Hence the 
disjunctive phrasing of "either in an injection or orally" is irrelevant 
to subjects' classification of the combinations of drugs. They merely 
have to classify combinations of two different drugs as correct, and two 
similar drugs as incorrect. In other words, the only relevant variable is 
the content of the drugs.
Not only arf syoitetrical foraulation and conjunctive foriwlation 
confounded in the problens used by Griggs and Newstead (1962) but, like 
the drug problem, the other problems all differ from the THOG problem in 
having only one variable. The THOG problem has two variablest colour and 
shape. This difference seems to make the problems easier, and prevents a 
valid comparison between performance on these problems and the THOC 
problem. In order to make it apparent that no clear conclusion can be 
drawn from the results of Griggs and Newstead (1962) it will be necessary 
to explain why their problems must be regarded as having important 
differences from the THOG problem: differences of which they were 
apparently unaware.
Their 'structured abstract problem' is very similar to the drug 
problem except that its content is more abstract. Griggs and Newstead 
describe it as follows: "The structured abstract problem required subjects 
to decide which pairs of nonsense syllables corresponded to 'correct' 
combinations of objects. Subjects were told that a correct combination 
must consist of one black and one white object, and that there must be one 
square and one circle. Squares and circles were given nonsense names, but 
the problem did not indicate which nonsense name corresponded to a white 
object and ntf^ ich to a black". In this problem colour and shape may both 
appear to be variables at first sight, but the four combinations which 
subjects are asked to classify are all said to contain one square (CHON or 
THIG) and one circle (GREF or WULP). Hence the only criterion on which a 
combination can be accepted or rejected is colour. Since two colours can 
be classified as the same or different, unlike a colour and a shape, the 
rule asks no more than that pairings of different colours should be 
accepted, as with the required pairing of different contents in the drug 
problem. Since there are two items of each colour, and CHON and GREF must 
be of different colours to be acceptable, it follows rather easily that
m s  and VULP 1b th« other correct coebinetlon.
A^ein there is only one variable in this probleei colour.
The 'structured diet problea' is identical to the diet problem 
(described below) except that the sandwiches contained either meat or 
cheese and the ladies were instructed to have laeat for one and only one 
meal, and to have cheese for one and only one neal. In this problea the 
only variable is the food item, neat or cheese; as in the case of the drug 
problem the only variable is the content, calcium or potassium. Hence a 
similar easy route to the solution could be described for these problems 
as for the structured-abstract problems. It is not possible to analyze 
the THOG problem in this way, since the content of the instances, 
combinations of a colour and a shape, precludes applying the description 
'different' or 'the same' to the pairs of content items. Hence there is 
an important semantic difference between Griggs and ^ewstead'8 problems 
and the standard THOG problem.
In their diet problem, unlike their other novel problems, Griggs and 
Newstead use a disjunctively and asymmetrically worded combinatorial rule, 
"You must have the two ounces of neat either for lunch or for dinner, but 
you must not have meat for both lunch and dinner". Subjects were told 
that two of four numbered sandwich boxes, one contained roast beef 
sandwiches, one ham sandwiches, one cheese sandwiches and one cucumber 
sandwiches. They were shown the following table end told that Joan had 
eaten a correct cosbination of sandwiches according to the instruction. 
Once again there is only one relevant variable: the food item, meat or 
non-meat.
Lunch Sandwich Dinner Sandwich 
Joan] Fro* Box 1 Fro« Box 3
Mary I Fron Box 1 Fron Box 4
Helen: Fro« Box 2 Fro« Box 3
Susan: Fro« Box 2 Fron Box 4
The diet problen resulted in 6 out of 21 correct responses when it 
was presented first, and 13 out of 21 when it followed the drug proble«, 
which had also elicited 13 out of 21 correct responses (Griggs and 
Sewstead, 1982; Cxperinent 1). In their Experiment 4 the standard THOG 
proble« was presented after the drug problen, but no facilitation was 
observed. Griggs and Vewstead argue that following the drug problem 
facilitation is obtained only with the diet problem because the diet 
problen resembles the drug problen more closely than does the THOG 
problem, thus permitting a transfer effect. They suggest that this is 
because the diet problem is semistructured, mentioning negatively the 
nonnaeat itens (cf; the features not written down in the THOG problem).
In fact the diet problem mentions exsctly as much as does the THOG 
problem. In the diet problen there are two meat items 'beef and 'ham', 
and two non-meat itens 'cheese' and 'cucumber', all of which are 
nentioned. In the THOG problem there are two colours 'black' and 'white', 
and two shapes 'diamond' and 'circle', all of which are mentioned. In the 
diet problen the rule is given in terms of the meat items alone, no 
mention being made of the non-meat items. Analogously, the THOC problen 
rule is presented solely in terns of the shape and colour which have been 
written down, no mention being made of those which have not been written 
do«a^ .
Hence Griggs and Newstead's explanation of the difference in transfer 
effect to the diet problem and the THOG problem following the drug problem 
does not appear to be soundly based. On the other hand, the drug problem
and diet problea ara aiailar, since they are both 'one variable' probleme: 
it is possible to say that a combination of neat and noonneat is a 
combination of 'different' items. The THOG problem is however a two 
variable problem: a combination of black and diamond is no more or leas 
'different' than a combination of black and circle etc. Hence the main 
respect in which the drug and diet problems are similar, and unlike the 
THOC problem, ia in the number of variables involved. It is apparently 
this feature which permits the transfer effect to occur.
It follows from the preceding remarks that, as suggested previously, 
it is not possible to conclude whether superior performance on the 
problems reported in Griggs and Mewstead (1962) is attributable to 
symmetrical presentation, conjunctive wording, the presence of a single 
variable or some coabination of these features. Indeed, the confounding 
with conjunctive wording is particularly suspect, since it has been 
established experimentally (Griggs and Newstead, 1983: Experiment 2) that 
conjunctive wording alone, as in the ANTl-THOG problem, where a THOG is 
defined as having both or neither of the written-dowi colour and shape, 
can elicit 45% of correct responses. It has also been pointed out that 
there is a possible conjunctive solution>path (see page 145} which 
subjects might use spontaneously in solving the problem. If such a 
solution can occur spontaneously, then it seems likely that conjunctive 
wording would cue more subjects to solve the problem in this way.
The present experiment was designed to examine the effects of 
symmetry and conjunctive wording on the THOG problem. The problems used 
had two variables, and involved four kinds of presentation of the problem: 
symmetrical conjunctive, symmetrical disjunctive, asymmetrical conjunctive 
and asymmetrical disjunctive.
Subjects were each presented with one of the four kinds of probiea 
named above. Hence comparisons of performance were between subjects.
Subjects
Ci9hty-nine undergraduates studying psychology at Keele University 
participated on a voluntary basis. They took part as three groups of 
approximately equal size.
The problems were presented on printed sheets. Each subject received 
a printed problem sheet showing the four designs at the bottom. Each 
sheet contained the following wording:
"At the bottom of the page are four designs: BLACK DIAHONO, WHITE 
DIAHOSD, BLACK CIRCLE and WHITE CIRCLE. You are to assine that 1 have 
written down the name of one of the colours (black or white) and one of 
the shapes (diamond or circle) on one piece of paper, and typed the name 
of the other colour and the other shape on a second piece of paper".
There followed one of the four rules described below; and the wording 
continued:
"I now tell you that the BLACK OIAMOhO is a TH(X1.
What can you say, if anything, about whether each of the other three 
designs is a THOC?
"Please write your answers in the spoaces below by putting:
6 tick if it is 8 TH X 
a cross "k", if it is not s THOG
s Question mark if you cannot say whether or not it is a THOC”.
The four rules were as follows:
Syasietrical conjunctive prohles (SC)
"If a design has both the colour I have written down and the shape I 
have typed, then it is called a TMOG. If a design has both the colour 1 
have typed and the shape I have written down, then it is called a THOC.
If a design has both the colour I have written down and the shape I 
have written do»r>, it is ^  a THOG. If a design has both the colour I 
have typed and the shape I have typed, it is not a THOC.
AsyMnetrical conjunctive probles (AC)
"If a design has the colour I have written down but not the shape I 
have written down, then it is called a THOG. If a design has the shape I
have written down but the colour I have written down, then it is
called a THOG.
If a design has both the colour and the shape I have written down 
then it is not a THOC. If a design has neither the colour f>or the shape 1 
have written down then it is not a THOG".
SysMetrical disjunctive problen (SO)
"If a design has e i U ^  the colour 1 have written down or the shape I
have typed, then it is called a THOC. If a design has either the colour 1
have typed or the shape 1 have written down, then it is called a THOG.
15>
ir s design has both the colour 1 have written down and the shape 1 
have typed, it is not a THOG. If a design has both the colour I have 
typed and tl« shape I have written down, it is no^ a THOG".
Asyimetrical disjunctive problem (AO)
"If a design has either the colour I have written down or the shape I 
have written down, then it is called a THOG.
If a design has both the colour 1 have written down and the shape 1 
have written down, it is no^ a THOG. If a design has neither the colour I 
have written down nor the shape 1 have written down, it is not a THOG".
Niote that the asynaetrical rules define a T H X  only in terms of the 
features which are written down, and the typed features are not mentioned. 
The syBMetrical rules define a T H X  in terms of written-down and typed 
features. The conjunctive rules define a THOG in terms of whether each of 
two features must be present or absent (as in the ANTl-THOG problem 
described near the beginning of this chapter) while the disjunctive rules 
define a THOG in terms of two features, one or the other (but not both) of 
which must be present. The features mentioned have been selected in such 
a way that all four rules are logically equivalent, and therefore the 
correct response to all four problems is the same. In the asymmetrical 
disjunctive rule a THOG is defined in the sane way as in the standard THOG 
problem described at the beginning of this chapter.
It is possible that the mention in the preliminary instructions of 
both the written and typed features may serve to cue the conjunctive 
solution-path suggested above, thus facilitating performance on all these 
versions of the problem. Hention of these features was retained in each 
condition in order not to introduce confounding between mention of typed
•nd Mritteo-doi«i features in the background inforaation and foraulation of 
the rule in terms of these features. This experiment therefore tests the 
hypothesis that synmetrical and conjunctive rule formulations are 
facilitstory in a context which includes positive mention of the typed 
features, rather than one which leaves them to be defined negatively as 
'not written down*. This is in contrast to the procedure adopted by 
Griggs and Newstead (1962) who do not distingish between rule formulation 
and problem context in the design and discussion of their experiments.
Subjects were asked to attempt the problem when they had understood 
the instructions. They were allowed as much time as they required to 
complete the problem.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Subjects responses were categorized according to whether they 
appeared to indicate the use of a correct solution strategy or took the 
form of one of the two kinds of intuitive error. Correct solutions were 
naturally included in the former category, ss were the responses described 
as 'near insight' by Wason and Brooks (1979): responses where the white 
circle is correctly classified as a THOG, but the subject is unable to 
decide how to classify the other two figures.
Frequency of four response types on four variants of the THOG problem
Correct Near Intuitive Others 
Insight Errors
Syfimetrical conjunctive 11 1 1 9
Asymaetrical conjunctive 6 2 i 10
Symmetrical disjifictive 7 3 10
Asymmetrical disjunctive 3
Inspection of Table 10.1 indicates that the effects of changing the 
standard (AO) THOG by including symnetrical presentation (SO) or 
conjunctive wording (AC) were very similar, doth of these modifications 
resulted in a fewer Intuitive errors. In addition, the 50 problem yielded 
4 more correct responses, while the AC problem yielded 3 more correct 
responses together with 2 responses indicating near insight.
For the purposes of statistical analysis the 3 near insight responses 
were combined with the numbers of completely correct responses. A 
chi-squared test indicated that the difference in performance on the two 
symmetrical problems (SC and SO) compared with the two asymmetrical 
problems (AC and AO) was significant at the p < 0.04 level. Hence the 
conclusion of Griggs and Newstead (1962) that symmetrical presentation is 
fácilitatory is supported in the case of an abstract THOG problem with two
Performance on the t«o conjunctively formulated problems (SC and AC) 
M6S significantly different fro<n that on the disjunctively worded problems 
(SO and AD) at the p < 0.02 level. This suggests that the unrecognized 
inclusion of this variable in the experiments of Griggs and \ewstead 
(1982) contributed to the size of the differences in performance which 
they observed.
The overall pattern of the results tends to confirm the earlier 
suggestion that both of these kinds of formulation cue subjects to adopt 
the conjunctive solution-path described above. It seems highly probable 
that subjects solve at least the symmetrical conjunctive problem in this 
way, without sny need for combinatorial analysis. If, as other 
researchers have supposed, correct solutions to the asymmetrical 
disjunctive standard THOG problem are reached by combinatorial analysis, 
then on the intermediate SO and AC problems some conflict should occur. 
Neither of the alternative solution^paths would be clearly cued by these 
intermediate problems, hence performance on these problems ought not to 
improve so much over performance on the standard THOG problem, and might 
even become worse due to the lack of a clear cue towards a particular 
solution-path. In fact, there were 4 fewer intuitive errors on each of 
the intermediate problems than on the AC problem, and 4 fewer again on the 
SC problem. Correct, or near correct, solutions increased by 4 and 5 on 
the intermediate problems (SO and AC), and by a further 3 and 4 on the SC 
problem. The cumulative and almost equal effects of synnetrical and 
conjunctive presentation might suggest that both of these isodifications of 
the problem cue the same solution strategy; and that the strategy 
concerned is, at least, one towards which subjects are not disinclined 
when presented with the standard THOG problem. It seems that both 
conjunctive and synnetrical presentation may elicit a fuller
representation of i4iat then amounts to a problem concerning a conjunctive 
relation. Hence features, such as symmetrical presentation, which can 
assist in representation may also make it easier to derive a solution from 
that representation using the conjunctive solution-path.
On a more general note, it appears that as a consequence of thinking 
about the THOG problem in terms of the application of mental logic, 
researchers have been led to believe that it requires 
hypothetico-deductive reasoning using conitinatorial analysis. It has not 
been appreciated that an adequate mental model nay be sufficient to allow 
a solution to be reached on the basis of the conjunctive relations which 
such a model must include. Subjects need not consciously reformulate the 
problem in conjunctive terms (athough such reformulation by the 
experimenter appears to help). The conjunctive relation between the 
features of a THOG is a logical property of such a model; but it is 
sufficient merely that subjects be able to perceive which combinations of 
features the model allows, and which are not permitted. As with the 
syllogistic and other problems considered by Johnson-Laird (1963), mental 
logic is not required to solve the THOG problem.
The above considerations may be brought to bear on the apparent 
difficulty of devising a version of the THOG problem which facilitates 
performance as a result of realistic and familiar content. In order to 
avoid the possibility of memory-cuing, the relation must not be a familiar 
one which is known to obtain between the content items. The use of 
nonsense words to describe the content should satisfy this memory-cuing 
constraint. Since the THOG problem can be based on a conjunctive relation 
and then reformulated in disjunctive and asymmetrical terms, many more 
possibilities arise than when it was thought that a realistic THOG problem 
must involve a naturally disjunctive relation, as opposed to a disjunctive 
verbal formulation. If a sufficiently familiar conjunctive relation is
used, and rediscribed in disjunctive tem, this should cue subjects to use 
the conjunctive solution-path suggested above.
The suggested experiment has yet to be carried out, but here is a 
suggestion of how it might be done. It would first be necessary to decide 
upon a familiar conjunctive relation which could be embodied in a task in 
such a way that the problem would be isomorphic with the THOG problem. A 
common type of conjunctive relation is that between an animal and the kind 
of food it eats} 'dog and meat' for example. If the animal is kept in a 
pen and it is desired to control the amount that it eats, one could make 
it a rule that the pen should contain either the dog or the store of meat, 
but not both. This particular rule could not be used in the problem 
because it contains a memory cue, since most people would recall that dogs 
eat meat. However, nonsense names may be used for animala and their food 
to yield a THOG isomorph such as that which follows.
1 have two animals, a CHON and a GREF, which I keep in separate pens. 
One of them eats only WHIP and one eats only THIG, but 1 am not telling 
you which animal eats which kind of food.
Because of lack of space 1 have to store the animals' food in their 
pens; but if I keep an animal with its own kind of food it will eat too 
much and become ill. 1 therefore make it a rule that a pen must contain 
either a particular animal or its own kind of food, but not both together. 
I now tell you that it is correct, according to my rule, to keep the CHON 
and the WULP in the same pen. What can you say about whether it is 
correct to keep the three other combinations listed below in the same pen.
Animal Food
CHON WULP —  Correct
CHON THIG ---
GREF WULP —
GREF THIG —
This problem has two variables! the type of aniisal and the type of 
food. The relevant rule is formulated disjunctively, and it is asyanetric 
since it does not mention the other type of aniasl or the food appropriate 
to it. Kor is memory-cuing a possibility. In fact it differs from the 
THOG problem in only one essential feature: there ia a familiar relation 
involved between an animal and 'its own kind of food'.
Since the experiment has not yet been carried out, it is left to the 
reader to decide whether this problem appears to invite the construction 
and testing of alternative hypotheses. There appears to be little basis 
for such a conclusion, and the problem looks so easy that it might be 
doubted whether it is isomorphic with the THOG problem. However, it is 
only necessary to substitute 'design' for 'pen, 'THOG' for a correctly 
filled pen, 'colour' for 'animal', 'black' and 'white' for 'CHOI^ ' and 
'GRCP, 'shape' for 'food' and 'diamond' and 'circle' for 'WULP' and 
'THIG' in order to transform this problem into the THOG problem. The 
relation between an animal and its own kind of food is logically the same 
as the relation between the written-down colour and shape in the THOG 
problem. This problem looks easy simply because there is a familiar 
relation between an animal and its food which does not obtain between a 
shape and a colour. This may well be sufficient to cue the optimal 
conjunctive solution-path described above.
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION
In Chapter 1 the question m s s  raisedi 'Under what conditions do 
educated adults fail to give correct responses to formal problems?'.
Formal problems are problems to which the solutions depend only on the 
relations between their content items as determined by the syntactical 
structure of their premises. Hence in cases where subjects do not form a 
representation of the premises on the basis of their syntactical form, 
errors will occur and correct responses will be adventitious. In 
Experiment 3 it was shown that even when the syntactic structure of the 
premises is not particularly complex, additional semantic information may 
prevent syntactically based solutions by making the syntactic information 
appear irrelevant. In Experiment 4 it was shown that a sentence may be 
comprehended on the basis of pragmatic factors rather than its syntactic 
structure. Many of the erroneous responses to the selection task and T H X  
problem have been attributed to the use of a matching strategy: a 
pragmatically based heuristic the use of which leads to responses which 
accord with relevance judgements. It was shown in Experiment 1 that, 
particularly when content items are perceived as binary, many of the 
responses previously thought to be a result of a verification strategy are 
in fact the result higher-order matching.
It appears that the only way to ensure that responses are made on the 
basis of the syntactic features of a problem is to express the problem in 
a form which is sufficiently simple to allow truth-functional inferences 
to be made using semantic composition: what have been referred to as 
'direct inferences'. An example of this has been observed when the 
selection task is expressed as a positive disjunction, in which case the 
majority of responses are correct and are not attributable to matching
bias. Further exanples of this kind of facilitation nay be afforded by 
the prevelance of correct solutions to the AhTl-THOG problen with its 
conjunctive fomulation and the conjunctively and synnetrically formulated 
versions of the THOG problen in Experiment 10.
Another way to raise the probability of correct responses is to make 
the pragmatic relations between the content items familiar ones which are 
isomorphic or congruent with the syntactic relations. (Pragmatically based 
Judgements about those relations will then be more salient than Judgements 
concerning the relevance of content items. Hence correct responses based 
on those relations will be more frequent, as illustrated by performance on 
the Sears problem, and as hypothesired on the 'animals and food* problem 
suggested above.
Alternatively the syntactic form of the premises may be manipulated 
in such a way that the probable relevance Judgements correspond to the 
logically correct responses, and no alternative pragmatic relations 
between the content items are suggested. For example, the 'Not both p and 
not-d' formulation of the selection task tends to elicit correct responses 
because responses made on the basis of a (higher-order) matching strategy 
coincide with the logically correct responses. The infrequency of correct 
responses to the NOT-ANTI-THOG problem might appear to constitute an 
exception to this since matching responses would coincide with the correct 
responses to this problem. However, it is a principal contention of this 
thesis that matching bias is a linguistically based bias which is 
sensitive to sentential context and, in particular, to negation. Hence 
»^en subjects are given a negative example, as in the NOT-ANTl-THOG 
problem (the black diamond is not a THOG) they are unable to decide how it 
relates to the conjunctive rule. This linguistic penetrability of 
matching bias lends support to the view that it ia a linguistically based 
bias, and is not a last resort strategy in response to logical bafflement.
Another factor which appears to ailitate against correct solutions is 
the unfsniliarity of the syntax used in formulating the selection task and 
the THOG problem. Formal statements of the rule appear to increase the 
error rate in the THOG problem (Smyth è Clark, 1986)( and subjects in 
Experiment i above gave many more correct responses when they formulated 
the selection task rule for themselves. In addition, formulations similar 
to those produced by subjects in Experiment 3 elicited many more correct 
solutions from other subjects than did the standard formulation of the 
selection task rule in Experiment 6 . This suggests that in everyday 
linguistic interactions, the participants are principally concerned to 
communicate in ways which are pragmatically effective. The features of a 
state-cif-affairs which are perceived as salient and relevant to a 
communicator are likely to be the features mentioned in the communication. 
Similarly, a communicator is likely to formulate the coamunication in such 
a way that its truth-functional implications can immediately be seen.
Hence if the recipients of such communications base their understanding on 
the pragmatic force of the communication, they will be unlikely to 
misunderstand what the communicator intends. Indeed, the partial 
redundancy of the syntactic form of a communication means that 
communications may be understood correctly even if they contain 
grammatical mistakes. Hence communications containing such mistakes tend 
to produce awareness of the presence of those mistakes rather than 
misunderstanding of the intended message.
By undertaking the present research in the spirit of enquiry into the 
conditions under which errors are made it has been possible to avoid 
classifying those errors in advance. In particular, there has been little 
motivation to assume that such errors are 'logical errors' although, in sn 
evaluative sense, they might legitimately be so described. It would 
appear that commitment to an evaluative approach to human reasoning may
have been responsible for the view that there is a logic in the mind.
The 'mental logic' based presuppositions and conclusions concerning 
performance on the selection task and the THOG problem have been sho««n to 
have little empirical justification. Explanations of performance on the 
selection task in terms of logical bafflement and verification have been 
shown to have largely spurious empirical support derived from experiments 
in which confounding variables tend to be implicated. Using an easier 
problem, and even turning the task into one of comprehension alone, does 
not prevent responding on the basis of relevance Judgements and pragmatic 
features of the task. Hence logical bafflement does not appear to be 
responsible for the similarly based matching responses.
In the case of the THOG problem, the empirical evidence has been 
shown to favour, once again, an explanation of the commonest responses in 
terms of a linguistically based matching strategy. The evidence which has 
a bearing on the psychological reality of the presupposed logical solution 
strategy suggests that subjects do not reason in this way about the THOG 
problem. Instructions to list the possible combinations of written-down 
items have not been facilitatory, and neither has the inclusion of an 
actual disjunctive relation which obtains between the parents of a 
person's half-sisters. By contrast, explicit mention of the iteias which 
are not written down (the items said to have been 'typ>ed' in Experiment 
1 0 ) has been facilitatory; yet these items are not involved in the 
disjunctive relation which is central to the original formulation of the 
problem. In addition, conjunctive formulation of the problem contributed 
further facilitation. All of this evidence suggests that the stategy 
which comes naturally to subjects is the proposed conjunctive solution, 
based on a representation of the problem in the fora of a mental model.
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TICNAMC PROeiCMS
Kick IS spending h is  s im e r  h o lid ay s  f r u i t  p ick ing . Ih e  farm er he works 
fo r  i s  v e ry  keen th a t  only f r u i t  i n  p e r f e c t  co n d itio n  should  be p icked , to  
avoid  w estege . He t e l l s  Ride t o  }udge th e  c o n d itio n  by th e  co lo u r.
Oi each  ol th e  f o l lo o n g  fou r p ag es i s  a  d iag rad  s iM ila r  t o  t h a t  shown 
below showing fou r c a rd s . Each h a s  th e  co lo u r  o f  a  f r u i t  on one s id e  and 
I t s  c o n d itio n  on the ocher s id e ,  lu o  o f  th e  card s stew  th e  f r u i t ' s  co lour 
uppermos t ,  and have i t s  c o n d itio n  on th e  o th e r  s id e . I t e  o th e r  two show 
th e  c o n d itio n  uppermost, and have Che co lo u r  on th e  ocher s id e .
Eteh d iagesH  i s  accoi|>anied by a  s en ten o e  a m a r i z i n g  t h a t  Che farm er t e l l s  
R id i ab o u t th e  f r u i t  t o  id iich  th e  c a rd s  on t h a t  pege r e f e r .  Your ta sk  i s  
t o  d ec id e  which o f  th e  card s ^ u  would n sed  t o  tu rn  over in  o ed sr  to  f ind  
o u t kdiethcr th e  farmer i s  r ig h t  i n  w hat ha says about th e  f r u i t .
P lea se  p u t e  t id e  U) below th e  bOK(t) rep reeen tin g  th e  csxds you would 
need t o  t u r n  o v er in  o rd e r t o  d ec id e  w hether th e  farm er i s  c o r ra c t  o r  n o t, 
and a  ex o ss (x l bel9< th o se  you would n o t  need t o  tu rn  o v e r. P lease  work 
through th e  boo k le t fra*  f ro n t  t o  beck, and do n o t change any answer s f c e r  
you have looked a t  a  l a te r  page. You eey  r e f e r  back t o  t h i s  pege i f  
n ece ssa ry . Begin a s  soon a s  you a r e  read y .
WíSTRACI BINARY RftOBltMS
Illustrated below are four cards, two showing a letter 'B' or 'C' and two 
stowing a nunticr '3' or *4'. lYtese cards are taken fren a pack in wtuch 
every card has a letter 'h' or 'C on one side and a noiter *3' or '4' on 
the other. Hence each card showing a letter upperrost has a nwt»r *3* or 
'4' on the other side, and each card showing a muter uppennost has a 
letter 'B' or 'C' on the other side.
@ 0 i 0
Oi each of the following four pages is a similar diagram together with 
a statement about what symbols appear cn the four cards. Your task is to 
decide which of the cards you would need to turn over in order to find out 
whether the statement is true or false.
Please put a tick {</) below the bGK(s) representing the cards you 
would need to turn ever in order to decide whether the statement on that 
page is true or false, and a cross (x) below those you would not need to 
turn ever.
Please work through the booklet fron frent to bade, and do not change 
any answer after you have looked at a later page. You may refer back to 
this page if necessary. Begin as soon as you are ready, and when you have 
finished please answer the question below.
ABSTRACT HULTIPLE PROBLEMS
Illustrated below are four cards, two showing a letter and two showing a 
nster. These cards are taken froa a pack in which every card has a letter 
cn one side and a nunter on the other. Hence eadi card showing a letter 
tfspenrost tus a nisrber on the other side, and each card showing a mnber 
upperaost has a letter on the other side.
i] 0 m 0
O) each of the following four pages there is a diagran showing four such 
cards together with a stateicnt about «^t symbols appear on then. Your 
task is to decide which of the four cards you would n ^  to turn over in 
order to find out whether the statsnent is true or false.
Please put a tick i/) below the bCDc(s) representing the cardit) you 
would need to turn over in order to decide whether the statanent cn that 
page is true or false, and a cross (x) below those you would not need to 
turn over.
Please work through the booklet fran front to back, and do not <hange 
any answer after you have looked at a later page. You ray refer bade to 
this page if necessary. Begin as soon as you are ready.

CXirir)9 the course of this experiineot you will often be ssked to press 
'Return' to continue. The 'Return' key is on the right of the keyboard. 
Please press 'Return' no«.
>
Thank you. Soaetiaes you «ill be asked to type in an answer. When 
you have finished typing your answer it will always be necessary to press 
'Return' in order to continue. Please press 'Return' again.
>
If you aake a aistake when typing an answer» you aay return to the 
point at which the aistake was aade by pressing the key with an arrow 
pointing to the left. It is just below and to the left of the 'Return* 
key.
If you change your nind about the whole answer press 'Return' and you 
will be given the chance to start again.
Press 'Return' to continue.
>
Please type your answer to the following question, reaeabering to 
press 'Return' afterwards.
What is your first naae?
>
Thank you <naine as entered>.
What is your last name?
That is the end of the preliainary instructions. If any of the 
details which follow are not at first clear you aay refer to then again by 
looking at the printed sheet on iWiich they are repeated. If anything 
renains unclear, please ssk the experiaenter for clarification.
Please imagine you are playing a card gaae in «Wiich you are allowed 
to write down an instruction which will tell your partner whether to 
accept each of four pairs of cards. He will draw the first card of each 
pair froa a pack of letter cards, and the second froa a pack of nuaber 
cards.
The first card will always be 'B' or 'C'« and the second card will 
always be *3' or '4*.
Press ’Return' to continue.
>
Below is a table showing the four possible coatiinations of synbols on 
the pairs of cards, and whether the pair should be accepted.
B 3 Accept
B 4 Do not accept
C 3 Do not accept
C 4 Do not accept
More rules are to follow, and you will be shown this table again. 
Press 'Return' to continue.
>
When giving the instruction you oust not type 'C  or '4'. You will 
also lose points if you laention 'B* or '3* more than you need, although 
you isust B»ntion the* as *any tines as necessary in order to make the 
instruction clear to your partner.
Press 'Return* to continue.
>
In addition to reneabering not to mention 'C or '4', and to mention 
'B' and '3' as few tines as possible, you should also try to make sure 
that your instruction is precise, so that anyone looking at the four pairs 
of cards, as in the example, would be able to say of every pair whether it 
should be accepted or not.
Press 'Return' to continue.
Tor example "Accept B and 3" is not sufficient since it is
uninformative about the other pairs. "Accept 6 and 3 only" is better, but 
it is not clear whether it refers to the pair ' 6  3* or to 'B' and '3' 
individually. Therefore, a better instruction would be "Accept only the 
pair 'B 3'". Another good answer is "The letter must be B, and the number 
must be 3".
Press 'Return' to continue.
>
Alternatively "Do not accept any pair except ' 6  3'" is also clear.
In these cases it would be possible to decide about the acceptability of 
all four pairs from these instructions. 'B' and '3' are mentioned only 
once, so these instructions mention them as little as possible.
Press 'Return' to continue.
>
In giving your instructions you may use similar wording to that used 
in these examples, or you may depart from it completely. The main thing 
is that the instruction must be completely clear to you.
Press 'Return' to continue.
>
Here is the table again. Please type in your instruction in your own 
words.
6 3 Accept 
B 4 Do not accept
C 3 Do not accept
C 4 Do not accept
Hy instruction is:
If you are sure that you instruction is clear enou9h for soaeone to 
draw up the table given only the four possible pairs of cardSt press 'Y', 
otherwise press 'H' to try again.
>
< The four conditional tables mentioned in the main text were then 
presented in randomized order in a similar manner to the above, and the 
responses stored on a disc. The second part of the experiment then 
commenced.)
Thank you < naine as entered >. Please wait for a moment. Now it is 
your turn to be the other partner in the game. This time the letter cards 
are 'V and 'W and the number cards are *6 ' and *7'. Please ask the 
experimenter for an instruction sheet relating to this second section. 
Please press 'Return* when you are ready to continue.
>
As the other partner in the game you have drawn four pairs of cords, 
but one card of each pair is face down. Your task is to say which of the 
face-down cards must be turned over in order for you to decide whether to 
accept the pair of which it is a member. Face-down cards will be 
indicated by
Press 'Return' to continue.
>
For each paired face-doiwt card which you would need to turn over in 
order to decide tether the pair is acceptable, type the symbol on the 
card with which it is paired. If you think that none of the face-down 
cards needs to be turned over, type 'none'.
Press 'Return* for an example.

The instruction isi
If the letter is 'V, then the nunber is *6V
The csrdc paired with the following must be turned over:
>
The instruction in the above exanple could have been any one of the 
four standard wording or four subject'a wording conditionals. The 
remaining seven problems were then presented in the same way in randomized 
order and the responses stored on disc.
Appendix C
Examples of three subjects' own forinulstions in response to the "If 
the letter is 'B', then the number is '3'" table in Experiment 3. 
The table is shown below and is the first table on page 82.
) 3 Accept 
) 4 Do not accept 
C 3 Accept 
C 4 Accept


